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2As India actively aspires to shape its security environment in South Asia and beyond, the future set of demands on the Indian 
military will be heavily influenced by its evolving 
global and regional environment. India is situated 
in a difficult neighbourhood where security threats 
are expected and predictable but can also be 
unexpected and unforeseen. Combined with the 
increasing need to project power in the extended 
neighbourhood, this extended threat spectrum 
posits a new challenge.
Future threats and conflicts cannot be won 
by copying past responses and older means of 
warfare. India’s current defence spending priorities 
are, however, heavily weighted towards traditional 
means of war-fighting and conventional modes 
of deterrence. Current postures favour large-scale 
conflict in the form of a “two-front war”— an 
almost negligible forward presence, limited lower-
end and versatile assets, and a lack of strategically 
mobile forces — which leaves India with limited 
options in responding to contemporary limited-
intensity operations, like missions such as non-
combatant evacuation, disaster relief, small-scale 
raids, and combat search and rescue. 
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3Budgetary constraints also mean that the armed 
forces will not be able to invest in technological 
solutions wholly to leapfrog their war-fighting 
capabilities. Adapting legacy platforms to the 
changing requirements and bringing innovations 
in war-fighting doctrines and strategies will be 
the key in dramatically increasing the range and 
precision of the Indian armed forces to observe, 
nominate, and prosecute targets.
The government and the armed forces need to 
prepare themselves for this challenge. The Defence 
Primer will lead off from the principal challenges 
to India — long, disputed, and militarised borders 
with Pakistan and China — and further explore 
visible technological and capability gaps vis-à-vis 
the ever-widening threat spectrum. It will also 
address India’s ambitions as net security provider in 
the Indian Ocean and the technological/ doctrinal 
innovations required for those capabilities.
Strategic Flexibility & 
Presence 
India’s military capabilities will have to keep pace 
with its diplomatic outreach and geopolitical 
ambitions. In a fast-changing global scenario, the 
military deployments of the future will be dictated 
by challenges that may not be limited by traditional 
boundaries of a nation-state. These challenges, 
when coupled with conventional challenges, 
are likely to create deployment scenarios which 
need wide-ranging military tactics and platforms. 
They may at times seem redundant, but military 
capabilities cannot be created in a short period of 
time. Moreover, the best way to prevent a future 
conflict is to be prepared for it. 
The Indian military thus needs to better invest 
in a diverse range of dynamic forces and assets 
to effectively counter adversary challenges along 
the full spectrum of conflict, particularly in those 
contests that may occur below its conventional 
strategic thresholds. Effective deployment, both 
in terms of speed and distance, is probably the 
greatest contemporary challenge facing the Indian 
military. As such, it may be useful to consider how 
the rapidity of a force deployment serves the policy 
objectives for which armed force is needed. Rapid 
deployment capability is expensive and weighing 
the costs involved in obtaining this capability 
against the benefits it accrues is therefore crucial.
Key in building on the potential to deploy and 
operate out of area will be Indian access to certain 
military bases in the region — like Diego gracia, 
Djibouti, Bahrain and the Australian Coco 
(Keeling) and Christmas Islands — to extend 
out-of-area humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief as well as anti-submarine warfare operations. 
Agreements like the Logistics Exchange 
Memorandum of Agreement with the United 
States, hold the potential to enable and extend 
these operations deep into the Indian Ocean. 
While mutual consent is a tenet of the agreement, 
Indian access to certain foreign bases would be 
mutually reinforcing, and is worth exploring given 
the potential to reduce the demands for logistical 
ships and tanker aircraft when combat assets need 
to be deployed. 
If India intends to protect maritime approaches 
into the Indian Ocean at the Malacca Straits, 
Sundra Straits and the gulf of Aden developing 
partnerships in the region needs to be central in its 
ambitions of sea control and maritime denial.  
To do this in the short term (10-15 years), the 
Indian Navy will need to build up the ability to 
consistently maintain a deployed presence at key 
approaches in the Indian Ocean Region and the 
capability to monitor and prosecute targets in 
wide swathes across this space. Maintaining an 
approximate 3.0 presence (i.e., three platforms 
on station 12 months out of the year) in ships/
submarines and anti-submarine/anti-surface 
warfare aircraft in the Bay of Bengal and the 
4Platforms bay of bengal arabian Gulf
Submarine 3 (9) 3 (9)
Surface Combatant 3 (9) 3 (9)
Maritime Patrol Aircraft 4 (12) 2 (6)
*Deploying one platform requires one more in maintenance and one in training.
Arabian gulf hence remains critical to Indian 
foreign policy and defence posturing. 
Aviation assets and platforms supporting and 
complimenting them will remain key in giving 
New Delhi the reach it wishes to acquire. There 
is a corresponding need for acquiring force-
multipliers and developing tactics to maximise 
the potential of such expensive platforms. Current 
disjointed procurement plans of aviation assets 
between all three services (Indian Air Force, Navy 
and Army) and the complete disregard for fleet 
standardisation by reducing the number of aircraft 
types have resulted in logistics-heavy platforms 
and little interoperability. These are important 
considerations because fleet standardisation 
reduces maintenance, training costs and improves 
interoperability/combined arms operations and 
platform availability for deployments. 
The current organisational structure of the Indian 
armed forces, where each defence service operates 
in its own silo, is not conductive to joint military 
action. Jointness in command at theatre level is an 
eventuality that needs to be imbibed by the three 
services at the earliest. A future challenge cannot 
be met without a unified military head — not 
merely an advisor or coordinator — providing 
direct support to the top political leadership. The 
current government has repeatedly spoken about 
creating such a post, and clearly joined the debate 
on this subject.
This debate is especially urgent as jointness is linked 
to the funding issue which will drive New Delhi’s 
cooperative sourcing of capabilities. India’s defense 
preparedness and capability-development efforts 
will ultimately depend on building an efficient 
system of defense procurement, indigenous 
5production capability, and acquisition reform in 
order to sustain this modernisation. 
The fundamental issue relates to the quantum of 
funds allocated for national security, and the share 
of those funds for defence modernisation. While 
the defence budget has fallen to about 1.7% of 
India’s gDP, a larger share of funds is now being 
allocated towards salaries, pensions and other 
operating expenses. The shrinking amount for 
capital expenditure is leaving the military short of 
its desired state of modernisation. Reforms have 
been initiated to streamline the procurement and 
acquisition process, and create indigenous defence 
development and production capacities, but 
these will do little to ameliorate the current state 
of military equipping in the immediate future. 
The capabilities for the future, even if thought 
through and accepted by the government, can 
only be acquired if adequate resources are made 
available for them. This needs a change in mindset 
and approach, which can be expected from this 
government, which is showing greater signs of 
acting on India’s geopolitical ambitions.
The challenge to achieve the blue sky capabilities 
that are required under various circumstances and 
in different aspects as discussed in this primer, will 
be predicated on a stark assessment of the current 
state of play and an honest appraisal of the means 
available with the country. The Primer hopes to act 
as a catalyst for ideas and options for India’s security 
community as the Indian military goes through a 
number of structural and technological changes. 
6Poised to be the third largest economy by 2030 after US and China, India’s force structures and military capabilities are far 
below expectations.1 Not just in comparison with 
the two world powers, vis-à-vis whom the gap is too 
wide to fill anytime soon, but also when assessed 
against New Delhi’s regional threat perception. For 
example, the inability of India’s “surgical strikes”2 
and diplomatic activism to quell cross-border 
terrorism from Pakistan and a costly purchase of 
36 Rafale multirole fighter aircraft from France 
to fill the shrinking operational strength of the 
Indian Air Force underline the twin failures facing 
India’s defence planning.3  
Firstly, despite growing economic and military 
capacities in absolute terms, India’s defence 
“capability” (or enablers) remains underdeveloped. 
This is as much an issue of lacking the required 
technology (both hardware and software) to deal 
with a widening threat-spectrum, as much it is 
about outdated military doctrines and strategies. 
Secondly, though a long-term issue of wider 
scope, India needs to start developing its defence 
industrial base at a much faster a rate than it has 
demonstrated the will for. Instead of proposing 
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a force outlay for India in 2030, this article 
concentrates on the various issues India faces today. 
Resolving some of these issues and addressing 
others, the article argues, will put India in a much 
better position to contain threats by 2030 instead 
of bogging down by “bean counting” exercises. 
The first section offers an overview of India’s 
evolving regional security environment, with 
emphasis on China and Pakistan. The reason 
for this is the endurance and potency of threats 
from these countries as opposed to instability 
in Afghanistan or Bangladesh, insecurity in the 
Indian Ocean, and cyber activism of the Islamic 
State elements. The second section highlights 
India’s existing doctrines and equipping the state 
to meet these threats. The third section analyses 
the state of India’s defence enablers such as Special 
Forces, interoperability and jointness, and C4ISR 
(command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).4 It 
advocates sharpening these enablers on one hand, 
and developing India’s defence industrial base with 
emphasis on R&D on the other.  
India’s Strategic Adversaries 
China and Pakistan have dominated India’s security 
and foreign policy thinking since Independence. 
Despite moments of conciliation, relations with 
Pakistan continue to remain tormented—and 
the trend is unlikely to reverse anytime soon. For 
instance, in December 2015, after a gap of over 
a decade, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
paid a surprise visit to Lahore in Pakistan. Coming 
in context of heavy firing along the Line of Control 
(LoC), the move was cautiously celebrated and 
viewed as a step in the direction of peace. Another 
surprise breakthrough in Bangkok (Thailand), 
where the National Security Advisors of the two 
countries held talks, led to the institution of a 
Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. 
Prone to accidents, however, the dialogue broke 
down when four heavily armed militants attacked 
the Pathankot Air Force Station on January 2, 
2016.5 While Indian policymakers scurried for 
a response, militants associated with the Jaish-e-
Mohammad (JeM) executed the “deadliest attack 
on the security forces in Kashmir in two decades” 
in Uri in September 2016,6 killing 19 Indian 
soldiers. This time, New Delhi openly responded 
by undertaking the aforementioned ‘surgical 
strikes’, wherein teams of Special Forces allegedly 
destroyed ‘launch pads’ along the LoC used by 
militants to infiltrate into Kashmir. Though 
not new, this was the first time India publicly 
announced an operation, signalling a shift in 
intent on how it plans to deal with cross-border 
attacks.7  
The surgical strikes, followed by escalation of 
violence along the LoC and India’s diplomacy to 
isolate Pakistan seems to be failing. As was visible 
in the 2016 BRICS Summit in goa, neither 
Russia nor China were interested in entertaining 
Indian concerns. If anything, Indian armed 
forces lost nearly 89 soldiers in 2016 alone due 
to cross-border attacks,8 prompting sections of 
the media to term it annus horribilis for soldiers 
posted in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The total 
number of casualties in the state for the period 
2005-2016 stood at 6,012 (including civilians and 
militants)9—a sizeable figure when viewed in the 
backdrop of an existing ceasefire agreement since 
2003 (the casualties were higher in the 1990s).10 
Pakistan’s strategy of keeping India off-balance 
and strategically frustrated, from this perspective, 
has been effective. 
Supported by Pakistan’s military establishment, 
which firmly controls the country’s foreign and 
security policy, a variety of militant actors are 
active in J&K (and in Afghanistan against the 
Kabul government as well as India). While the 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is most powerful of these, 
others such as the JeM and the haqqani Network 
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(an Afghanistan-oriented group that helps LeT 
execute attacks against Indian installation in 
Afghanistan) form panoply of militant outfits 
threatening India. Deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s 
domestic sociopolitical landscape, clamping down 
on these groups can be exorbitantly costly for the 
Pakistani army. Therefore, even in the best-case 
scenario, where their capabilities are systematically 
degraded, these groups are likely to thrive till 
2030. 
A terrorist attack similar to 26/11—with or 
without clearance from the Pakistani security 
establishment—would most likely lead to war 
between the two countries, even if under the 
nuclear umbrella. The violent status quo along 
the LoC ever since the “surgical strike”, in this 
context, plays into the hands of the Pakistani army 
without inflicting serious operational costs on 
them. Not only does it keep the Kashmir Valley 
on the boil, it also undermines India’s plan of 
using sustained military and diplomatic coercion 
as punishment, and shifts India’s focus away from 
its developmental goals. 
As the former Pakistani COAS general Raheel 
Sharif said before stepping down from office, 
“India should know that mistaking our policy 
of patience for weakness would be dangerous”.11 
Though India views it as rhetoric, coming from 
one of the most powerful and celebrated army 
chief in the history of Pakistan, the statement 
was loaded with intent, especially in light of the 
irrelevance of India’s conventional superiority over 
Pakistan. Islamabad’s expanding nuclear arsenal, a 
strategic weapons system that Islamabad wants to 
deploy even for tactical purposes, affords cover for 
asymmetric warfare, severely limiting New Delhi’s 
policy options (short of full-scale war). 
Even in the conventional domain, despite 
outmatching Pakistan by a ratio of 3.5:1 in per 
soldier expenditure, and fielding 1,346,000 active 
soldiers against Pakistan’s 644,000, India may 
not be able to overwhelm Pakistan.12 Factors 
ranging from terrain and favourable deployment 
of Pakistani forces to a complete lack of surprise 
in most conflict scenarios, mitigate the few 
technological advantages India has over Pakistan. 
Thus, as noted by scholar Walter C. Ladwig III, 
“Indian policymakers cannot be confident that 
even a limited resort to military force would 
achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-
condition for deterrence failure”.13 
Pakistan’s relationship with China offers strategic 
cover for its activities against India. Though 
longstanding, the strategic value of this relationship 
has increased (at least for Pakistan) in the wake 
of US tilt towards India, worsening relations 
with Islamabad, rivalry with China, and strained 
Sino-Indian relations. While there is good reason 
for skepticism about the extent to which Beijing 
would support overt aggression from Pakistan, 
there are equally valid concerns that China’s 
increasing economic footprint in Pakistan—in the 
form of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) that comes under the umbrella of the 
One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) development 
strategy—would make Beijing a stakeholder 
in a future India-Pakistan conflict. Though the 
viability of CPEC, given Pakistan’s precarious 
domestic security situation, is under doubt, China 
is unlikely to reduce its developmental footprint 
in Pakistan by 2030. 
In the military sphere, Pakistan accounts for 35 
per cent of China’s defence exports, making it the 
largest recipient of Chinese equipment.14 The two 
countries recently signed a USD 5 billion deal for 
transfer of eight conventional attack submarines 
(Chinese Navy’s Type 039 and Type 041 Yuan-
Class), half of which would be supplied by 2023 
and the rest by 2028.15 In 2015, China promised 
to deliver 110 JF-17 Thunder jets, a lightweight 
single-engine multi-role combat aircraft, of which 
nearly 50 would be supplied by early 2019.16 When 
viewed in context of India’s ageing fighter aircraft 
Filling the Capability Deficit
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and submarine fleet—India shelved the Scorpene 
submarine deal with France after a serious data 
leak17—such Chinese support to Pakistan helps 
reduce (if not overhaul) the conventional military 
gap between India and Pakistan by 2030. 
Fluctuations in India’s own relationship with 
China exacerbates these concerns. Beijing’s 
muted response to Pakistan’s sponsoring of 
cross-border terrorism and proactive stalling of 
Indian attempts for membership of the Nuclear 
Suppliers group (NSg) have been two critical 
issues. Similar to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif ’s celebrated 2014 visit, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping visited New Delhi and met Modi in 
September 2014. however, instead of becoming a 
historical breakpoint, the visit was sabotaged as a 
1,000-strong contingent of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) crossed into southern Ladakh.18 
India responded by dispatching a 1,500-strong 
counterforce of its own, and called off talks unless 
status quo was restored. Not only did China refuse 
to clarify the Line-of-Actual Control as asked by 
Modi, but little emerged from the visit. 
Beijing’s proactive courting of India’s neighbours 
and moves in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 
increases India’s strategic anxieties. In addition 
to seeking development of the gwadar port 
(Pakistan), the hambantota port (Sri Lanka), the 
Kyaukphyu port (Myanmar), and strengthening 
trade and political relations with both Bangladesh 
and Nepal, China recently invested in its first-
ever IOR port in Djibouti.19 Despite India’s access 
to Sittwe (Myanmar), Seychelles and Mauritius 
among other ports, the rate of Chinese expansion 
in the IOR puts stress on India’s “port diplomacy”. 
India’s capacity crunch is somewhat visible 
in Japan’s intervention to jointly develop the 
Chabahar port in Iran, which New Delhi views as 
strategically critical for access to Iranian, Afghan, 
and Central Asian markets.20  
In background briefings to journalists and analysts, 
Indian officials confess that the Sino-Indian 
relationship is undergoing its most difficult phase 
since 1962. Though the special envoys of the two 
countries have met frequently, and so have the 
National Security Advisors, there is little visible 
progress. Beijing’s support for Pakistan’s bid for 
NSg membership adds insult to injury. While 
intelligent and effective diplomacy from both 
sides can arrest this trend, the structural disparities 
between the two countries are increasing. In the 
economic sector, for instance, of the robust 
bilateral trade figure of USD 70.73 billion, India’s 
trade deficit stood at USD 52.68 in 2015-16.21 
Militarily, China’s defence budget stood at nearly 
USD 215 billion in 2015, more than four times 
that of India’s USD 51.3 billion.22 With the 
number of active soldiers at 2,285,000, China’s 
manpower is also much higher—and so are its 
technological capabilities.
India’s Response and 
Challenges   
India’s strategic force structures (nuclear triad) 
and doctrines (no-first-use policy combined 
with credible minimum deterrence) are well 
developed. New Delhi has also begun investing 
in building transport and communications 
infrastructure along the China border, inducting 
Mountain Strike Corps, expanding its naval 
capabilities, and upgrading the Indian Air Force 
(IAF) in response. however, there is still a wide 
gap between aspiration and reality. To bridge 
this, more recently, India emphasised on rapid 
military modernisation and redrafted the Defence 
Procurement Procedure (DPP).23 Intent on 
upgrading the lethality and mobility of its armed 
forces, India has been diversifying its arms import. 
This not only implies a shift away from its stockpile 
of outdated Soviet and Russian weaponry, but also 
suggests it becoming the biggest arms importer in 
the world (accounting for 14 per cent of global 
arms imports). 
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In order to rectify import-centric procurement, 
DPP-2016 emphasises on ‘Make in India’ within 
the defence sector, and speeding up defence 
imports. Nonetheless, the Ministry  of Defence 
remains divided over the issue of strategic 
partnerships (SPs) i.e. whether to allow one 
company in one segment or allowing foreign 
players to ally with Indian companies in multiple 
segments such as ammunitions, aircraft, warship, 
target acquisition and other critical material.24 
herein lies the dilemma. Indian companies require 
time to become internationally competitive—an 
investment the government can’t afford given 
the shortfall in India’s defence platforms. heavy 
reliance on foreign players further hinders 
development of an indigenously-focused defence 
industrial base. While there is no end-date to 
reconcile such structural dilemmas, a clear vision 
with a workable plan should be articulated by the 
Ministry of Defence. 
One of the biggest and controversial decisions, 
for instance, was the purchase of Dassault Rafale 
multirole fighter jets from France in 2016 to 
fill an operation void in the IAF. After years of 
deliberations and failed negotiations over pricing 
with France, India decided on buying 36 ready-to-
fly planes instead of its previous hope of procuring 
126 fighter jets with a technology transfer clause 
built in. India is also inducting 3,000 indigenously 
produced 155mm/52calibre artillery guns and has 
signed a USD 737 million contract with US to 
buy 145 M777 Ultralight howitzers. Aiming to 
ensure flexibility in mountainous terrain, these 
guns would replace the infamous but effective 
Bofors gun. 
Defence deals worth INR 43,000 crore were 
also signed with Russia to purchase air defence 
systems, jointly produce stealth frigates and 
Kamov helicopters.25 Israel is keen on supplying 
cutting-edge technology, including ‘Litening-4’ 
targeting pods for IAF’s Sukhoi-30MMKI fleet, 
‘Spice 250’ precision-guided munitions with a 
standoff range of 100 km as well as ‘Spike’ anti-
tank guided missile systems, and missiles.26 The 
Navy, too, despite various accidents in recent years, 
is inducting multi-mission platforms such as INS 
Chennai that are capable of shore bombardment, 
anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, air defence, 
and defending strike groups.27 
Ostensibly promising, India’s military 
modernisation process (at the heart of India’s force 
structures) is wrought with systemic challenges. 
Firstly, most of these measures are stopgap i.e. 
India’s combat readiness and defence standards 
vis-à-vis China (but also Pakistan), till recently, 
have been despicably low. True, India is much 
better equipped to counter a Pakistani challenge 
similar to the 1999 Kargil intrusion or a Chinese 
aggression like in 1962. But it is not equipped 
to overwhelm Pakistan without crossing the 
nuclear threshold in case of a terrorist attack, thus 
reverting to old-style LoC battles. The infantry, 
for example, is still seeking a more effective rifle 
than the indigenous INSAS rifles, and there still 
is a dearth of tactical air mobility in the form of 
helicopters and night vision equipment (though 
drones have filled the gap to an extent, they are 
unavailable at brigade or battalion levels). This 
ongoing equipment acquisition then becomes 
an exercise in “catching-up” rather than being 
“competitive”. 
Secondly, despite the ambitious modernisation 
process, India’s military doctrines are woefully 
underdeveloped. Evolving from the Sundarji 
Doctrine, developed in the 1980s for “defensive” 
purposes, the Indian Army articulated “Cold 
Start” in 2004 after the failed Operation Parakram. 
Aimed at undertaking swift offensive strikes within 
Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella, “Cold Start” 
came under criticism for being operationally 
unviable.28 Still, that did not stop Pakistan from 
developing battlefield tactical nuclear weapons to 
annihilate advancing Indian corps in the event of 
war.29 While India has not responded by altering 
Filling the Capability Deficit
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its own nuclear force structures, it evolved its 
doctrines from “dissuasive” to “active” deterrence, 
and begun to emphasise upon the use of offensive 
covert action (against Pakistan).30   
Thirdly, despite being aware about the need for 
high-quality indigenous defence production, there 
is little visible progress. This is despite the aggressive 
PR in favour of the domestically produced 
hAL Tejas and jointly produced (with Russia) 
BrahMos cruise missile. This is most indicative 
in the budgetary allocation towards ‘revenue’ and 
‘capital’ expenditures by the government. In 2016, 
for instance, of the USD 52.2 billion defence 
budget (2.26 per cent of the gDP), nearly 52 
per cent was allocated to the Army, 16 per cent 
to the Navy, and 22 per cent to the Air Force.31 
Of this total, more than 60 per cent is ‘revenue’ 
expenditure meant to cover operating costs, about 
28 per cent is ‘capital’ expenditure on permanent 
assets, and the rest is for ‘capital acquisitions’.32 
Unless measures are taken to reverse this trend, 
without compromising on the welfare of soldiers, 
the dream of ‘Make in India’ will remain exactly 
that—a dream. 
A combination of strain in civil-military relations, 
questionable quality of tactical level military 
leadership, and inter-service rivalry form the 
fourth challenge. Lack of dialogue between 
military professionals, civilian bureaucrats and 
politicians has been a longstanding problem, 
often leading to mutual mistrust. Recent agitation 
over the one-rank-one-pension scheme and 
reports of alleged irregular movement of troops 
towards Delhi in 2012 highlighted the delicacy 
of India’s civil-military relations. Centralisation 
of security decision-making further erodes civil-
military trust (NSA Ajit Doval was blamed for 
micromanaging counter-terror operations during 
the Pathankot attack).33 Compounding this 
challenge is missing conversation between the 
three services itself. Undermining interoperability, 
competition between the three services has 
hindered development and implementation of 
joint doctrines.
Enabling Indian Forces 
In the light of India’s widening threat spectrum, 
ongoing military modernisation, and the panoply 
of challenges it faces, how best can it secure itself 
by 2030? There are two broad issues that need 
to be worked upon with urgency. Firstly, India 
needs to sharpen enablers such as interoperability, 
Special Force capabilities, and C4ISR coupled 
with development of asymmetric capabilities. 
As scholar Shashank Joshi argues, more than the 
different land and air capabilities, such enablers 
are “crucial to India’s military power in both local 
and broader contexts”.34 Secondly, India needs to 
take serious steps towards developing its defence 
industrial base with emphasis on R&D. 
Indian planners are acutely aware of the need for 
effective joint operations and C4ISR. Creation 
of the Integrated Defence Staff, the Andaman 
and Nicobar Theatre Command in 2001, the 
Strategic Forces Command in 2003, and the 
Defence Intelligence Agency after 26/11 were 
belated steps in this direction. however, without 
access to military assets and a limited resource set, 
these agencies remain toothless in comparison 
with the three services. Allocating more resources 
towards these agencies, which can then be tasked 
to overhaul India’s existing doctrinal state with 
emphasis on joinery, would be a start. 
To ensure further cohesion, establishing the 
position of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would 
go a long way. Appointing a CDS has been a 
sensitive issue that brings out the insecurity 
of India’s civilian politicians vis-à-vis an all-
powerful military position. In this context, the 
government’s recent decision to appoint a CDS, 
then, is a welcome move. A CDS can help bridge 
the operational gap between strategic and tactical 
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level of warfare, which is often either taken over 
by politicians (Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962) or 
National Security Advisors. If instituted properly, 
a CDS can reduce civil-military mistrust and 
decrease inter-service rivalry. 
A separate Special Force Command for offensive 
clandestine operations should be created (akin to 
the US Joint Special Operations Command or 
JSOC).35 The Indian Army’s Parachute Regiment 
can contribute towards this endeavour with 
active involvement from the Navy and the Air 
Force. Operating with limited technology, lack of 
centralised command, and poor skill sets, India’s 
Parachute Regiment does not currently fulfil the 
role of elite Special Forces. Directly under the 
CDS, such a Special Force Command can provide 
credible policy options to the government to 
undertake limited offensive action deep across 
enemy lines without majorly escalating conflict 
levels. It could, in fact, be a first step towards 
expediting India’s stated plan of developing 
integrated theatre commands that require effective 
jointness as a prerequisite.36 
Further, sharpening India’s intelligence gathering 
and analysis machinery is of critical importance. 
India’s aerial and satellite surveillance capabilities, 
for instance, have improved over the years. As 
Rajeswari Rajagopalan shows, a combination of IAI 
Searcher II reconnaissance drones, airborne early 
warning and control (AEWC) systems, and Israeli 
Phalcon radars have increased the IAF’s visibility 
considerably. India’s successful space programme 
has afforded a rich mix of military and dual-
purpose satellites (RISAT-1 and 2, CARTOSAT-
2A and 2B, gSAT-7, OCEANSAT-2, TES, and 
the INRSS).37 
hUMINT under the Research and Analysis Wing 
(R&AW), and TEChINT under the National 
Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), 
however, remain shrouded in secrecy—making 
assessment difficult. Functioning from the Cabinet 
Secretariat, there is no oversight of R&AW and 
NTRO’s activities. This has often led to both over 
and underestimation of these agencies’ potential. 
More worryingly, it is argued that R&AW’s 
capabilities have been undermined due to rivalry 
with other agencies such as the Intelligence 
Bureau, and the Military Intelligence. Intelligence 
observers remain sceptical about R&AW’s covert 
offensive architecture in the neighbourhood as 
well.38 These agencies could be brought under 
parliamentary oversight, both to ensure reduced 
inter and intra-agency rivalries and also to develop 
efficient intelligence cycles and accountability. 
Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned 
aspects, India needs to allocate more funds towards 
developing a strong defence industrial base. This 
would be difficult in the light of 7 percent gDP 
growth rate. India could allow private companies 
to enter the industry (and not just support big 
businesses like Reliance), cut red tape within 
India’s premier defence research organisation 
(DRDO), and emphasise on higher resources 
allocation towards R&D. China’s sophisticated 
defence industrial base that allows indigenous 
production of conventional as well as asymmetric 
weapons such as Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems 
(that could be transferred to Pakistan in future) 
is a challenge to India’s security and aspirations. 
Working towards narrowing this gap by 2030, in 
addition to plugging the “capability” gap, should 
be on top of India’s defence agenda.
Filling the Capability Deficit
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The last decade has been a disorienting period for the Indian Army. While land borders with Pakistan and China 
remain unsettled, the Army’s core competency—
conventional land warfare—has been increasingly 
constrained by the maturation of Pakistani nuclear 
capabilities and Indian leaders’ prioritisation of 
stability. While much-publicised ground raids into 
Myanmar and Pakistan have put the Army at the 
heart of conventional deterrence, supplanting the 
Air Force as the presumptive instrument of first 
resort, these operations have employed a small and 
atypical subset of the organisation, and cannot yet 
be said to have had strategic effects. Modernisation 
in the combat arms has been slow and halting, 
with growing competition for resources from 
the capital-hungry Navy and Air Force. Despite 
unquestioned civilian supremacy, civil-military 
relations have grown more acrimonious, tensions 
between veterans and the government have 
grown, and intra-Army disputes over promotions 
and appointments have spilt over into the courts.1 
What does the future hold for the Army, what are 
its challenges, and how can it best address them?
Future Challenges for  
the Army 2030
VIPIN NARANg  |  ShAShANK JOShI
Shashank Joshi is a Senior  
Research Fellow at Royal  
United Services Institute
Vipin Narang is Mitsui Career 
Development Associate  
Professor of Political Science  
at MIT and a member of MIT’s  
Security Studies Program.
16
Defence Primer 2017 
Priority Missions
Barring a breakthrough in diplomacy with Pakistan 
or a fundamental change in Beijing’s view of New 
Delhi, primary threats will remain insurgency 
and terrorist activity, Kargil-like efforts to revise 
borders or control of territory, and conventional 
military attacks arising from other scenarios 
such as a Pakistani ground response to Indian air 
strikes. The Army’s priorities will therefore remain 
territorial defence, conventional deterrence, and 
counterinsurgency. The most significant changes to 
the Army’s doctrine and structure—the evolution 
of a “proactive” strategy colloquially known as 
Cold Start, and the raising of a mountain strike 
corps—have been driven by the second of these. 
however, the recent decision to have an infantry 
general supersede two mechanised forces’ officers 
in the appointment of army chief indicates the 
continued importance of counterinsurgency to 
political leaders, not least during what could be a 
long phase of unrest in Kashmir.2 It is likely that 
these will remain the priority missions for the 
foreseeable future.
Secondary Missions
In addition to these three central missions, the 
Army increasingly faces a wider set of secondary 
tasks. In December 2015, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi told the Combined Commanders 
Conference that “our responsibilities are no longer 
confined to our borders and coastlines. They 
extend to our interests and citizens, spread across a 
world of widespread and unpredictable risks”.3 The 
Army lags behind the other services in its embrace 
of out-of-area operations, but a growing Chinese 
presence in the Indian Ocean littoral, particularly 
Pakistan and Djibouti, may increase the salience 
of amphibious and other expeditionary forces. 
Other secondary tasks include humanitarian 
and disaster relief (hADR), which has acquired 
an overt element of regional competition and 
international prestige, and which includes large-
scale evacuation of Indian nationals from unstable 
areas. Again, these secondary missions will likely 
remain stable over the next decade.
India’s Way of War
India, informed by history, has shunned formal 
military alliances and is likely to continue doing 
so. India is highly likely to fight alone in its 
border wars. however, India’s growing defence 
partnership with US, its deepening interest in 
the security order in the Western Pacific, and its 
self-identity as a “net security provider” mean that 
the Indian Army is called upon to play a role in a 
future military coalition. India’s heavy involvement 
with UN peacekeeping operations provides some 
experience in this regard.4
Priority Threats/interests example
higher priority
Territorial defence Revision of borders Kargil
Conventional deterrence Terrorism, conventional war Post-Uri strikes
Counterinsurgency Insurgency, terrorism J&K, Assam
Lower priority
hADR Regional influence Op. Maitri (Nepal)
Out-of-area operations Regional influence, peacekeeping MONUSCO (Congo)
Future Challenges for the Army 2030
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Force Structure
What is the Army’s current force structure, and 
what might that force look like in the coming 
years?
Core skills
Both modern warfare and its political context are 
changing. Military technology is rendering the 
battlefield more transparent, units and platforms 
are better networked (but also more vulnerable), 
and norms against large-scale conventional warfare 
are driving the use of hybrid, less overt methods of 
coercion and compellence. At the same time, the 
fundamentals of land warfare have not changed.
Stephen Biddle has shown that military capability 
depends ultimately on proficiency with cover, 
concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit 
independent manoeuvre, and combined arms.5 
Caitlin Talmadge argues that these skills require 
merit-based promotion, rigorous and frequent 
training, and decentralised, unified, and clear 
command.6 The Indian Army enjoys considerable 
autonomy in these areas, with the exception of mid-
level and senior promotions.7  however, a shortage 
of over 9,000 officers is likely to impact the quality 
of junior leadership.8 Recent reductions of officers’ 
status relative to civilian counterparts, along with 
rising private sector salaries, may compound this 
problem.9 Building out an augmented quality 
force structure, however, takes significant time 
and it is likely that the current structure of the 
Indian Army will persist for the next decade.
In addition to these core skills, the Indian Army 
also requires sufficient numbers and quality of 
arms in core combat branches: infantry, artillery, 
and armour. Each of these areas is undergoing 
a belated, gradual, and uneven process of 
modernisation. This has significant implications 
for the Army’s future operational capacity.
Infantry
Infantry modernisation began over a decade ago 
with the ‘Future Infantry Soldiers As a System’ 
(F-INSAS) scheme for lighter and better-equipped 
forces, has since broken up into separate parts for 
equipment and communication.10 Progress has 
been extremely slow. Bulletproof jackets approved 
in 2009 arrived only seven years later, in late 
2016, leaving the Army to operate with half the 
required quantity in the interim.11 The Defence 
Research and Development Organisation’s 
(DRDO) $7-8 billion replacement carbine and 
assault rifle programme has been beset with 
problems such as delayed trials, slow negotiations, 
and cost overruns.12 DRDO’s latest effort, the 
Excalibur, is being “provisionally” inducted13 but 
has been widely criticised14 and, according to a 
senior Indian Army official, “does not have any 
future”.15 In 2014, senior Army officers described 
infantry modernisation as “delayed by six to seven 
years”, almost exclusively because of the Army’s 
inability to formulate qualitative requirements 
(QR).16 If these institutional failings at the Army, 
ministry, and governmental levels go unaddressed, 
infantry capabilities are likely to remain an issue 
of concern into the 2020s. This is especially 
concerning because the rate of Pakistan and, 
particularly, Chinese infantry modernisation is 
quite significant.
Artillery
India has only a tenth of self-propelled artillery 
it requires, a shortfall of 1,600 guns across all 
types, and widespread obsolescence in existing 
inventory.17 India’s towed, wheeled, and self-
propelled guns have subject of drawn-out 
procurement and manufacturing efforts.18 These 
are now yielding fruit, with 80 per cent of the 
Army’s capital budget dedicated to artillery in 
2016.19
18
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Six Indian-built 35km-range Dhanush howitzers 
have been inducted and deployed in Siachen and 
Rajasthan—the first new artillery guns in three 
decades, since the 1980s vintage Bofors-with 114 
more approved for manufacture in June 2016.20 
In November, India finalised a $700 million deal 
with US to buy seven regiments of the M777 
ultra-right howitzer, with 20 guns delivered within 
two years and the remaining 120 to be assembled 
in India over the next four to five years.21 Their 
weight, permitting carriage by Chinook, makes 
them particularly suited for the new 17 Corps, 
India’s fourth strike corps and the first intended 
for mountain terrain. Finally, India is likely to 
induct around 100 self-propelled 155mm K9 
Vajra-T, a modified Samsung K9 with about 50 
per cent indigenous content, over the next three 
years.22 This would rectify a perceived imbalance 
created by the US sale of self-propelled artillery 
to Pakistan in 2009.23 The 45km-range Advanced 
Towed Artillery gun System (ATAgS) is an earlier 
stage, with firing trials in December 2016.
These efforts should also be considered alongside 
progress in building and acquiring both indigenous 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and 
multiple regiments of the short-range BrahMos 
cruise missile. Some of these systems should be 
available to the Indian Army in the coming years, 
but the challenges of equipping and procuring a 
modern force will remain.
Armour
The future of Indian armour is similarly in flux, 
with tension between indigenous and imported 
systems, and deeper questions around the optimal 
balance between protection and mobility in India’s 
likely theatres of conflict. While the T-72 remains 
in service, deployed in greater numbers to Ladakh 
over the past few years, the pillar of armour 
modernisation is the indigenous Arjun Main 
Battle Tank (MBT) and license-built Russian 
T-90S MBTs. As of 2016, India had produced less 
than a quarter of the 945 T-90s ordered by the 
Army.24 Over 400 further T-90s were ordered in 
November.25 
The Arjun Mark 1 has not been cleared for combat 
because of its weight, and three-quarters of the 
fleet was grounded as of mid-2015 because of 
technical problems with the transmission system, 
targeting, and thermal sights, as well as a shortage 
of imported parts.26 As many as 118 lighter and 
more advanced Mark 2 variants have been cleared, 
but the Army has requested international proposals 
for a Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) to 
be inducted in 2025-27. This could circumvent 
DRDO and undermine the future utility of the 
Arjun tank.27 Arjun’s defenders point out that it has 
out-performed the flagship T-90S in trials while 
critics in the Army criticise its inability to fire anti-
tank guided missiles (ATgMs) through its main 
gun28 as well as its inability to cross some bridges 
owing to weight.29 The future of Arjun is likely 
to be a bellwether for indigenous modernisation. 
Platform Old new 
Assault rifle INSAS (1990s-2000s) TBD
Ultra-light artillery ? Mh77
Towed artillery Fh-77B (1980s) Dhanush, ATAgS
Self-propelled artillery M-46 (1980s) K-9 Vajra
MBT T-72 (1980s) T-90, Arjun, FRCV
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But even if it is a success, India is not procuring 
tanks in sufficient numbers to open up a militarily 
meaningful gap over Pakistan—if such a gap could 
be exploited under nuclear conditions at all. 
Doctrinal Developments—
Where India is and Where it 
can Go
These are India’s capabilities and force structure, 
but what are the challenges in how it might be 
employed? That is, what is India’s current Army 
doctrine, how did it get here, and where can it go 
in the next decade or so? The fundamental political 
issue driving the security competition between 
India and Pakistan is that the latter continues 
to have a revisionist political agenda towards the 
former. Pakistan has used both its covert, and 
then overt, nuclear weapons capabilities to more 
aggressively pursue that agenda.30 While India 
desperately tries to escape entanglement between 
conventional and nuclear doctrine, Pakistan races 
to more deeply intertwine the two as a deterrent 
to Indian conventional action. This is the 
fundamental doctrinal challenge facing the Indian 
Army, and has been for decades, with variation on 
the same theme.
Indeed, India and Pakistan are presently in their 
third cycle of conventional nuclear dynamics. 
Even prior to testing nuclear weapons in 1998, 
Pakistan used its recessed nuclear capabilities 
to more aggressively support insurgent and 
secessionist movements in India’s Punjab and 
Kashmir.31 This was the first cycle in the India-
Pakistan security competition under the shadow 
of nuclear weapons. The second cycle began after 
India openly tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, 
and Pakistan followed suit three weeks later. In 
that iteration of security competition, elements 
within the Pakistan Army attempted to directly 
revise the status quo by infiltrating across the 
Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector, on the 
theory that Pakistan’s nascent nuclear capabilities 
would enable it to achieve a fait accompli and 
deter Indian conventional retaliation, particularly 
across the International Border (IB).32 A delayed, 
but ultimately effective, Indian conventional 
response limited to the LoC highlighted the risks 
of potential further escalation across the IB and 
underscored just how risky an overt Pakistani 
revisionist strategy could be. Force on force 
engagements in open terrain between nuclear 
powers would generate extreme and unwelcome 
risks. 
That birthed the third cycle where the Pakistani 
state shifted away from the failed strategy of overt 
infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir to sponsoring 
mass-casualty terrorism in Indian cities—such as 
the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai 
siege—using quasi-firewalled proxies such as the 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT), on the theory that India’s nuclear weapons 
cannot deter terrorist attacks and that Pakistan’s 
growing nuclear inventory would deter ground-
based conventional retaliation.33 
For India, the dilemma of this third cycle has been 
how to generate credible conventional retaliatory 
options—primarily Army-driven—that would 
punish particularly the Pakistan Army for 
sponsoring mass-casualty terrorist attacks against 
its cities, and thereby deter future support for 
such outrages, without approaching Pakistan’s 
nuclear thresholds? The fundamental paradox 
of this condition is that any retaliation punitive 
enough to serve as a potential deterrent for state-
sponsored terrorism would almost by definition 
require India to cross Pakistan’s presumed nuclear 
redlines, especially the so-called military attrition 
threshold.34 Through the Parliament attacks, 
India’s mainstay conventional response centreed 
around what is colloquially known as the Sundarji 
Doctrine, which envisioned massive armoured 
manoeuvre warfare through the plains and desert 
sectors of Pakistan and which would certainly, if 
20
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ever employed, risk threatening the survival of the 
Pakistani state. This response, which would require 
weeks to mobilise, proved futile as a coercive tool 
in the 2002 Operation Parakram. 
But the lesson the Indian Army drew from its 
experience in Operation Parakram was not that 
the fundamental retaliatory concept was flawed, 
but that the long mobilisation time (of 21 days) 
for the main strike corps elements (I, II, and XXI 
Corps) to deploy from their peacetime locations 
in the interior narrowed India’s perceived window 
for a retaliatory ground war. The Indian Army’s 
subsequent changes to doctrine and posture became 
popularly known as ‘Cold Start’, although there is 
little evidence this was formally adopted by the 
Army, agreed with other services, or approved by 
civilians.35 Public accounts of Cold Start suggested 
that it entailed breaking up the Strike Corps into 
eight to 10 so-called ‘integrated battle groups’ 
(IBgs, which ended up never being integrated, 
nor battle ready) and locating them closer to 
the border so that India could begin offensive 
retaliatory operations from a ‘Cold Start’ in 48-
72 hours from an order to do so. The operational 
problem with this concept is that those IBgs, 
being deployed so close to the border, would be 
ripe targets for preemption. The logistical challenge 
was the grave difficulty of acquiring land for new 
bases. As a result, though ‘Cold Start’ received a 
lot of media hype, the Army was never keen to 
move away from its main operational concept of 
employing the existing strike corps, with I and II 
Corps engaging their counterparts in the Jammu 
and Punjab sectors, and XXI Corps conducting 
deeper penetration in the desert sector.36 
What the Indian Army instead adopted is what is 
internally known as ‘Proactive Strategy Options’, 
which maintains the erstwhile strike corps’ concept 
but focuses on more streamlined mobilisation—
on both the Pakistani and Chinese fronts. On the 
Pakistani front, this first involved reorganising the 
four defensive holding corps which have always 
been deployed closer to the IB (IX-XII Corps). 
By attaching an armoured brigade to each of the 
holding corps, the Army converted IX-XII Corps 
into ‘Pivot Corps’, which can quickly ‘pivot’ 
from defensive to offensive operations while the 
three strike corps mobilise behind them. This has 
allowed the Indian Army to claim to the political 
leadership that it would be ready to initiate offensive 
operations roughly seven to 10 days after an order 
to do so. But critically, the operational concept of 
Proactive Strategy Options is no different than 
India’s longstanding conventional strategy.37 
For all the talk of waging conventional war below 
Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds, the concept still 
calls for I and II Corps to engage and destroy 
their counterparts in the northern plains sector 
and for XXI Corps to execute a deep strike in 
the desert sector. however, the Army’s assumed 
war aims—in particular, the balance between 
attrition of the Pakistan Army (punishment) 
and seizure of territory (bargaining)—remain 
unclear. Indeed, the latter may inadvertently but 
inescapably overlap with the former, as the level 
of attrition of the Pakistan Army that would 
be required to hold sizeable pieces of Pakistani 
territory, particularly population centres, would 
certainly cross any nation’s nuclear redlines, and 
certainly Pakistan’s. A similar concept of territorial 
seizure and bargaining may also have informed 
the Indian Army’s currently largest unfunded 
mandate: the so-called Mountain Strike Corps 
(XVII Corps headquartered in Panagarh), which 
would similarly attempt to seize territory in Tibet 
to use as either a deterrent to Chinese aggression, 
or as a bargaining chip if deterrence has failed. The 
Indian Army doctrine towards Pakistan and China 
is converging on the same concept, even though 
the two fronts are radically different and pose 
different conventional and nuclear challenges.
At the broader political level, Indian leaders’ key 
problem, likely considered during the Cabinet 
Committee on Security deliberations following 
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the Mumbai attacks, is that the distinction 
between ‘limited’ ground retaliation and ‘total 
war’ is extremely difficult to maintain once a 
large-scale war commences.38 This is especially so 
in the case of Pakistan, given its small size and the 
vulnerability of its population centres and lines 
of communication. And on the Chinese front, 
without the ability to surge reinforcements to a 
Mountain Strike Corps, Chinese forces might 
be in a position to significantly attrite the Indian 
position rather than attempt to bargain for peace. 
Therefore India finds itself, in this third cycle, with 
only marginal improvements in finding a credible 
punitive/deterrent conventional option. 
however, the media hype around Cold Start, 
particularly its description as a national war 
strategy rather than an operational concept, has 
been a strategic blunder for India, as it facilitated 
Pakistan’s efforts to justify the expansion of its 
nuclear arsenal and the development of a wider 
array of delivery capabilities to further to entangle 
conventional operations with the risk of nuclear 
use. This was captured in Pakistan’s shift in nuclear 
doctrine from “credible minimum deterrence” to 
“full spectrum deterrence”, the latter requiring 
Pakistan to ‘close the gaps’ in deterring both 
Indian conventional and nuclear forces. At the 
lower end, that means developing battlefield 
nuclear systems like Nasr and cruise missiles such 
as Babur and Ra’ad to deter Indian conventional 
power by operationalising them as usable war-
fighting instruments should the Pakistan Army 
be attrited by an Indian offensive.39 At the 
higher end, that means developing a survivable 
‘third strike’ of strategic nuclear forces to deter 
India’s (increasingly incredible) threat of ‘massive 
retaliation’ to Pakistani limited first use. In this way, 
Pakistan is betting that India would not retaliate 
against Pakistani cities for a tactical nuclear use on 
Indian forces—most likely in the Pakistani desert 
against, for instance, XXI Corps elements40—not 
only because it would be disproportionate, but 
also because Pakistan would be able to hold at risk 
multiple Indian cities should India retaliate. India’s 
inability to develop a credible–here, meaning 
plausibly limited–conventional retaliatory option, 
coupled with Pakistan’s closing of the gaps in 
deterring India’s conventional and nuclear forces, 
has essentially resulted in Indian paralysis should it 
suffer another mass-casualty terrorist attack on its 
soil. While Pakistan further entangles its nuclear 
and conventional operations, the Indian Army 
must stop deluding itself into believing that these 
domains are completely firewalled and that Army 
doctrine can be developed and implemented in 
isolation from India’s nuclear doctrine.
Indian leaders therefore have four options. First, 
they can shun overt military force, opting for 
diplomatic, covert, and other means of retaliation. 
This was the course chosen in 2008.41 Such an 
approach makes some sense, given the risks 
of escalation outlined here, and the potential 
impact of escalation on India’s broader economic, 
political, and diplomatic objectives, in relation 
to the comparatively modest cost imposed by 
terrorism. however, domestic political pressures 
mean that overt restraint is not a viable long-term 
approach. This is where future Army doctrine and 
posture becomes salient.
Second, Indian leaders can opt for ultra-limited 
ground incursions, constrained in size (sub-
company level) and penetration (sub-4km). 
Such raids have been regular occurrences on the 
LoC in the 1990s and 2000s, but reached their 
zenith in the publicly announced “surgical strikes” 
of September 2016.42 The use of Para (Special 
Forces) units gives the Army an outsize role in 
conventional deterrence, but reduces its scope to 
effectively escalate to the strategic level–a far cry 
from Cold Start. Building up this capability so 
that it can perform more complicated raids and 
operations is a task that will take years. This might 
be the most plausible role for the Army but it 
relegates it to operations that are relative strategic 
pinpricks. 
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Third, Indian leaders may consider stand-off 
capabilities that do not require large-scale ground 
penetration.43 Airstrikes are the most potent and 
precise of such capabilities, although a longer-
term reliance on these would challenge the Army’s 
domination of Indian military strategy. however, 
the Army could still play a role through the use 
of artillery (the mainstay of tactical deterrence 
on the LoC today), rockets, or its expanding 
tactical cruise and ballistic missile forces.  44The 
use of stand-off force can of course expand into a 
conventional ground war, but this would have the 
advantage of placing the onus of escalation onto 
Pakistan, putting India on a credibly defensive 
footing, and so precluding credible Pakistani 
threat of even limited nuclear use. There would, 
however, be a risk of Pakistani stand-off retaliation 
against Indian military facilities and population 
centres. It should not be assumed that the 
escalation dynamics of a war confined to stand-off 
capabilities will necessarily favour India.
These options have implications for the Indian 
Army’s doctrine in the years upto 2030. Should 
airstrikes take a more dominant role in India’s 
repertoire of retaliatory options, the evolution 
of the Army’s doctrine should consider how best 
the institution could provide support to a stand-
off strategy. This would be institutionally and 
ideologically difficult, given the Army’s historically 
central and paramount role in Indian wars. 
Furthermore, ultra-limited ground engagements 
are likely to grow in importance, particularly after 
the political–if not necessarily deterrent–success 
of the September 2016 raids. Indian leaders may 
also demand better options for targeting, killing, 
or capturing high value targets within Pakistani 
territory. As with support for airstrikes, this will 
require close cooperation between the Army 
and intelligence agencies, as well as enhanced 
investments in airlift and other specialised 
equipment.
While this discussion has focused on Pakistan—
India’s most likely and arguably complicated 
adversary—India’s approach to China has 
somewhat different constraints. While nationalist 
sentiments on both sides might drive escalation 
once a militarised dispute has begun, the risk of 
conventional or nuclear escalation is generally less 
severe than in the case of Pakistan. One reason 
for this is that India’s probable military targets 
do not present a plausible existential threat to 
Beijing. Another is that China does not view 
nuclear weapons as war-fighting instruments. But 
if a strategy of seizure and bargaining is less risky 
against China, it is also militarily more difficult, 
given the correlation of forces and the difficult 
terrain. The demands on fixed-wing and rotary 
airlift in particular are likely to be exceptional, 
surpassing even the rapid pace of India’s present 
buildup. Even if India were to develop a viable 
Mountain Strike Corps, the question of what piece 
of territory to seize, how deep, and how it could 
hold it against Chinese PLA reinforcements are all 
questions to which the answers remain unclear.
Civil-military relations 
India’s civil-military relations have been 
summarised by Anit Mukherjee in the previous 
iteration of this volume.45 how do these affect the 
Indian Army?
First, military strategies based on manoeuvre 
warfare demand rapid, responsive, and therefore 
decentralised decision-making. While special forces 
raids allow for a high degree of political oversight 
given the limited scope of such operations, this 
is not so in conventional ground wars. Political 
leaders would have to entrust commanders with 
greater autonomy if strike units were to maximise 
opportunities for penetration and advance. 
India’s recent military history, notably the 
restrictions imposed on airpower in Kargil, and 
the risks of conventional and nuclear escalation, 
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indicate that this will not come easily. It will require 
political leaders’ familiarity with the details and 
risks of war plans, an understanding of political 
and diplomatic sensitivities by commanders, and 
resilient wartime communications, especially 
for out-of-area operations. If war aims are 
unclear—whether strikes are to punish, to seize 
territory or bargain—mutual civil-military 
understanding becomes all the more crucial. Even 
with improvements in these areas, India’s civilian 
dominance is likely to prove a further constraint 
on the types of strategies that the Army can 
realistically employ. 
Second, while the Rafale is likely to continue a 
nuclear-delivery role for the Air Force, India’s 
nuclear forces will are re-balancing away from the 
air-breathing leg of the triad towards the Navy-
operated sea-based and Army-operated land-
based legs. India’s intermediate-range missiles are 
increasingly deployed in canisters.46 This shortens 
launch times and enhances survivability; however, 
it also lessens the dispersal of nuclear weapon 
components that prevailed in previous decades 
and, therefore, dilutes a powerful physical means 
of negative civilian control.47 But this gives the 
Army a major role in nuclear operations, and in 
the Strategic Forces Command. It presents the 
Army with an opportunity to better integrate 
conventional and nuclear doctrine—not to 
operationalise nuclear weapons as war-fighting 
instruments but to better consider how to deter 
lower order Pakistani nuclear use by making the 
threat of limited, rather than massive, retaliation 
more credible.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief overview of 
the challenges facing the Indian Army’s force 
structure, doctrine, and civil-military relations. 
Armies do not turn on a dime and they are big 
institutions, so many of the challenges that 
have plagued the Army thus far—shortage of 
equipment and innovative doctrinal thinking—
will likely continue for the foreseeable future. The 
question is whether the Army’s leadership in the 
coming years will be nimble and creative enough 
to seize opportunities to develop more credible 
conventional offensive options and roles against 
both Pakistan and China, and potentially reshape 
the Army to implement them. historically, the 
nature of civil-military relations in India has 
resisted radical shifts in Army thinking—Sundarji 
may be the only example, but the belief that he 
may have almost dragged India into war during 
the Brasstacks crisis has led to a string of Army 
leaders that have more restrained ambitions for 
the institution. For that to change, there has to be 
will among the Indian political leaders to re-craft 
the Army for modern challenges. Even with the 
latest supersession of the Army Chief, it is unclear 
whether that will exist for a long term. Without 
it, the Army will likely continue on a straight-line 
path, strong enough to protect the country’s fate, 
but too weak to change it.
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The Indian Army is the third largest army in the world in terms of the sheer number of personnel. however, this description 
obfuscates the fact that it is not as powerful as one of 
the world’s largest armies. Its capacity to undertake 
military operations optimally in the multi-domain, 
technology-dominated battlefield of the future is 
questionable. The Indian Army essentially remains 
a force largely organised, equipped and trained to 
fight wars of the past. having said that, it is not 
as if the Army cannot carry out its role and tasks 
successfully if it is provided the requisite means to 
do so. And so, it seems almost imperative that the 
Army be modernised expeditiously if it has to be 
prepared to take on the security challenges of the 
future.
As India rises in stature, economically and 
technologically, towards a more eminent position 
in the region and the world, it has to concurrently 
build on its military power, in the modern 
context, to thwart the threats and challenges that 
it is likely to face along the way from our potential 
adversaries. however, for India, building military 
power is not easy, given the budgetary constraints, 
especially when the country needs to meet the 
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requirements of economic development to provide 
human security and a better quality of life to its 
people. 
The inadequacy of funds is compounded by 
bureaucratic prevarication, risk averseness, 
frequent changes in qualitative requirements by 
the Army, and occasional corruption charges, 
which result in blacklisting of vendors in an 
unplanned manner. hence, not only is there a 
need to efficiently identify the future orientation 
and equipment needs of the Army—in its role 
as the largest and most powerful component of 
the Indian military—but it is also important to 
find a way forward to build capacity and speed 
up the procurement process while addressing the 
problems that may prove to be a barrier for the 
force. 
Future Security Scenarios
India’s threats and challenges in the military realm 
primarily emanate from the historically inherited 
territorial disputes involving its two nuclear armed 
neighbours, over which five wars have already 
been fought. The growing nexus on military and 
nuclear matters between our potential adversaries 
suggests that, unlike in the past, India may face a 
‘two-front threat’ the next time round. Meanwhile, 
the fact that the existing territorial disputes are 
‘land-centric’ highlights the pre-dominant role of 
the Army in the Indian security context. 
Further, Pakistan has been running a sub-
conventional campaign against India since the 
early 1990s, which essentially involves stoking 
militancy in Muslim-majority areas of Jammu & 
Kashmir (J&K), where it has been pushing terror 
modules across the border under cover of nuclear 
coercion to cause casualties among civilians and 
security personnel in an effort to keep the Kashmir 
issue alive. Nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’ is used in 
conjunction with the cross-border terror strikes to 
prevent India from “raising the ante” and retaliating 
with a punitive conventional response. The last 
war fought in this backdrop was the Kargil War 
in 1999, limited in scope and duration, which was 
launched by the Indian Army with support from 
the Air Force to evict an ‘hybrid’ intrusion by the 
Pakistan Army across the Line of Control in the 
Ladakh sector of J&K. 
Changing Nature of 
Conflicts
In the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
of the first decade of this century, the world has 
witnessed a reduction in full fledged ‘State vs 
State’ wars. Hybrid wars appear to be the new 
norm, involving a combination of two or more of 
the following:
Conventional/Regular warfare:•	  State vs State 
wars, primarily waged by conventional forces 
or regular troops on both/all sides. In case of 
India, all such wars will be fought under a 
nuclear overhang, implying that escalation to 
the level of nuclear exchanges is possible, and 
must be planned for.
Irregular warfare:•	  Conflict against a State 
by employing trained combatants who are 
not regular military soldiers. Pakistan has 
launched such ‘irregulars’ in all its wars against 
India.
Asymmetric warfare:•	  War between sides 
whose military power differs greatly, waged by 
the weaker side using non-traditional means 
like terrorism. Wars waged by insurgents/
terrorists against nation states, its government 
or people fall in this category. For example, 
9/11 by al-Qaeda and the Afghanistan war by 
the Taliban, among others.
Unconventional warfare:•	  War waged by a 
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country using means other than established 
forms of armed conflict to make the adversary 
capitulate even without a classical war. 
Economic wars, water wars and legal wars are 
some examples.
Technological/Informational warfare:•	  Wars 
fought in the areas of cyber, space, electronic, 
propaganda, psychological, media or social 
media. 
The Indian Army, as the largest component of 
the military, should be prepared to deal with 
asymmetric, informational and/or conventional 
threats in the backdrop of a nuclear coercion 
from across our Western border in the short to 
middle term, and additionally, from the Northern 
border in the long term. The Indian Army must 
therefore aim to achieve cross-spectrum (nuclear, 
conventional, counter sub-conventional) war-
fighting capability to achieve a favourable 
outcome even in a ‘wo-front war scenario, which 
would concurrently achieve credible or punitive 
deterrence, as required, against our potential 
adversaries. 
Capability Building in the 
Indian Army
India is not a member of any traditional military 
alliance and thus has to maintain an independent 
military capability as a critical need to retain its 
strategic autonomy while protecting its unity and 
integrity against possible threats.
The primary role of the Indian Army is to ensure 
the territorial integrity of the nation by deterrence 
or by waging a war. The secondary role of the 
Army is to provide assistance to civil authorities, 
when requisitioned. In keeping with its mandated 
roles, the Army has to ensure multi-dimensional 
capability to deal with external threats from our 
potential adversaries and also be prepared to 
assist in dealing with internal security threats of 
a heightened nature, especially those involving 
secessionist uprisings against the state or disaster 
management.
Accordingly, as most of our current threats 
pertain to conventional conflicts over disputed 
land borders and sub-conventional challenges 
like insurgencies and cross-border terrorism, the 
Indian Army has been structured as a ‘two-and-a-
half front’ force, whereby, not only has the Army 
built conventional capabilities to deal with threats 
along the Western and Northern Fronts, but it 
has also built the capacity to deal with the lesser 
‘sub-conventional front’—by employment of the 
Rashtriya Rifles independently or in combination 
with regular, paramilitary or police forces. 
Capability building of the Army is a continuous 
process, where budget, especially capital funds, are 
requested annually based on the projected needs 
for implementing a 15-year long-term perspective 
plan. however, it has been the experience for 
many years now that adequate capital funds for 
modernisation are not allotted, and consequently, 
there are major shortfalls in acquiring new 
equipment and other war-fighting capability in a 
time bound manner.
Modernisation Needs of the 
Army
The Army of the future will have to be 
technologically oriented, with many more 
specialists on its rolls as compared to generalists. 
It will have to be equipped progressively with 
modern weapons and weapon systems, supported 
by technology-based processes and automation 
to meet the needs and challenges of the future 
battlefields. Accordingly,  the Army will need to 
replace or upgrade its ageing inventory of weapons 
and equipment while also restructuring in a 
transformational way. however, considering that 
Modernising of the Indian Army
29
the modernisation plans of the Army are lagging 
far behind already, budgetary constraints will play 
an important part in formulating and executing 
plans for the future.
As far as weapons and equipment are concerned, 
the Army needs the following on priority to 
replace or rejuvenate vintage equipment as part of 
the capability development programme:
Infantry:•	  The infantry, which is continuously 
being employed in counter-terrorist or 
counter-insurgency operations, needs to be 
empowered immediately by provisioning 
of new generation lightweight assault rifles, 
bulletproof jackets and helmets, hand-held 
thermal imagers (hhTIs) as well as a host of 
other modern weapons like carbines, machine 
guns, rocket launchers, anti-tank guided 
missiles (ATgMs), mortars, night-vision 
devices, radio sets and better back packs to 
replace outdated weapons and equipment. 
Further, the infantry needs to reduce the 
number of general duty (gD) soldiers and 
replace them with specialists. To that extent, 
it is worth serious consideration that many 
more infantry battalions be converted into 
Special Forces battalions. Further, the fourth 
company of each infantry battalion needs 
to be converted into a Special Operations 
company. 
Artillery:•	  Adequate quantities of new 155 
mm artillery guns, including indigenously 
manufactured Dhanush systems, as well 
as more lethal precision artillery systems 
like BrahMos cruise missiles, Smerch  and 
Pinaka rocket systems need to be inducted 
immediately to replace its earlier vintage 105 
mm and 130 mm guns and vintage rocket 
systems. Also, the procurement of M-777 
light howitzers must be expedited for early 
deployment along the mountainous terrain of 
the northern borders.
UAVs:•	  More quantities of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) of latest technology must be 
inducted in adequate numbers for surveillance 
and precision attack operations in both peace 
and war.
Mechanised Forces:•	  Additional quantities 
of contemporary technology such as night-
enabled T-90 tanks and ICVs, equipped with 
long-range ATgMs, need to be inducted on 
priority. Older generation T-72 tanks and 
ICVs must be refurbished and technologically 
upgraded at the earliest. Future Ready Combat 
Vehicle (FRCV) and Future Infantry Combat 
Vehicle (FICV) projects must be pursued with 
vigour so that the next generation of state-of-
the-art replacements are inducted within the 
next 10 years. 
Army Aviation:•	  Acquisition of three 
squadrons worth of new generation Apache 
attack helicopters into the Army Aviation has 
been reportedly sanctioned, as a follow up 
of the Air Force order. Further, the Kamov 
replacement helicopters, indigenous Light 
Utility helicopter (LUh) and Light Combat 
helicopter (LCh) projects must be pursued 
aggresively so that reliable helicopters are 
delivered to the Army at the earliest.
Air Defence (AD):•	  The Army AD equipment 
is undergoing a total revamp. The various 
Army AD weapon acquisition projects—for 
all types of surface to air missile systems—as 
well as the process of upgrading old generation 
systems must be provided fresh impetus so 
that these materialise at the earliest.
Engineers:•	  Combat engineers need to be 
provided new generation bridging equipment, 
mine-laying equipment as well as mine 
clearance equipment. Where possible, old 
equipment must be upgraded indigenously.
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Night Vision Devices:•	  All arms of the Army 
have to be night enabled by fulfilling the 
remaining requirement of light-weight, long-
range and easily usable night vision devices.
Challenges in Capability 
Building
There are huge ongoing challenges in the process 
of capacity building of the Indian Army. The more 
important of these are discussed  as follows: 
At present, military planning is hamstrung •	
by lack of a clearly articulated and integrated 
military strategy. In such a situation, the three 
wings of the military are left to devise their 
own strategies and military philosophies, 
which could end up being at cross purposes 
with each other. The reasons that can be 
ascribed to this state of affairs is the absence of 
military expertise at the apex level of national 
security and defence matters, exacerbated by 
non-institution of the appointment of Chief 
of Defence Staff to coordinate defence policy 
and strategy more meaningfully. 
Lack of modernisation and an alarmingly •	
large percentage of old equipment are still in 
use because several proposals for acquisition 
of new equipment and upgradation of existing 
equipment having been inordinately delayed.
There seems to be an expanding hollowness in •	
arms and ammunition over the years due to 
quality issues related to indigenous production 
of modern ammunition, compounded by 
inadequate budgetary support. 
Lack of capital budget for new procurement •	
schemes, especially ‘big ticket’ items, is 
another challenge. This is due to the fact 
that there has been inadequate allocation of 
defence budget for several years now. Though 
at least 2.5 percent of gDP should be allotted 
for defence expenditure (other than pension), 
only 1.5 to 1.7 percent is actually allotted, 
resulting in reduction of budget allocation 
in real terms after taking into account the 
annual inflation component. The Army’s 
inter-service share within the defence budget 
has taken a dip—from 60 percent in 1990-
91 to about 52 percent in the current budget. 
The problem is exacerbated by the burgeoning 
revenue expenditure, especially on pay and 
allowances, and the alacrity displayed by the 
finance ministry in withdrawing defence 
capital funds year on year, apparently for 
balancing shortfalls and deficits under 
other heads of budget expenditure, cleverly 
projecting these as ‘surrenders’.  Though 40 
percent of the Army budget should be spent 
on capital procurement, including committed 
liabilities, a meagre 15 percent has been spent 
in the last two years. 
Over the decades, the Indian Army has •	
continued to expand, in terms of human 
resource,, in its quest to build its capability 
to deal with potential threats and challenges. 
however, there have been some faulty human 
resource policies in the Army in recent 
years, which have incentivised holding more 
manpower by linking it to calculation of senior 
rank positions in the Army. The total strength 
of the Army stands at more than 1.3 million. 
The ‘manpower problem’ has been exacerbated 
by lack of serious control over the ever-
expanding size of civilians under the defence 
ministry who suck up a large percentage of the 
revenue budget of the Armed Forces without 
proportionate returns in ‘capability’ terms. All 
this has adversely affected the Army’s efforts at 
optimisation and modernisation in an era of 
overwhelming budgetary constraints. In fact, 
matters have reached a serious point, where, 
within the next two to three years, there may 
not be any money left in the Army budget for 
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new ‘capital’ purchases after expending budget 
under the revenue head, combined with the 
committed liabilities of the capital budget. 
There is not enough expertise within the Army •	
in the field of weapon design and technology, 
resulting in lack of meaningful inputs for the 
indigenous defence industry. An Army Design 
Bureau (ADB) has been inaugurated recently 
to address this shortfall. As of now, it is still 
too early to determine whether the ADB will 
be able to produce the desired results towards 
providing guidance to the indigenous defence 
industry for producing new weapons and 
equipment for the Army. The Army must 
continue to study the experiences of the Navy 
Design Bureau to draw lessons for developing 
the ADB on similar lines, or better. 
There is a lack of sustained efforts within •	
the Army to develop expertise on defence 
procurement and financial issues. The Army 
remains rooted to the outdated policies of 
employing ‘generalists’ rather than ‘specialists’ 
to man the weapon procurement functions 
at Army headquarters. Unless serious efforts 
are made to create a cadre of specialists to 
man critical functions related to procurement 
of Army weapons and equipment, starting 
with the Apex level, the situation is not 
likely to improve. Formulation of general 
Staff Qualitative Requirements (gSQR) 
and conduct of trials are two specific areas 
of weaknesses within the Army, and needs 
constant efforts at improvement.
Then there is inefficiency and apparent lack of •	
accountability of various organs of the defence 
ministry responsible for indigenous design 
and manufacture of weapons, equipment and 
ammunition for the Army, namely the Defence 
Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO), Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) 
and Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs). It 
is obvious that the vibrant private industry of 
the country is not yet being provided a level 
playing field to compete fairly with the public 
sector. Consequently, the indigenous defence 
industry, mostly based on the public sector, is 
unable to provide items of desired quality in 
a timely manner. Most procurement through 
this route are affected by huge cost overruns.
As a consequence of the mentioned problems, 
especially lack of capital budget, the Army’s 
modernisation plans are running far behind 
schedule. The only saving grace has been the 
continued acquisition of the relatively modern 
and robust T-90 tanks for the Armoured Corps 
and the continuing production of BMP-II 
infantry combat vehicles, which are the mainstay 
of the mechanised infantry, which taken together, 
continue to provide a combat edge on the Western 
front.
Concluding Observations 
and Road Map for the 
Future
India needs to progressively build capability of 
hard military power, soft power and demonstrated 
power in its quest to be recognised as a regional 
power with global influence, which can deter 
threats to its stability and integrity. The Army, as 
the largest component of the Indian military, has 
to be prepared to play its mandated role in the 
interests of defence and security of the country. 
however, budgetary constraints, combined with 
disproportionate stress on sub-conventional 
warfare, has led to adverse effects on capability 
building for conventional deterrence and war 
fighting.
Some of the measures that need to be put in place 
are discussed below:
The Indian military of the future, backed by •	
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nuclear capability, is essentially meant for 
conventional deterrence and war fighting to 
the extent of even taking on the worst case 
scenario of a ‘two-and-a-half front threat’. 
The Indian Army’s deterrence posture must be 
based on flexible capability-based structures to 
deal with various forms and levels of conflict. It 
requires technology pre-dominant capabilities 
for prosecuting hybrid conventional and 
informational wars under the nuclear shadow. 
We need to prepare for the same with an 
immediate (three years), medium (seven years) 
and long-term (15 years) perspective. We 
must develop appropriate retaliatory counter 
sub-conventional threat capability within 
existing resources by raising the Special Forces 
Command. 
The Indian Army needs to undergo •	
transformation and right-sizing towards 
becoming an optimised modern force, with 
a more efficient teeth-to-tail ratio. Though 
it provides ‘comfort’ from the military 
commanders’ point of view to have an 
independent capability for each front, it 
would make more pragmatic and economic 
sense to have only a minimum essential 
capability on either front while maintaining 
a suitably large dual-front capable central 
reserve, possibly under the aegis of a Strategic 
Reserve Command to reinforce the front 
where the actual threat develops. Thus, our 
logistics need to be integrated and optimised 
on priority.
Enhanced jointness with the Air Force and •	
the Navy, appointment of a Chief of Defence 
Staff (CDS) and formation of ‘theatre 
commands’ would definitely contribute to 
optimisation of resources. however, for such 
a system to succeed, the structure of each 
theatre command’ and service background 
of the commander must reflect operational 
necessity and not ‘political’ or ‘mathematical’ 
correctness. In the latter case, the repercussions 
would be disastrous.
The Indian Army must fully operationalise •	
the concept of  the Reorganised Army’s Multi-
role Quick Reaction Force (RAMFOR) by 
creating a highly mobile assault division as 
a strategic reserve, consisting of modular 
brigades capable of being transported swiftly 
by air, land or sea. This must be done within 
its existing resources.
The Army must review its ‘big ticket’ needs and •	
prioritise them periodically, as has been done 
for the past three years, and ensure sustained 
push with the government and bureaucracy to 
ensure timely procurement of items listed as 
‘most critical’. Modernisation of equipment 
must involve not only replacement of vintage 
equipment but also upgradation of selected 
quantities of old serviceable equipment in a 
phased manner. Maximum priority must be 
accorded to acquisition of 155 mm towed 
artillery guns, air defence weapons for 
mechanised formations, assault rifles and 
ATgMs for the infantry, and replacement 
helicopters for the Army Aviation, as well as 
for technological upgradation of T-72 tanks 
and ICVs. Fresh review of quantities of each 
‘big ticket’ item must be carried out, keeping 
in view the enhanced effectiveness of newly 
procured systems. 
The government must closely monitor •	
capability building of the services, especially 
the Army, and vigorously support plans to 
address ‘hollowness’ of weapons, equipment 
and ammunition. Where necessary, the 
government must not hesitate to sanction 
‘one-time import’ of ammunition against 
critical deficiencies.
The government must increase allocation •	
for defence (excluding pensions) to 2.5 
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percent of gDP initially, and further raise it 
gradually to 3 percent until modernisation of 
the Armed Forces is complete. Concurrently, 
the government must introduce a system of 
‘roll-on’ budget, whereby funds once allotted 
to defence cannot be re-appropriated for any 
other purpose. It should even consider re-
allotting previously withdrawn or surrendered 
budget to the Armed Forces to help catch up 
with their modernisation needs. Further, the 
proposed defence expenditure must be aligned 
with NITI Aayog’s three, seven and 15-year 
vision and budget allocation perspective.
The Indian Army must cap its overall •	
numbers at the current level of 1.3 million 
but continue making fresh efforts at making 
up for the shortfall of officers. New structures 
for expanding the Army Aviation, enhancing 
informational warfare capability and for 
raising geadquarters for the proposed Special 
Operations, Cyber and Space Commands 
must be provided manpower from within the 
existing establishment. 
The government must stop protecting the •	
defence public sector and create a genuine 
level playing field for entry of the private sector 
into indigenous defence manufacturing. The 
private industry must be provided all possible 
incentives and encouragement to not only 
manufacture components and sub-systems for 
the defence PSUs and Ordnance Factories—
or just take over their assembly lines—but to 
manufacture full systems independently as 
well.
ADB must be fully operationalised on priority •	
under the guidance and support from the 
Ministry of Defence. It must be empowered 
to contribute effectively towards creating 
futuristic designs of all types of weapons and 
equipment for the Army. A separate cadre of 
officers must be deputed to this organisation 
and specialisation, once created among them, 
must be retained. Care must be taken, however, 
to protect their promotional prospects and 
career interests.
All functions within the procurement set-•	
up at Army headquarters must be manned 
by specialists rather than by generalists, thus 
making drastic improvements in the existing 
system. Specialists can be created by focussed 
selection, followed by extended and repeated 
tenures in ADB and procurement-related 
postings at Army headquarters.
The Indian Army must introduce measures •	
to restructure as well as cut down revenue 
expenditure with a view to generate more 
funds for capital procurement. The first 
step in this direction would be to integrate 
and, where possible, outsource its logistic 
functions. A good beginning was made 
in this area in 2011-12 as part of an initial 
implementation of the Army’s Transformation 
Study ordered at that time. however, the 
process was stalled and reversed due to 
vested interests and lack of sustained resolve. 
Further, concurrent to induction of new big 
ticket items and automated processes as part 
of the Army’s modernisation, the Army must 
restructure its units and cut down manpower 
where warranted. Plans for the same must be 
approved well in advance. however, efforts 
to reduce manpower must follow (and not 
precede) the equipment modernisation 
process.
Last but not the least, the government must •	
provide guidance to the military through 
issuance of national security strategy, defence 
policy and military strategy so that the three 
services, including the Army, can align their 
respective policies and doctrines to these 
formulations in a coordinated manner.
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There can be no doubt that the Indian Army 
needs to be modernised on priority. To achieve 
this objective, the government and the Army will 
have to take a look at the entire issue afresh and 
come up with innovative solutions to address the 
various obstacles standing in the way. Unless the 
identified challenges are addressed imaginatively, 
the modernisation plan will continue to flounder, 
as has been the experience over the past few 
years. Nonetheless, if the government of the day 
is seriously interested in modernising its Army, it 
must start off by allocating additional budget and 
starting a system of ‘roll-on’ budget so that money 
once allotted for modernisation cannot be re-
appropriated for any other purpose whatsoever.
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The Indian Air Force (IAF) was first established in 1932 as an auxiliary of the Indian Empire during the height of 
the British Raj. Today, that much-expanded and 
greatly modernised institution has since become 
the world’s fourth largest air arm, with more than 
1,300 aircraft and 170,000 personnel operating 
out of more than 60 far-flung bases nationwide. 
It is now looking forward as an able fighting 
force to its impending centennial in less than two 
decades.
Despite its impressive advances in capability 
in recent years, however, the IAF now faces a 
growing force structure predicament as a result 
of its declining number of fighter squadrons for 
accommodating the growing air threats posed by 
China and Pakistan. For years, the IAF had an 
authorised end strength of 39.5 fighter squadrons 
to deter and, if need be, defend India against these 
growing threats. More recently, that number of 
authoriszed squadrons was increased to 42. Yet, 
against that overall fighter force size approved 
in principle, the IAF maintains only 35 fighter 
squadrons in active service today. According to 
a recent assessment by the Indian government’s 
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Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, 
that number of squadrons is at risk of declining 
even further to as low as 25 by 2022 as the service’s 
ageing and obsolescent Mig-21s and Mig-27s are 
progressively retired before they can be replaced 
by India’s indigenously developed new Tejas Light 
Combat Aircraft (LCA).1
In light of this ever-deepening IAF fighter force-
size predicament, it would be an overreach to 
suggest that it “has brought Indian air power to its 
knees,” as one Indian appraisal recently concluded 
hyperbolically.2 Yet, more than a few informed 
observers would readily concur with the more 
measured judgment of the respected American 
analyst Ashley Tellis that the IAF is now “in 
crisis” as a result of its steadily declining fighter 
inventory.3 Indeed, the situation was assessed as 
having become a matter of sufficient concern that 
the IAF’s Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal 
Birender Singh Dhanoa, declared frankly before 
the start of the service’s latest Iron Fist firepower 
demonstration in March 2015: “Our numbers 
[of active fighter squadrons] are not adequate 
to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front 
scenario.”4
That assessed predicament points to a growing 
need for both the IAF and the broader Indian 
defence community to begin bending every effort 
to halt and reverse this continuing decline in 
India’s fighter strength. That, in turn, will require 
some hard choices on the part of both before long 
to draw and duly honour an unsentimental line 
in the sand between what is absolutely essential 
for the IAF and what would merely be ideal for it 
to have in a perfect world. Towards that end, the 
discussion that follows will review the most urgent 
decisions now facing India’s leaders with respect to 
the IAF’s three fighter acquisition programmes that 
have long been in various stages of still-unfinished 
evolution—the just-mentioned LCA, the Medium 
Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), and the 
Fifth-generation Fighter Aircraft (FgFA), the last 
of these an advanced stealth fighter intended to 
keep the IAF in the major league of aerial combat 
capability.
Completing the Tejas 
Acquisition
The IAF’s LCA that is now, at long last, in its 
initial phase of being operationally fielded is the 
hindustan Aeronautics Limited (hAL) Tejas 
delta-winged light fighter intended eventually to 
recapitalise at least a portion of what remains of 
the service’s long-serving Mig-21s, now slated for 
final retirement by 2020. The Tejas (which means 
‘brilliance’ or ‘radiance’ in Sanskrit) recently 
completed a long-in-progress multi-year technical 
evaluation aimed at ensuring that the aircraft’s 
performance attributes would meet the IAF’s 
declared operational needs.
This indigenous product, which first flew in 
January 2001, has its programmatic roots 
running as far back as 1983, when the IAF first 
formally recognised its eventual need to replace 
its inventory of Mig-21 fighters that had been 
the service’s combat mainstay since the 1970s. 
In early 2006, the IAF signed a contract with 
hAL for the delivery of 20 Tejas Mk I fighters to 
be ready for squadron service by 2011 once the 
aircraft passed its initial operational clearance. 
That milestone was not met, however, owing to 
multiple recurring development problems and 
resultant schedule slippages that have repeatedly 
hindered the programme’s progress ever since.
Ever since the aircraft’s maiden flight in January 
2001, the preproduction versions that have been 
in flight trials ever since have been powered by 
general Electric’s F404 engine (which also powers 
the earlier versions of US Navy’s F/A-18 hornet) as 
hAL and the IAF continued to await—ultimately 
in vain—the maturation of a planned more 
powerful domestically-designed engine called the 
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Kaveri. As a result, in its current configuration, 
the LCA is underpowered for its intended mission 
needs. For its part, the indigenous Kaveri engine 
programme ultimately proved to have been so 
afflicted by both design problems and rampant 
inefficiency that the IAF finally gave up on it.
To make a long story short here, after 32 years of 
continuously plagued and halting development, 
the first production Tejas Mk I aircraft was finally 
delivered to the IAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air 
Chief Marshal Arup Raha, in a formal handover 
ceremony at the hAL plant in Bengaluru on 
January 17, 2015. A retired IAF air marshal 
wrote soon thereafter, however, of “the low level 
of confidence the IAF has in this platform,” as 
attested by the fact that the aircraft had still so 
far received only its initial operational clearance 
and that the IAF to date has ordered only 40 Mk 
I versions to equip two squadrons, the delivery of 
which is now expected to be completed by 2020.5 
In this regard, India’s Comptroller and Auditor 
general later reported that the LCA Mark I “still 
has significant shortfalls... in meeting Air Staff 
requirements” that will cause it to have “reduced 
operational capabilities and reduced survivability, 
thus reducing its employability when inducted 
into IAF squadrons.”6  
On the positive side of the long-protracted LCA 
saga, Air Chief Marshal Raha, an experienced 
fighter pilot, flew the Tejas two-seat trainer 
version in May 2016 and subsequently declared 
it “a good aircraft and fit to be inducted into the 
IAF.”7  however, in light of the LCA’s relentless 
developmental problems throughout its three-
decade-long history, the IAF’s current plan to 
acquire no more than six squadrons of that aircraft 
seems all the more wise, particularly considering 
that the IAF chief ’s stated hope as recently as 
April 2016 that one Tejas squadron would be fully 
operational by year end has since proved overly 
optimistic.8 
It might make even further sense for the IAF to 
abandon entirely its long-promised eventual Mk 
II version of the Tejas and to proceed instead 
with all deliberate dispatch towards filling out its 
remaining 12 Mig-21 and Mig-27 squadrons. 
Squadrons, that will have been vacated by their 
current aircraft retirements within four years with 
whatever domestically-built foreign fighter that the 
IAF and the Indian government may eventually 
settle on to be produced under the aegis of the 
‘Make in India’ programme recently initiated by 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi (see immediately 
below for further discussion of this just-arisen new 
IAF fighter acquisition option). On this potentially 
liberating new count, an experienced former IAF 
test pilot who was closely involved in the Tejas’s 
development programme during his time in 
active service wrote in early 2015 that because of 
its “serious deficiencies in performance, the LCA 
cannot become the IAF’s frontline fighter at the 
low end of the mix,” nor can the IAF afford to 
“look for a one-to-one replacement of its rapidly 
ageing Mig-21 fleet.”9  
Picking an Acceptable 
MMRCA Beyond the Rafale
In marked contrast to hAL’s long-troubled LCA 
programme, a more substantial and potentially 
rewarding undertaking that has been in train 
for more than a decade has been the IAF’s effort 
to acquire a new Medium Multirole Combat 
Aircraft (MMRCA) to supplement and eventually 
supplant its ageing inventory of Mig-29s and 
Mirage 2000s.  That programme initially entailed 
a $10 billion bid by the service to induct 126 
new fourth-generation foreign-designed fighters, 
with all but the first 18 to be manufactured in 
India by hAL and with an option for a follow-
on acquisition that might ultimately yield a total 
of 200 new MMRCAs for the IAF in due course. 
This competition initially pitted six contenders 
against one another for the intended winner-take-
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all prize—Lockheed Martin’s F-16 (essentially 
a latest-model Block 70 F-16E/F missionised to 
specific IAF needs), Boeing’s F/A-18E/F (likewise 
missionised to IAF requirements), the Eurofighter 
Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale, SAAB’s JAS-39 
gripen, and the still-developmental Mig-35 
derivative of the Mig-29.
After protracted internal deliberations, the 
Ministry of Defence finally issued a formal 
request for proposals in August 2007 from the five 
foreign contenders that had opted to enter into 
the MMRCA competition. After having received 
formal bids from those contenders, the IAF then 
completed its technical evaluation phase and 
subsequent flight trials of the candidate aircraft in 
2010, after which it chose the Rafale in January 
2012 as its preferred follow-on MMRCA.  
The ensuing government-to-government 
negotiations for the IAF’s pending Rafale 
acquisition, however, soon became mired in various 
contractual disagreements, the most notable being 
Dassault’s understandable unwillingness to accept 
final responsibility for the quality of one of its 
products to be manufactured by hAL in India over 
which it would have no direct control. A seeming 
break of sorts in this protracted impasse was 
finally achieved in April 2015 when Modi, during 
an official Indian state visit to Paris, unexpectedly 
offered a direct government-to-government buy of 
36 Rafales for the IAF in flyaway condition straight 
off Dassault’s production line. At that point, with 
all on the French side having finally agreed to that 
proposed transaction, the remainder of the long-
festering initial Indian tender for 126 to 200 co-
produced Rafales that had hitherto failed to reach 
fruition was summarily cancelled, thus ending 
with the seeming stroke of a pen the IAF’s arduous 
decade-long quest for a follow-on MMRCA—yet 
still with nothing to show for it but the promise 
of a scant fraction of the number of new fighters it 
had initially sought.
In that important respect, the most significant 
downside of the arrangement achieved by Modi 
was its preclusion of any option for a follow-on 
procurement of any additional Rafales by India 
at the same price agreed to in principle, since 
the contract the two countries signed on 23 
September, 2015, included no provision for any 
purchases beyond the 36 aircraft already agreed 
to—meaning that any desired subsequent buy 
would have to be renegotiated at a new price.10
All of that said, the IAF’s original declared 
requirement for 126 to 200 new fighters to fill out 
its desired follow-on MMRCA inventory remains 
the same now as it was at the competition’s start. 
On that count, Air Chief Marshal Raha recently 
reiterated that “it is important [that] we have an 
MMRCA.” It may not need to be more Rafales 
than the 36 now negotiated for, he hastened to 
add, but “we need to have [something in that 
category] in the quickest possible time.”11  
As for what such an alternative in the same fighter 
category might ideally be, the Modi government 
recently expressed its readiness, under the rubric 
of its newly-declared ‘Make in India’ initiative, to 
support the IAF’s eventual acquisition of one of 
the fighters evaluated during its initial MMRCA 
flyoff, albeit this time to be made in India by the 
chosen foreign producer, and with India’s private 
industry rather than with hAL now envisaged as 
partnering in any such domestic manufacture. 
Towards that proposed end, Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, and Saab have all expressed their 
readiness to move their entire production lines for 
their respective F-16s, F/A-18s, and gripens to 
India to continue producing the most advanced 
versions of those aircraft not just for the IAF, but 
also for prospective additional buyers worldwide, 
and with a substantial supporting involvement 
of the Indian domestic labour force under the 
auspices of Indian private industry participation 
with whichever of those foreign companies may 
ultimately be picked to meet whatever may remain 
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of the IAF’s unfulfilled MMRCA requirement. 
Whatever course of action the IAF and the Indian 
government may ultimately choose to take in this 
regard, the stakes have become unprecedentedly 
high at a time when the IAF sorely needs such a 
continued recapitalisation effort to get its fighter 
squadron strength back up to a more reassuring 
level.  
Achieving Final Closure with 
the FGFA Requirement
The last of India’s three ongoing fighter acquisition 
initiatives entails its long-determined pursuit of a 
stealthy Fifth-generation Fighter Aircraft (FgFA), 
to begin entering service with the IAF once its 
MMRCA induction nears completion. Towards 
that ambitious end, the Indian government in 
late 2007 signed an agreement with its Russian 
counterpart to co-develop a suitable variant of 
the Sukhoi Design Bureau’s long-awaited T-50, 
a prospective Russian stealth fighter that was and 
continues to be promoted as being comparable 
in its essential design features and performance 
capabilities to the US Air Force F-22 Raptor air 
dominance fighter.
The T-50 finally made its long-awaited maiden flight 
at Sukhoi’s manufacturing facility at Novosibirsk 
in January 2010, and it has undergone continuing 
developmental trials at the Zhukovsky flight test 
centre near Moscow, Russia, ever since. Sukhoi 
describes the aircraft as one that will eventually 
incorporate very low observability to enemy radar 
and sustained supersonic speed without the need 
for using engine afterburners that consume the 
aircraft’s precious internal fuel so voraciously.  
In addition to promising to provide the IAF with 
a stealthy multirole fighter for the 21st century, 
a major aim of the proposed endeavour from the 
Indian government’s perspective was to enlist 
hAL’s involvement in a cooperative arrangement 
with Sukhoi to modify the aircraft to meet specific 
IAF mission needs. At the programme’s start, 
Russia and India each promised to contribute 
more than $4 billion to the FgFA development 
enterprise. however, throughout the nearly 10 
years that have since elapsed, hAL has played no 
role whatsoever in the PAK-FA’s development, 
and a serious question has arisen regarding hAL’s 
likely opportunity for playing any significant role 
in the aircraft’s co-development, since its most 
basic design features have already long since been 
set.
Further compounding the mounting uncertainties 
that now cast a dark shadow over the IAF’s initial 
hopes for its FgFA venture with Russia, throughout 
the seven years that have elapsed since the T-50’s 
maiden flight in early 2010, Sukhoi has flown 
only six prototypes of the aircraft to date, and its 
flight test programme continues to show halting 
progress at best. With respect to its all-important 
promised engine development, the T-50 test 
airframes now flying are still powered by merely 
improved versions of the engines that power the 
IAF’s existing Su-30MKIs. The aircraft’s projected 
definitive engines that will be needed for it to be 
able to supercruise at supersonic speeds without 
the use of afterburners—an essential precondition 
for a fifth-generation fighter—have not yet even 
been developed, let alone flight-tested. 
For its part, India’s state-owned aeronautics 
establishment from the very outset has counted 
on its promised co-development of the PAK-
FA to provide it needed access to Russian 
stealth technology and design know-how that 
will eventually be applicable to its planned 
indigenously-produced Advanced Manned 
Combat Aircraft (AMCA) that remains solely 
in initial concept development thus far, with an 
engineering and manufacturing development 
phase expected to begin in 2017. Yet the Russians 
to date have steadfastly refused to allow India 
any close exposure to that technology or even 
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any willingness in principle to share it, and IAF 
pilots—now seven years into Sukhoi’s T-50 test 
programme—have still not been permitted to fly 
the aircraft. 
Apparently in light of the T-50’s continuing 
developmental problems summarised earlier, 
the IAF in October 2012 reduced its planned 
acquisition of the aircraft from its original 
expected buy of 214 to just 144. Yet a further 
curve ball with regard to the seriousness of the 
T-50 programme was thrown India’s way when 
the Russian Ministry of Defence announced its 
decision in July 2015 to reduce its own planned 
buy of the aircraft to just a dozen for the Russian 
Air Force, less than even a single squadron’s worth, 
and to opt instead for the less expensive and more 
reliable fall-back alternative of the Su-35, a much-
improved upgrade of the now-venerable Su-27.12 
That may have been at least one factor behind 
a report the following month that the IAF had 
further reduced its planned acquisition of T-50s 
to just three squadrons totalling 63 aircraft—a 
70 percent decline in numbers from what had 
originally been envisaged as the IAF’s prospective 
fifth-generation fighter force.13  
In this regard, the IAF’s leaders argued before India’s 
Ministry of Defence towards the end of 2014 
that the prospective Russian-developed FgFA—
that had long been in their force-modernisation 
plans—had since shown clear “shortfalls ... in terms 
of performance and other technical features.”  The 
service’s vice-chief later declared that the aircraft’s 
existing interim engine was unsatisfactory, its 
radar was inadequate, its stealth features appeared 
poorly engineered, India’s permitted work share 
was too low, and the aircraft’s unit cost would 
be prohibitive by the time the T-50 is eventually 
ready for series production.14 These problems led 
one former IAF officer in mid-2016 to conclude 
finally that the Indo-Russian venture was showing 
“all symptoms of being still-borne.”15  
All of this raises the inescapable next question as 
to whether the IAF and its civilian superiors might 
now conceivably have a growing incentive to begin 
giving close consideration instead to the American 
F-35 as a more promising FgFA candidate, since 
it offers the only realistic alternative available for 
the IAF’s eventually acquiring an effective stealth 
fighter by the time of the service’s centennial in 
2032. At the outset of the IAF’s proposed joint 
FgFA venture with Russia in 2007, India’s 
defence minister at the time was so confident 
of its prospects that he rejected any thought of 
India’s signing up to the F-35 programme. That 
alternative has still not yet been openly explored in 
Indian force development discussions throughout 
the years since, even though the US government 
has expressed its willingness to entertain any such 
indication of Indian interest.  Today, nearly a decade 
later, perhaps the time for such consideration by 
the IAF and by its civilian superiors in the Indian 
government may now finally be at hand.
The IAF’s Enduring 
Strengths 
Despite its gradually declining number of active 
fighter squadrons, the IAF has nonetheless evolved 
over the past decade and a half into an air arm of 
world-class respectability in every other significant 
respect. That abiding fact of life needs to be kept 
prominently in mind by any who would fret about 
the service’s force-structure tribulations in simple 
terms of numbers of fielded combat aircraft. 
Any Indian fighter pilot today from the Chief of 
the Air Staff to down would declare confidently 
that he and his service remain more than up to 
the demands of taking on any plausible combat 
challenge that might come their way any time 
soon. 
The IAF’s most notable maturation milestones in 
recent years have been its emergence as India’s main 
means of nuclear deterrence, its growing role as 
India’s Air Force at a Pivotal Crossroads
41
India’s leading provider of conventional deterrence, 
its shift from being a geographically-limited force 
to one with growing transcontinental reach, and 
its ability to achieve not only prompt tactical but 
also strategic effects as the country’s first responder 
in case of a sudden military challenge to India’s 
core security interests. As just one indicator of 
the IAF’s continuing transformation in combat 
capability, the service now operates one of the 
world’s finest fighters in the Soviet-designed 
and Indian-built Su-30MKI multirole combat 
aircraft. This platform, with a total of 272 on 
order and possibly more yet to follow, is not just 
a stock Russian product like India’s earlier Migs, 
but a true hybrid aircraft built expressly to IAF 
requirements and incorporating both indigenous 
and Western technology, including the Israeli-
developed Litening targeting pod that enables the 
precision delivery of conventional munitions from 
safe stand-off altitudes beyond the effective reach 
of enemy short-range surface-to-air missiles.
With regard to its doctrine and concepts of 
operations, the IAF stands today at the cutting 
edge of modern air power thinking, with its 
leaders well mindful that any future conflict will 
be air-led and that the conflict’s outcome will turn 
heavily on what the IAF can contribute to the joint 
fight.16 That continuing evolution in the service’s 
operational outlook was perhaps best reflected 
most recently through the release in 2012 of a 
new and updated version of the IAF’s earlier 1995 
doctrine document aimed at capturing the latest 
in applied approaches toward air warfare.17 
As for the mindset that governs day-to-day IAF 
sortie generation at the squadron level, the service’s 
latest doctrine manual expressly acknowledges the 
abiding rule of western air forces stressing “the need 
to validate [force employment concepts] through 
realistic exercises.”18 Towards that end, IAF 
fighter pilots in their routine peacetime training 
now log 180-200 flight hours a year in a variety 
of air-to-air and surface-attack sortie profiles. 
This intensity of training is easily at par with the 
average number of flight hours flown annually by 
their US Air Force and Navy counterparts. Recent 
years have also seen an increased trend towards 
the periodic conduct of squadron-level large-
force employment exercises involving multiple 
tanker hookups and the supporting involvement 
of airlifters, helicopters, and teams of Special 
Operations Forces.
high-profile bilateral international training 
exchanges have also become a new and welcome 
focus of IAF activity over the past decade and a 
half, offering both useful learning opportunities 
for IAF pilots and also invaluable occasions for 
showcasing the IAF’s increasingly refined air 
combat prowess. The service first opened itself 
up to the outside world of military aviation in 
February 2003 when it invited a detachment of 
French Air Force Mirage 2000 fighters to gwalior, 
in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, to take 
part in the garuda I air-to-air training exercise. 
It was only after that eye-opening experience that 
the IAF fighter community began to appreciate 
the importance of acquiring proficiency at beyond 
visual-range air-to-air combat, as well as the value 
of cross-training with western air forces rather 
than simply accepting as gospel what their Russian 
suppliers had long said with respect to the combat 
capabilities of Russian aircraft.
That cutting-edge operating capability was more 
recently showcased when an IAF contingent in 
2008 participated for the first time ever in the US 
Air Force’s renowed two-week-long Red Flag large-
force training exercise conducted four times a year 
out of Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. That IAF 
deployment of eight Su-30MKI strike fighters, 
two Il-78 tankers, and two Il-76 airlifters was by 
far the service’s most elaborate involvement in such 
international training events since the practice 
first began for it on a regular basis in 2003. The 
IAF included a mix of seasoned and novice pilots 
in its deployment package, and they rode a steep 
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learning curve throughout the two-week exercise. 
Although its Su-30MKIs were not configured to 
tap into the American Link 16 communications 
network, they flowed seamlessly into the Blue 
Force’s daily game plan in every other respect. 19  
Another IAF force contingent, this time consisting 
of four Su-30MKIs, four Jaguars and two Il-78s, 
took part in Red Flag Alaska 16-1 conducted out 
of Eilson Air Force Base, Alaska, during a similar 
two-week period from April 28 to May 14, 2016. 
In that latest reprise of the IAF’s earlier Red Flag 
experience, IAF pilots planned, briefed, and led 
three coalition strike missions, with their Su-
30MKIs taking part in both Blue and Red Force 
roles. Afterwards, the exercise’s chief operations 
officer, US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Brian 
Toth, recalled of the experience, “The IAF’s 
participation has been very good....  For most 
nations, it takes an exercise or two to step up to 
meet the requirements of a mission commander. 
The IAF has been mission commander three times 
and also performed the package commander’s 
roles.”20 One could scarcely ask for a more 
authoritative and credible foreign validation of the 
IAF’s operating prowess.    
Understanding the IAF’s 
Declining Fighter Force Size 
For all its many organisational strengths summed 
up here, the IAF continues to suffer from a 
growing shortage of combat aircraft owing to the 
progressive retirement of its older fighters in the 
absence of a concurrent dedicated effort by the 
Indian government to maintain and sustain the 
service’s authorised squadron strength. The still-
unaddressed question here concerns the extent to 
which the permanent Indian civilian government 
bureaucracy, with its ingrained corporate drag and 
impacted decision processes, and the country’s 
ruling political elites who oversee and approve all 
defence resource apportionment, will ultimately be 
able to muster the capacity for collective action that 
will be required for them to act most expeditiously 
toward providing a measure of enduring relief to 
this single most persistent IAF liability.
At bottom, when it comes to pursuing its legitimate 
force modernisation needs in the policy arena, the 
IAF has repeatedly faced a hard sell. Like India’s 
other two uniformed services, it wields little 
organisational clout in high-level defence decision 
making. By all accounts, political leaders and senior 
civilian bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence and 
the Ministry of Finance make all major strategy 
and weapons procurement decisions, with inputs 
emanating from the service chiefs only when 
expressly requested. This arrangement has been 
the outgrowth of an early determination by newly 
independent India’s first leaders in 1947 to ensure 
firm civilian control over the armed forces. Within 
its framework, there is an agreed and routinely 
exercised channel through which the service chiefs 
can let their programmatic needs be known. 
however, as two respected scholars of Indian 
security policy have pointed out, the services are 
“entirely at the mercy of the civilian bureaucracy, 
both in the Ministries of Defence and Finance,” 
when it comes to resource apportionment and 
policy matters.21  
Yet another obstacle to rational IAF force 
development has long been what one Indian 
observer called the government’s “Victorian-era 
bureaucracy” and what a former Indian Navy chief 
described as that bureaucracy’s “archaic system of 
higher defence management.”22 A former mid-
level US defence official, who served in New 
Delhi, recalls from first-hand observation in 2009, 
“the government of India has a very hierarchical 
decision-making process whereby even minor 
decisions need to be approved at very high levels of 
the bureaucracy. This creates a major chokepoint 
for getting things done.”23
A final impediment to effective IAF force-
India’s Air Force at a Pivotal Crossroads
43
development planning is the fact that there is no 
military representation in the formal structure of 
India’s government, since the service chiefs are 
excluded from a permanent role in the Cabinet 
Committee on Security.  This arrangement, unique 
among the world’s major democracies, militates 
against the most senior political leadership’s 
interacting with the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
and with the service chiefs individually in a 
policy-useful way. It also has, in the words of one 
knowledgeable observer, “insulated the armed 
forces’ leadership from security and defence 
decision making and eroded the role of service 
chiefs as professional military advisers to the 
government.”24
Desiderata for Reaching the 
IAF’s Centennial on a High 
Note
The above-noted political and bureaucratic facts 
of life in India lie at the heart of the IAF’s steadily 
declining number of fielded fighter squadrons 
and—arguably—are largely responsible for it. 
At its core, the problem here ultimately does 
not lie within the corporate confines of the IAF, 
which is as sophisticated and professional as any 
air force anywhere when it comes to its ability 
to conduct rational long-range force planning. 
Rather, the principal source of the IAF’s current 
force-structure malaise is what one Indian scholar 
recently described as “India’s lackadaisical military 
acquisition processes and a habitually obstructive 
and ... lethargic [civilian] bureaucracy” that shows 
“little evidence of adequate understanding and 
will to prepare for the projected ... challenges of 
the future.”25 Thanks to that ingrained failing 
on the larger Indian government’s part, the IAF 
continues to be burdened with a mounting crisis 
in fighter-force end strength, with its authorised 
goal of 42 squadrons now down to 39 on paper, 
but with only 31 squadrons currently in actual 
service and with an expected further decline to 28 
or fewer squadrons as still more obsolescent Mig-
21s and Mig-27s go to pasture before the promise 
of any recovery can be realised.
given this ever-deepening predicament, the IAF’s 
pronounced edge over its most likely opponents in 
pilot proficiency and tactical acumen may well be 
its most valuable ace in the hole for offsetting its 
otherwise disturbing decline in numbers of fielded 
fighter squadrons. For more than a decade now, the 
IAF and its civilian superiors have endlessly agitated 
over three vital fighter acquisition initiatives that, 
to date, have delivered to the service the grand total 
of just two Tejas Mk I indigenously-made fighters, 
both of which have been deemed still not ready for 
unrestricted operational use. To reverse this self-
inflicted adverse situation, India’s civilian defence 
bureaucracies will need to bend every effort to get 
beyond their past equivocations to both make and 
systematically honour three hard decisions to get 
the IAF’s three most important still-continuing 
fighter force modernisation efforts off dead centre 
and moving in a productive direction at long last. 
First, the government of India must make a firm 
and final determination as to how many Tejas LCAs 
it will expect the IAF to acquire and then must 
support every needed effort to make that aircraft 
operationally acceptable to the IAF’s leadership. 
Second, it must soon choose a preferred MMRCA 
candidate from among the three foreign-designed 
alternatives now back in contention and support 
the earliest establishment of a domestic production 
line for that aircraft under Prime Minister Modi’s 
‘Make in India’ aegis. This effort should be made 
not only to satisfy the IAF’s MMRCA requirement 
beyond the 36 Rafales already negotiated for, but 
also to help replenish at least some of the service’s 
Mig-21 and Mig-27 squadrons that will soon 
be losing their existing aircraft to long-overdue 
retirements.  
Third and last, India must finally face up squarely 
to the question of whether it is still willing to 
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continue gambling, at great likely cost for dubious 
gain at best, on Russia’s now manifestly flawed 
and faltering FgFA candidate. If it is not, and 
if the IAF is indeed determined to have a fifth-
generation stealth fighter in its inventory by the 
time of its centennial celebration in 2032, the 
Indian government will need to take a searching 
look at the F-35 as its only realistic alternative for 
making good on that requirement. Either way, if it 
and the IAF can come to a definitive meeting of the 
minds on these most pivotal force-development 
issues once and for all, India’s air service will have 
every chance of reaching its 100th anniversary 
standing both proudly and with confidence as one 
of the world’s most able and respected air arms.
1 Franz-Stefan gady, “The Indian Air Force’s Big 
Problem: Not Enough Pilots,” The Diplomat (New 
Delhi), April 30, 2015.
2 Abhijit Iyer-Mitra and Angad Singh, “Indian Air 
Power,” in Sushant Singh and Pushan Das, eds., 
Defence Primer: India at 75, New Delhi: Observer 
Research Foundation, 2016, p. 43.
3 Ashley J. Tellis, Troubles, They Come in Battalions: 
The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force, 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2016, p. 5.
4 Sandeep Unnithan, “IAF in Downward Spiral,” 
SP’s Aviation (New Delhi), Issue 3, 2015, p. 2.
5 Air Marshal B. K. Pandey, IAF (Ret.),“Moving at 
a Tardy Pace,” SP’s Aviation (New Delhi), Issue 3, 
2015, p. 42.
6 group Captain A. K. Sachdev, IAF (Ret.), “Tejas 
Mark-2 and IAF,” SP’s Aviation (New Delhi), Issue 
6, 2016, p. 11.
7 Air Marshal B. K. Pandey, IAF (Ret.), “Air Chief 
Marshal Raha Flies Tejas,” SP’s Aviation (New 
Delhi), Issue 6, 2016, p. 11.
8 Quoted in Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, IAF (Ret.), 
“hitting the Nail on Its head,” Force (New Delhi), 
March 2016.
9 Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, IAF (Ret.), “have 
We Lost the Plot?” Vayu Aerospace and Defence 
(New Delhi), Issue 2, 2015, p. 37.
10 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Unlikely to Buy 
Additional Rafale Fighter Jets, MoD Source Says,” 
Defense News, October 5, 2016.
11 Quoted in Rahul Bedi, “Aero India 2015: Indian 
Air Force Chief Adds to MMRCA Confusion,” 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 22, 2015.  
12 Air Marshal B. K. Pandey, IAF (Ret.), “Views: The 
Fifth-generation Fighter Aircraft,” SP’s Aviation 
(New Delhi), Issue 3, 2016, p. 6.
13 Shashank Joshi, “India’s Incredible Shrinking Air 
Force,” The Interpreter (New Delhi), September 
21, 2015.
14 Ajai Shukla, “Russia Can’t Deliver on Fifth 
generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF,” Business 
Standard (New Delhi), January 21, 2014.
15 group Captain A. K. Sachev, IAF (Ret.), “Tejas 
Mark-2 and IAF,” SP’s Aviation (New Delhi), Issue 
6, 2016, p. 10.
16 Air Chief Marshal F. h. Major, IAF, “Aerospace 
Power in a Changing National Security 
Environment,” Air Power Journal (New Delhi), 
Monsoon 2007, p. 6.
17 See Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, IAP 
2000-12, New Delhi: Indian Air Force, Air 
headquarters, Directorate of Operations (Space), 
2012. 
18 Ibid., p. 116.
19 “Red Flag at Nellis: The Indian Air Force in Big 
League,” Vayu Aerospace and Defence (New Delhi), 
Issue 5, 2008, pp. 40-47. 
20 Air Marshal B. K. Pandey, IAF (Ret.), “Perfect Red 
Flag,” SP’s Aviation, Issue 6, 2016, pp. 18-21.
21 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming 
without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2010, pp. 40-41.
22 gupta, “India’s Military Aviation Market,” p. 53 
and Admiral Arun Prakash, IN (Ret.), “All ‘Chiefs’ 
and No ‘Indians’! Yet Another Case for the Chief 
of Defence Staff,” Force (New Delhi), November 
2007, p. 14.
23 Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. hedrick, USA, 
India’s Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding 
Global Relationships, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute, Occasional 
Paper, November 2009, pp. 39-40.
24 Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, IAF (Ret.), “Direction 
of higher Defence: II,” Strategic Analysis (New 
Delhi), July 1998, pp. 504-507.
25 Ajai Sahni, “The One Super Simple Thing That 
Is holding Back India’s Military Might,” The 
National Interest, November 19, 2016.
Endnotes
45
The India Air Force (IAF) is one of the best funded in the world, however, paradoxically it is one of the most 
underfunded for its allocated task. In order to 
defend the country against potential hostile actions 
and provide deterrence against both Pakistan and 
China, the IAF is increasingly ill equipped. One 
of its largest drawbacks in terms of operational 
efficiency—that it operates more types of fast jet 
simultaneously than almost any other air force—is 
also paradoxically an indication of how well funded 
it is compared to many air forces, which think of 
themselves as “reference air forces”. A victim of 
political interference in procurement efforts, the 
IAF has been relatively unsuccessful in convincing 
politicians to move towards an air power-centric 
approach taken by most global powers, and it still 
competes for funding with a huge Army and an 
increasingly strident Navy with blue water power 
projection ambitions. Despite a target strength 
of 44 squadrons of fast jets, the IAF is at present 
well below its authorised minimum safe figure 
of 39.5 squadrons.1 In fact, almost a quarter of 
its intended numerical strength has been lost to 
obsolescence in a little over a decade, even without 
considering normal attrition, which remains high 
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in its older fleets. 
In terms of fast jets, India currently flies the hawk, 
Mig-21, Mig-27, Mig-29, Jaguar, Mirage 2000, 
Su-30MKI and Tejas; and will soon fly the Rafale. 
In addition, the current ambition is to procure 
another lightweight fighter, most likely the Saab 
gripen E/F or Lockheed Martin F-16 ‘Block 
70/72’, as well as a fifth generation derivative of 
Russia’s troubled PAK FA/T-50 stealth fighter. With 
such a staggering diversity, ranging from extremely 
old and on their way to retirement to cutting edge 
and expensive multi-role aircraft, the IAF faces 
daunting logistics, training standardisation and 
force design challenges. Moreover, partly due 
to the expense of supporting and operating so 
many different aircraft fleet, the IAF is seriously 
under strength with only 32 squadrons as of early 
2016.2 The fast jet components of the IAF will 
be examined here in terms of its air defence and 
strike capabilities as against Pakistani and Chinese 
airpower trends. 
At present, the IAF is undergoing a phase out its 
ageing and accident-prone Mig-21, which was 
a fine interceptor in the 1960s and 1970s but is 
now laughably outclassed by every hostile aircraft 
it might encounter in the region.3 This leaves 
the bulk of Indian air defence duties to the large 
and growing Su-30MKI multirole fighter fleet, 
alongside the exclusively air-to-air Mig 29s and 
the small but capable multirole Mirage 2000-5 
fleet. The indigenously produced Tejas Mark 1 
has so far proven inadequate for IAF’s needs; 
and so development of an improved Mark 1A 
is a matter of priority in order to minimise the 
numerical shortfall created by the final retirement 
of the remaining Mig-21s by 2017. The 36 Rafale 
swing-role fighters being procured directly from 
France will certainly help meet India’s air defence 
requirements, given the potent air superiority 
capabilities of the type, but it is too small a 
number to provide much of an answer to India’s 
requirements for defending its vast airspace from 
intruders and potential hostile strikes. Further, 
the Rafale will be the only remotely credible 
type operated by the IAF for an airborne nuclear 
delivery mission against Chinese and even 
eventually Pakistani air defences in the years to 
come. So it is likely that the majority of the Rafale 
fleet will concentrate on the nuclear deterrence 
mission unless the order number expands in future 
to the detriment of its capability to maintain pilot 
proficiency in the conventional multirole and air 
defence domains. 
The Su-30MKI needs to be discussed in some depth 
since its numerical dominance in the makeup 
of the IAF into the 2020s means that the latter 
has staked a huge gamble on the type, remaining 
viable and competitive against rival air forces for 
some time to come. India has ordered 272 Su-
30MKIs and has, so far, received over 240 of the 
heavy fighters. This large fleet size contrasts with 
an envisaged strength of around 55 Mirage 2000s, 
70 Mig-29s and 36 Rafales, as well as somewhere 
in the region of 200 light fighters—most likely a 
mix of Tejas Mark 1A/2 and gripen/F-16s. 
The Su-30MKI shares almost all standard strengths 
and weaknesses of late-model ‘Flanker’ family. It is 
extremely manoeuvrable in a close-range turning 
fight, although it bleeds energy fast in high-alpha 
manoeuvres and does not have the thrust-to-weight 
ratio of the latest Western or Russian fighters. It 
has a large and powerful radar, can carry a wide 
variety of missiles and ground attack munitions, 
and has an impressive range on internal fuel. On 
the downside, it has a huge radar cross-section 
(RCS) and is thus liable to be detected long 
before it can detect opposing fighters—whether 
operating under active or passive search methods. 
The thrust-vectoring engines significantly increase 
manoeuvrability at high angles of attack, low 
airspeeds and very high altitudes. however, at the 
same time, it increases maintenance complexity 
and decreases reliability. With a mix of long and 
short-range missiles and different seeker heads, 
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the Su-30MKI is a dangerous opponent for non-
stealth fighters of the fourth and 4.5 generations. 
however, against fifth generation fighters such 
as the F-22 Raptor and F-35, as well as China’s 
developing J-20A, the aircraft has few answers. 
Stealth aircraft will always detect the Su-30MKI 
from very long range, and can take position to 
either avoid it or engage under the best possible 
launch parameters.4 
For the task of carrying the main weight of 
policing India’s airspace and conducting multirole 
air superiority and strike missions against Pakistan 
in a future conflict, the Su-30MKI is likely to give 
the IAF a capable and potent core fleet for the 
next 10-15 years. however, against Chinese Su-
35, J-10B and J-11 fighters, it is at least equalled 
in most scenarios; but the J-20A and future 
Chinese stealth aircraft will significantly outclass 
it. Further, the Su-30MKI is not credible against 
modern air defence networks, due to very high 
RCS, heat signature and, at best, average electronic 
warfare and jamming capabilities. This means 
that, for deterrence purposes, it is not credible 
against China and will slowly lose its capability 
to conduct deep strike missions in Pakistan as the 
latter improves its defences. With the air-launched 
Brahmos supersonic cruise missile integrated, 
however, the type does give the IAF a formidable 
anti-ship capability, especially with the long range 
inherent in the ‘Flanker’ design. 
The IAF’s other air defence types do not offer much 
that the Su-30MKI cannot either. The Mirage 
2000-5, currently being upgraded and modernised 
at the Indian Mark 2 standard, remains a capable 
and efficient lightweight fighter but cannot offer 
any BVR improvements over the Su-30MKI. It 
is a rough analogy in capability terms at medium 
and short ranges with China’s J-10A, Pakistan’s 
F-16 Block 52+ and FC-20 (J-10 derivative), 
and only provides a marginal superiority over 
the Sino-Chinese JF-17. Meanwhile, the Mig-29 
is an ageing design, which remains formidably 
manoeuvrable within visual range but shares Su-
30MKI’s drawbacks of huge RCS and lack of 
supercruise, besides being desperately short legged 
on internal fuel. It remains a limited capability 
interceptor for the IAF with little technology-
growth potential. The Rafale could certainly be 
a highly capable air combat capability for the 
IAF but, as previously mentioned, 36 is a very 
small fleet to defend such a large airspace; and 
the IAF’s nuclear deterrence mission will most 
likely take priority for the type. Essentially, the 
IAF is equipping itself with air defence types that 
are at least adequate to face the current threat 
types, which it is likely to encounter. however, it 
remains numerically in a state of understrength; 
and consecutive delays in modernisation efforts 
mean that by the time the new force composition 
is fully in place, China will most likely to operating 
fifth generation J-20s in relatively large numbers, 
for which the IAF will have no adequate answer. 
Pakistan has also expressed interest in both the Su-
35 (a more capable ‘Flanker’ in the air superiority 
role than the Su-30MKI) and the Chinese FC-31 
stealth fighters. however, the FC-31 is still very 
much an unknown quantity and the J-31 on 
which it would be based has not found favour with 
the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 
in China so far. It would be unwise, therefore, 
to suggest Pakistan is on the verge of operating 
fighters which could seriously threaten the IAF 
over Indian territory. 
In the medium term, the IAF needs to decide 
whether it is aiming to offer a serious challenge to 
the growing might of the Chinese PLAAF or not. 
If the main effort is to remain focused on Pakistan, 
then the current acquisition programme for Indian 
combat airpower is probably technologically 
adequate but remains short on mass. If offering 
a serious aerial challenge to Chinese freedom of 
action in India’s backyard is the intention however, 
the IAF is on course to fall seriously short in both 
the quality and quantity of its fighter force by 
the mid-2020s. Indigenous fighter development 
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efforts are unlikely to solve this problem. The Tejas 
saga has exposed some uncomfortable realities 
for India’s defence aviation industry. While it 
has proven to be capable of upgrading existing 
airframes with a variety of avionics, weapons and 
engines—for example, the Jaguar and Mirage 
2000 upgrade programmes—hAL has taken 30 
years, huge resources and a great deal of political 
backing to produce a lightweight fighter with 
modest conventional capabilities and serious 
quality control issues. The inability to reach a 
satisfactory set of arrangements to manufacture 
the 4.5 generation Rafale in India was not simply 
a matter of price, but also a result of hAL’s 
unsuitability in its current form to ensure sufficient 
quality control for manufacturing modern high 
performance fighter aircraft. The task of producing 
a fifthgeneration fighter—or sixth—will be a far 
more formidable undertaking. 
India has placed its hopes in the fifth generation 
sphere on the Russian PAK FA/T-50 programme, 
and has been a longstanding partner and funder 
of the aircraft’s development. however, this 
is beginning to look like a poor investment 
decision since Russia is discovering what China 
and US also discovered with the J-20 and the 
F-35 programmes, respectively. The fact is that 
while it is comparatively simple to develop flying 
prototypes that look like fifth generation fighters, 
it is exceedingly difficult to transition to produce 
something in quantity that performs like a fifth 
generation fighter, both in low-observability 
and sensor fusion-enabled situational awareness. 
There are many reasons to criticise the manner 
in which US and Lockheed Martin (an American 
global aerospace, defence, security and advanced 
technologies company) have managed the F-35 
programme, but the core reason why the aircraft’s 
delivery is so delayed and expensive—compared to 
initial assumptions—is because of the featuresUS 
wants in the aircraft and its extremely difficult 
systems engineering. 
Russia’s plans for purchasing the T-50 for its own 
air force have now been cut back to a laughable 
single squadron for the VVS, which is a very strong 
indicator that all is not well inside the secretive 
programme.5 Difficulties remain with the aircraft’s 
engines, wing strength and stealth properties, as 
well as sensor integration for the pilot. While a 
usable combat-capable T-50 might emerge towards 
the mid-2020s, developing an Indian Sukhoi/
hAL Fifth generation Fighter Aircraft (FgFA) 
derivative will take longer still; and be expensive 
and slow to deliver in quantity. The upshot of 
all this is that India has a serious fifth generation 
fighter problem if it plans to confront China in 
air. It is unlikely to get combat-worthy platforms 
from Russia in the short term, and US has not 
yet indicated any willingness to sell F-35s to the 
IAF. Meanwhile, the J-20A low-rate production 
aircraft being displayed by the PLAAF represent 
a fast-emerging capability for low-observable 
strikes inside Indian airspace by China in a crisis. 
One solution might be to seek purchase of new 
generation AWACS aircraft, which might at least 
give current generation IAF fighters an idea of 
where to look for stealthy intruders. Saab’s latest 
Erieye ER—which uses a very high-energy AESA 
array to reportedly track stealthy fighter-sized 
targets at significant range—has been bought 
by the United Arab Emirates; and represents a 
potentially disruptive technology which India 
could benefit from.6 Another path might be to 
purchase Russian long-wavelength frequency agile 
ground radars such as the Nebo-series in order to 
provide a credible anti-stealth capability for the 
five regiments of long range S-400 air defence 
systems, which India agreed to purchase from 
Russia in October 2016 for deliver by 2020.7 This 
combination, far more than any aircraft which 
the IAF has in the procurement or development 
pipeline at present, is likely to remain a serious 
threat to any low-observable would-be intruders 
into Indian airspace. 
In terms of offensive conventional striking power, 
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the IAF will have to rely increasingly on the same 
multirole fighters as it does for air defence—the 
Su-30MKI and Rafale. This is because India’s 
two dedicated strike and interdiction fast jets, the 
Jaguar and Mig-27, are both long past their prime 
against peer-competitors in spite of several engine, 
avionics and weaponry upgrade programmes 
during their long service lives. Following a spate of 
crashes due to technical failures, the IAF is aiming 
to retire its entire Mig-27 fleet by 2024, and 
has already started decommissioning individual 
airframes.8 In contrast, the Jaguar has recently 
been upgraded again and, particularly in the 
case of these newest DARIN III standard aircraft, 
possesses a respectable payload capacity, excellent 
range on internal fuel at low level, and the ability 
to deliver a range of precision munitions. however, 
the essential limitation for both the Jaguar and 
Mig-27 in terms of current and future combat 
effectiveness is that generational improvements 
in fighter and air defence radars have rendered 
their core concept of operations—flying very 
low in ground clutter to avoid detection on 
deep-penetration strike operations—at extremely 
high-risk in the face of modern opposition. 
Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, as well as China’s Flanker 
derivatives and J-10 family are all equipped with 
radars capable of good detection and tracking 
performance in look-down, shoot-down mode 
against ground-hugging intruders. Both the Mig-
27 and upgraded Indian Jaguar DARIN III have 
very limited self-defence capabilities, so would 
have to be closely escorted by dedicated fighter 
types during medium-level sorties into hostile 
airspace, thereby further reducing the number of 
Indian fighters available for air defence/superiority 
missions. The ill-fated MMRCA programme was 
supposed to provide a powerful supplementary 
and, eventually, replacement capability for IAF 
strike squadrons. however, as with air defence 
tasks, the 36 Rafales will be extremely capable in 
the strike role, but are being bought in completely 
insufficient numbers to replace the 125 Jaguars 
and around 85 Mig-27MLs still in IAF service. 
A purchase of either F-16 ‘Block 70/72’ Vipers 
or gripen E/Fs to complement the Tejas in the 
light-fighter niche and fill some of the void left by 
the failure of MMRCA would certainly go a long 
way towards addressing the obsolescence of India’s 
strike fighter fleets. 
None of the types at present operational in the IAF 
can hope to survive long inside a Chinese hQ-9 
missile engagement zone (MEZ). Therefore, it 
seems logical for the IAF to accept that maintaining 
conventional deterrence capabilities against the 
might of a rising Chinese superpower is unlikely 
to remain possible in the next 20 years, based on 
current trends. however, it should be well within 
the capabilities of the IAF to adequately defend 
Indian airspace and provide a powerful deterrent 
against Pakistan, given its level of technical 
competence and funding, provided it accepts that 
its fighter aircraft will not be able to detect and 
destroy stealth threats, and continues to invest 
in modern air defence missile and radar systems 
optimised for these difficult targets. 
The IAF as a highly proficient service which, unlike 
many of its Western counterparts, operates in the 
vicinity of, and trains to fight against, two peer 
competitors in high-end operations. Pakistani and 
Chinese aerial capabilities present very different 
levels of threat to India’s ability to defend its own 
airspace, and likewise, their respective air defence 
capabilities present greatly differing levels of 
threat to India’s own offensive power-projection 
capabilities. India stands to benefit from an effects-
based measurement of capability requirements, 
rather than the older practice of ‘counting 
airframes’. Instead of chasing an unrealistic 
target of 40-44 squadrons of modern combat 
aircraft, or even the current minimum target of 
39.5 squadrons, the IAF should try to eliminate 
much of the costly duplication of platforms for 
various missions and focus on defending its 
airspace from potential Chinese intrusions in 
future, and maintain credible offensive strike 
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capabilities to ensure stable deterrence at the sub-
nuclear level against Pakistan. These two tasks 
might be effectively attained by developing a 
modern and potent ground-based integrated air 
defence system (IADS) focused on counter-stealth 
capabilities for defence against China, paired with 
a smaller number of fourth and 4.5  generation 
multirole fighters to provide flexible air defence 
and strike capabilities to counter Pakistan. This 
sort of approach, however, would mean accepting 
a loss in airframe numbers and a cull of older, 
less effective types to allow rapid acquisition of 
modern multirole types in sufficient, but not 
equivalent numbers. An example of this approach 
is that against modern opponents such as the 
Chinese and Pakistani Air Forces, replacing the 
14 squadrons of Mig-21s and Mig-27s with 
three or four squadrons of modern F-16 ‘Block 
70/72s’ or gripen E/Fs would certainly represent 
a significant growth in capability, despite a large 
numerical decrease in airframes available. 
given the lack of credible fifth generation fighter 
options for the IAF in the foreseeable future, 
India’s most profitable avenues for capability 
enhancement of its existing fourth and 4.5 
generation types in the face of Pakistani and 
Chinese threat technologies are likely to be found 
in long-ranged, high-speed standoff weaponry and 
electronic warfare. These approaches both hinge 
around reducing the vulnerability of non-stealthy 
air assets—by allowing engagements at longer 
ranges in comparison to threat system engagement 
envelopes—and offer the potential to significantly 
prolong the operational usefulness of the fourth 
generation types against high-end threats for all 
air forces. It is, therefore, encouraging to see the 
progress being made in the IAF’s Su-30MKI fleet, 
for example, in terms of integrating the capable 
Israeli Elta EL/M-8222 jamming pod and Brahmos 
cruise missile. The eventual incorporation of the 
Zhuk-AESA radar on the fleet should also enhance 
situational awareness, survivability and electronic 
warfare capabilities.9 Equally, the Rafale will 
bring the formidable and impressive SPECTRA 
electronic warfare suite, SCALP Eg cruise 
missiles and the gripen Ng (should India opt to 
purchase it). Electronic warfare-based approaches 
to aircraft survivability require a sustained tempo 
of investment in software development to remain 
viable but, due to this higher refresh time, are 
inherently more flexible than a reliance on 
airframe-shaping for stealth properties.  
Luckily, part of the IAF’s core strength, partly 
as a result of its practice of operating so many 
different types of aircraft in so many different roles 
simultaneously, is its institutional capacity for 
flexible and novel ways of approaching problems. 
The IAF also stands at a fascinating crossroads 
between Eastern and Western approaches to 
airpower, a position which brings great logistical 
challenges but also great opportunities to harvest 
from technology and concepts of operations. A 
mix of Russian-style modern IADS development, 
with Western models of airpower for power 
projection, offers huge promises for India’s defence 
and deterrence needs. however, before embracing 
a radical modernisation and restructuring 
programme, the IAF must overcome entrenched 
political interference in military procurement 
decisions, as well as the fixation on solutions 
which have been ‘made in India’, otherwise it 
risks continuing along its current path of trying to 
catch up with outdated acquisition plans to fight 
yesterday’s wars.
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The principle asymmetric threat that India faces and will continue to face well into the policy-relevant future pertains to 
Pakistan’s reliance upon terrorist proxies under 
its nuclear umbrella. Pakistan relies upon terrorist 
proxies for several reasons. First, they are relatively 
inexpensive. Analysts believe that the annual 
operating budget of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is 
about $50 million of which about $5.2 million 
is dedicated to military operations.1 Compared 
to Pakistan’s defence budget of $7.4, this amount 
is meagre.2 Second, no matter how robust India’s 
counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism and 
counter-infiltration efforts are, it is impossible to 
detect and pre-empt every terrorist attack planned 
and supported by Pakistan. Third, these attacks 
achieve Pakistan’s minimalist objectives. While 
they cannot and will not change the territorial 
dispensation of Kashmir, they do effectively focus 
international attention on the so-called ‘Kashmir 
dispute,’ which in turn prompts international calls 
for dialogue. Pakistan uses these calls at home and 
abroad to legitimise its claims to Kashmir. Finally, 
the use of proxies confers some degree of plausible 
deniability which hinders India’s ability to argue 
persuasively for punitive actions bilaterally or by 
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the United Nations. Complicating this scenario is 
Pakistan’s explicit reliance upon its ever-expanding 
nuclear arsenal to raise the cost of Indian action 
and to draw in international actors to shield 
Pakistan from the consequences of its actions.
This creates a series of dilemmas for the Indian 
state and, in turn, for its application of power. To 
date, India has generally opted to use “strategic 
restraint,” which has generally involved not 
responding to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism 
militarily. Proponents of this approach argue 
that avoiding a major conflict with Pakistan will 
permit India to continue its economic growth, 
and thus its ability to continue to invest in military 
modernisation. Moreover, Pakistan’s behaviour is 
self-marginalising and undermines the integrity of 
the Pakistani state. however, many observers fear 
that India is making a virtue out of a necessity to 
obfuscate the fact that India lacks the ability to 
punish Pakistan militarily while retaining control 
of the escalation ladder.3 Whether India is making 
a strategic decision or simply making a virtue out 
of inability to act otherwise, India is essentially 
accepting that dozens, if not hundreds, of Indians 
will continue to die as a transaction cost of India’s 
economic growth. While such a trade-off seems 
distasteful once articulated, it is not an irrational 
one to argue the national benefits to such an 
approach. On the other hand, if India were to 
undertake the reforms in defence, it would need 
to better manage the threat—the financial and 
political costs will likely be great and unlikely to 
fructify over the policy relevant future. And, despite 
these investments, success cannot be assured.
here I argue that in the near term, India should 
consider military others than war for a variety of 
reasons. Most importantly, it is far from obvious 
that India can achieve its objective of compelling 
Pakistan to abandon terrorism under its terrorist 
umbrella through war. Thus what India may be able 
to do is raise the cost of this strategy to Pakistan 
while seeking to deny some the benefits that it 
enjoys. In this essay, I make three assumptions. 
First, I assume that India has chosen to cease 
making a virtue out of a necessity. Second, I assume 
that Pakistan will not resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons unless the very existence of the state is 
imperilled. The reason for this is straightforward: 
presently, the conditions of “mutually assured 
destruction” do not hold. While Pakistan can 
inflict grievous damage to India, India will 
ultimately survive. Pakistan, on the other hand, 
will not survive a nuclear retaliation. Most of its 
military, industry and population is concentrated 
in the Punjab region and the country lacks strategic 
depth as is well known. Third, I assume that China 
will remain as uninvolved as it has in the past and 
will not undertake military action against India 
in defence of its client’s continued ability to use 
terrorism as a tool of policy.
The Challenge
India’s central challenge is to compel Pakistan—
particularly its army and Inter-services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI)—to cease using groups like LeT 
to terrorise India into making some concession to 
Pakistan’s equities in Kashmir. This challenge is 
daunting as Perkovich and Dalton note, despite 
their reckless misformulation of India’s principle 
challenge.4 As they note, for a compellent strategy 
to be effective, the chain of action and reaction 
must ultimately inflict more harm on the object 
of the compellence strategy (Pakistan) than on 
the compeller (India). Put differently, how can 
India inflict such costs upon the Pakistan army 
and the ISI that they will cease and desist from 
attacking India using terrorist proxies that does 
not ultimately impose more cost upon India? 
Does it make sense for India to initiate war over 
a terrorist strike? If India were to launch a limited 
aims war with the intent of seizing valuable territory 
before the international community intervenes 
and use that territory as a bargaining chip to 
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force Pakistan to concede to a comprehensive 
peace, would that peace hold? how can India 
ensure that the war remains limited? When the 
dust settles, with countless dead on both sides, 
has the status quo changed? Is there anything that 
India can do to impose such costs that is short of 
a comprehensive defeat of Pakistan and the ISI? 
Under the conditions of such a defeat, would 
India be more or less secure? These are incredibly 
difficult questions to answer and, in my view, have 
not been asked and answered effectively in the 
open source domain.
To achieve a comprehensive defeat of Pakistan, 
as Dalton and Perkovich have argued, India must 
make massive overhauls in virtually all aspects 
of its civilian-military relations, higher defence 
organisation, defence procurements, defence 
modernisation and service-specific visions of the 
future battlefield, among others. The military is 
not integrated into civilian decision-making, the 
services resist jointness; the Defence Research 
and Development Organization in India has a 
monopoly on defence development but often fails 
to deliver; the Ministry of Defence often fails to 
make important acquisition deals in part because 
it lacks a specialised cadre of defence professionals, 
and there is little political will to redress these 
sundry hindrances. Most exigently, India requires 
“[p]olicies and capabilities to decisively punish 
Pakistan in the event of another major terrorist 
attack against India,” yet has not rigorously 
analysed much less articulated such a strategy, 
nor debated the resources and methods that could 
be reasonably acquired and deployed to “move 
Pakistani leaders to curtail the terrorist threat.”5  
For these reasons, I argue that India should pursue 
military operations other than war in the near 
term while the above-noted issues are debated 
and hopefully resolved. (Despite a crippling mis-
framing of the puzzle which exculpates Pakistan 
from direct responsibility of using these groups as 
tools of policy, Dalton and Perkovich exhaustively 
examine the range of military requirements needed 
to compel Pakistan and the myriad political and 
financial investments that would ensue.) These 
options, detailed below, include sub-conventional 
actions in Pakistan, limited actions along the Line 
of Control (LoC), and continued fortification of 
the LoC and border with better integration with 
police organisations.
Sub-conventional 
Operations
One of the puzzling aspects of Indian behaviour 
is that it has generally demurred from engaging 
in sub-conventional operations in Pakistan in 
the recent past. Presumably India’s own nuclear 
deterrent should provide India the same umbrella 
of impunity for such operations as Pakistan’s 
umbrella affords it. In the 1980s, then Prime 
Minister Rajiv gandhi ordered the Research and 
Evaluation Wing (RAW) to establish two covert 
groups: one to target Pakistan generally and 
another to target Khalistan groups in Pakistan.
The two groups were responsible for carrying out 
insurgency inside Pakistan. A low-grade but steady 
campaign of bombings in major Pakistani cities, 
notably Karachi and Lahore, were carried out. This 
forced the head of the ISI to meet his counterpart 
in RAW and agree on the rules of engagement as 
far as Punjab was concerned. The negotiation was 
brokered by then-Jordanian Crown Prince hassan 
bin-Talal, whose wife, Princess Sarvath, is of 
Pakistani origin. It was agreed that Pakistan would 
not carry out activities in Indian Punjab as long 
as RAW refrained from creating mayhem and 
violence inside Pakistan.6
The reason for this seems to be a policy decision 
undertaken by former Prime Minister I. K. gujral 
to demobilise assets that Indian intelligence 
cultivated for sub-conventional operations.7 It 
takes years to cultivate such assets and they cannot 
Doctrinal and Technological Innovations in the Indian Armed Forces
55
simply re-activated.  India should reverse this 
policy of sub-conventional restraint immediately. 
It will likely take years to re-establish the kinds 
of assets inside Pakistan needed for effective sub-
conventional deterrence. India would be wise to 
commence this immediately.
India must also tread carefully in the kinds of sub-
conventional operations it would pursue. In recent 
years, India has flirted with giving a fillip to the 
Baloch insurgency. This is appealing at first blush. 
however, I believe it may not be wise for several 
reasons. First, the Baloch militant groups are not 
disciplined, prone to competition among each other 
and killing civilians. Supporting such groups run 
the risk of undermining India’s pristine reputation 
of not engaging in such activities in Pakistan. 
Second, the Pakistani state has no compunction 
about massacring Baloch. Any Indian interference 
will be used as further justification at home and 
abroad for ever more brutality. Similarly, providing 
funding to the Pakistani Taliban would likely be 
unwise even though it has a demonstrable record 
in undermining the Pakistani state. Because the 
Pakistani Taliban are Deobandi, they have strong 
ties with Deobandi groups that target India and 
Afghans. The potential for blowback is quite high 
for this option. 
Instead, India should focus its efforts on degrading 
groups like the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) as 
well as their enablers in and out of uniform. India 
would not likely attract international opprobrium 
if it focused its covert operations to non-state 
combatants and their enablers in the state. Dalton 
and Perkovich recommend against this, citing 
Israel’s history of leadership decapitation and the 
ever-more sanguinary violence that the targeted 
groups perpetrate. It is true that leadership 
decapitation strategies are not suitable for groups 
with whom one wants to negotiate because such 
strategies remove from power the persons who can 
control the production of violence.8 This is not 
the case with LeT, JeM or its enabling support 
network. In fact, LeT has a very hierarchical 
structure and tends to move the same leaders about 
these various positions. LeT has not developed a 
deep bench of replacements. Thus India should 
consider seriously how it can degrade key leaders. 
LeT seems particularly ripe for such options given 
its hierarchical structure.
given that these leaders tend to roam about in 
cities, with Pakistani protection, this will not be 
an easy feat. however, it should not be impossible. 
JeM is similar. While the organisation had a serious 
leadership split in late 2001 with most of its 
members turning against the state, Massood Azhar 
remained loyal. The ISI has invested considerable 
resources to relaunch JeM in recent years as a part 
of its strategy to manage the Pakistan Taliban 
problem. given the hierarchical nature of these 
groups’ organisational structure and given the 
dependence of the groups upon key personalities, 
their elimination could be an effective means of 
degrading their lethality.
India should also focus upon those in and out 
of uniform who are providing assistance to these 
groups. These individuals link the terrorist group, 
the army and the ISI; and are important conduits 
for money, training, mission planning and 
personnel selection. Pakistan is riven with criminal 
and competing terrorists who could potentially 
be cultivated for these tasks. Additionally, India’s 
historic ties to Afghan intelligence may also be a 
propitious partnership to undertake operations in 
Pakistan. 
Actions Along the Line of 
Control and International 
Border
The Uri raid of September 2016 drew high praise 
from Indians. however, Indian armed forces had 
been conducting these raids for years: they simply 
were not made public.9 Clearly these kinds of 
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raids are not adequate to degrade the terrorist 
organisations’ ability to conduct strikes even if 
they are an important kind of operation that must 
be performed routinely. When India went public 
with the raid, Pakistan denied it. This was likely a 
wise move on Pakistan’s part: had it conceded the 
raid took place, there would have been domestic 
pressure to respond demonstrably. As it was, 
Pakistan undertook reprisals. Only Indian security 
professionals know whether India inflicted or 
suffered more costs. What is clear is that while 
these kinds of operations are important, they are 
not game changers. 
The task for India is to develop a capability to 
conduct strikes against terrorist infrastructure as 
well as those military formations that enable them 
to operate in territories that would not justify 
Pakistan launching a larger punitive offensive. 
Arguably, the Indians should work with supportive 
international partners to ensure that the Pakistan 
response is muted. The most likely terrain for these 
operations is Pakistan-administered Kashmir. 
however, there may be need to do so along parts 
of the International Border as well on occasion. 
To conduct these operations effectively, India 
needs to invest much more heavily in special 
operations units that are specifically designed 
for infiltration operations to conduct high-risk 
missions on enemy soil. This suggestion is not 
intended to denigrate India’s current capabilities 
or numerous special operations groups; rather to 
emphasise the need for specific elite that conduct 
these kinds of operations in this terrain. India 
should also consider inducting armed drones. 
however, drones are frequently misunderstood. 
Drones are simply a means of delivering ordinance 
without putting a pilot at risk. Drones are only 
effective if used in conjunction with a sophisticated 
human intelligence network inside Pakistan, 
operating in concert with signals and other forms 
of intelligence as well as requisite command and 
control capabilities.  
The United States has been widely criticised for 
its use of drones in Pakistan. Opponents of the 
policy have argued that the strategic effects of 
drones outweigh their tactical benefits. Others 
claim that drones create more terrorists than 
they kill. however, there is scant evidence for the 
maximalist versions of these claims while there 
is evidence that drone strikes in Pakistan have 
helped curb violence, particularly high value 
targets. As these hard targets became increasingly 
off limits, Pakistani terrorist groups reverted to 
their older habit of targeting civilians.10 If India 
pursues the use of armed drone strikes, it should 
consider and learn from US experiences with 
signature strikes (in which individuals are killed 
based upon their behaviour even if their identity 
is unknown) versus personality strikes (in which 
specific persons are targeted based upon a robust 
intelligence package). The former strikes were very 
controversial and often had high civilian casualties 
whereas the former tended to be more precise with 
fewer collateral deaths and injuries.
Hardening the Borders and 
Integrating with Improved 
Law Enforcement
India continues to make efforts to frustrate 
ability of Pakistan’s security forces to facilitate the 
infiltration of their terrorist proxies into India. India 
should consider continued investing in ever newer 
technologies to harden the LoC and parts of the 
International Border from which infiltration takes 
place. however, even the most robust of efforts 
will be inadequate to pre-empt every terrorist cell 
or every agent provocateur. Once the perpetrators 
are on Indian soil, it is the task of domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to catch 
the person. There has been adequate ink spilled 
about the seams that exist across and among 
these different agencies by Indian analysts. The 
question remains: why have these previously 
identified reforms been slow to transpire or not at 
Doctrinal and Technological Innovations in the Indian Armed Forces
57
all? This is an Indian domestic political question 
that is beyond the remit of this author. however, 
it is a well known fact that terrorists exploit these 
seems. (In Europe, the analogue is Belgium which 
is riven with competing, dysfunctional and non-
cooperating security agencies as well as a thriving 
arms market.) 
Another related problem is the failure to robust 
reform India’s police. This is a well known problem. 
The police are poorly trained, poorly compensated, 
poorly armed and lack basic personal protective 
equipment. Acquisitions are riven with corruption 
and often result in India’s police using defective 
gear. This is not the fault of the police. It is the 
failure of state legislatures to prioritise modernised 
policing. The reasons for this are lamentable and 
tragic: politicians in India would prefer to have 
police forces under their control rather than acting 
as professional forces to serve and protect the polity. 
India’s policing still derives from the Indian Police 
Act of 1860, which created forces to subdue rather 
than protect the citizens. Unfortunately, failures in 
policing can have enormously strategic impacts.
One example of this is afforded by the Kashmir 
crisis of the summer of 2016. After the killing 
of a known Kashmiri militant, Pakistan was able 
to orchestrate stone throwing by women and 
children in Kashmir with the intent of provoking 
a disproportionate response from police. This 
ruse worked when Indian security forces shot 
and killed protestors with so-called non-lethal 
munitions when they were surrounded. This 
created a situation that became ever-more ripe for 
Pakistani interferences which in turn brought to 
the two nations to loggerheads. This could have 
been avoided had the police in Kashmir had a 
different concept of policing. Instead of seeking 
out the chimeric non-lethal munition, policing 
should focus upon crowd control. This  requires 
the police to have the appropriate gear for crowd 
maintenance, which Indian police force generally 
lacks. (The United States is NOT an example of 
effective policing in crowds. Instead, India should 
look to Japanese or western European models.) 
The British, german and Japanese police, among 
others, are adept at managing crowds of thousands 
of people without a single fatality. 
Unfortunately India’s domestic political imperatives 
make such changes very unlikely. There is very little 
pressure from the public for police reforms and 
legislators have their own incentives to not engage 
in the revolutions in policing that are needed 
to effectively protect India. Moreover, private 
industries have not developed lobbying efforts to 
pressure police reforms because they seem to prefer 
using private security. This is rational: lobbying 
will require them to spend resources with dubious 
outcomes while investing in private security has 
obvious and immediate gains. While policing is 
not traditionally seen as an issue for the armed 
forces, in environments afflicted by insurgencies 
and terrorism, police forces are a necessary if over-
looked part of the overall security puzzle.11
Conclusions
While Indian capabilities to deliver a decisive 
defeat to Pakistan may take decades to develop, 
in the near term India should consider military 
operations other than war to contend with this 
continuing security threat from terrorist groups 
like LeT and their masterminds in the Pakistani 
army and ISI. The task will be calibrating these 
responses to deprive Pakistan of an opportunity to 
launch a larger conflict. This will require working 
with partners like the United States and Britain 
to force Pakistan to acquiesce. This is not akin 
to asking for permission; rather a notification of 
Indian intentions immediately before undertaking 
the planned operation. These efforts will fall short 
of the overall goal of coercing Pakistan to cease 
and desist from using terrorism as a tool of policy; 
however, they may provide an important interim 
step in degrading their lethality. 
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During the next 15 years, the Indian Navy (IN) will have to grapple with a complex and unpredictable security environment 
as the Indian Ocean/Asia-Pacific region undergoes 
a major power transition resulting from the rise 
of China, deals with regional instability, and 
faces the proliferation of disruptive military 
technologies. These developments will shape the 
capabilities needed to achieve Indian national 
security objectives, as well as the operational 
employment of those capabilities. To succeed, 
the IN will need to acquire and maintain three 
overlapping foundational capabilities: Sea control 
in the Indian Ocean, power projection within the 
Indian Ocean, and power projection beyond the 
Indian Ocean. With these foundations in place, 
the Navy can then scale, modify, or augment 
its operations to meet emergent challenges. 
This paper discusses each of these foundational 
capabilities in turn, explaining their importance, 
identifying impediments to acquiring them, and 
suggesting means of overcoming impediments. 
Developing these foundational capabilities will be 
costly, requiring India to acquire a considerable 
amount of additional naval capacity. By doing so, 
however, it can help ensure that the IN has the 
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building blocks needed to meet the challenges of 
the coming decades. 
Sea Control 
The most foundational capability that the IN will 
need to develop in the next 15 years is the ability to 
maintain sea control in the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR). On its face, the term might seem to suggest 
exclusionary or coercive use of the oceans. And in 
the event of conflict, navies must have the ability 
to deny an adversary use of the sea at particular 
times and places. however, sea control also seeks 
to ensure that the maritime domain remains an 
open common, in which shipping passes freely and 
one’s navy is able to manoeuver at will. Without it, 
a country’s adversary could prevent its naval forces 
from exercising their most basic functions of 
protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
facilitating commerce, and generating security. 
The primary impediments to Indian sea control 
in the IOR come from evolving Chinese naval 
and air capabilities and, to a lesser extent, from 
Pakistani Navy developments. China’s submarine 
and surface forces are growing both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, and these forces are expanding 
operations beyond their traditional areas. China 
also is in the process of operationalising its first 
aircraft carrier, setting the stage for carrier strike 
group operations. Further, Chinese long-range 
air and ballistic missile capabilities, supported by 
a robust command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture provide an 
asymmetric capability to project power into the 
IOR from China. 
With regard to Pakistan, the establishment of a 
Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012 could 
portend a future in which Pakistan employs 
nuclear weapons at sea. Pakistan’s move to acquire 
at least eight diesel submarines fitted with air-
independent propulsion systems from China in 
the 2023-2028 timeframe adds more uncertainty 
to this subsurface mix. Pakistan also possesses a 
variety of surface assets, including frigates and 
fast-attack craft. And, in the aerial domain, 
Pakistan employs the US-made P-3 Orion anti-
submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft 
carrying the harpoon missile. Together, these 
burgeoning capabilities will challenge India’s 
traditionally preeminent position in the Indian 
Ocean, and could significantly erode its freedom 
of manoeuver. 
Indian leaders will need to pay close attention to 
these challenges and devise effective responses. 
These will likely include enhanced maritime-
domain awareness (MDA); improved anti-
submarine warfare (ASW); development of more 
mobile, dispersed and resilient forces to mitigate 
air and missile threats; and better electronic 
warfare capabilities. 
As sea control is foundational to maritime 
operations, maritime domain awareness is 
foundational to sea control. In future, the traditional 
view of MDA must expand to multi-domain 
awareness that includes the surface, subsurface, 
air, and cyber realms, since operations across these 
domains are synergistic and mutually supporting. 
Effective MDA depends on networks of fixed and 
mobile sensors that provide surveillance of areas 
of interest, and also requires the ability to fuse, 
integrate, and distribute the resulting operational 
information. The application of information 
technology and data analytics to development 
of a multi-domain common operational picture 
(COP) is an area of ongoing innovation. 
ASW will be a mission area of particular 
importance as India tries to cope with the 
challenges posed by Chinese and Pakistani 
submarines. The traditional threat to disrupt sea 
lanes of communication posed by an adversary’s 
submarine forces is expanding to include the 
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threat of submarine-launched cruise missile attack 
on maritime and land targets. Improved quieting 
will make submarines increasingly difficult to 
detect in future while nuclear or air-independent 
propulsion will increase their range and endurance. 
China is now deploying both conventional and 
nuclear-powered submarines in the Indian Ocean, 
which have resupplied at ports in Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
To counter this, the IN will need a robust 
subsurface COP as well as the ability to hold 
hostile submarines at risk when required. This 
is potentially an area of increased cooperation 
between India and US., which could leverage the 
US Navy’s six decades of experience with strategic 
anti-submarine warfare. These efforts could 
include other partners as well. 
India’s acquisition of the capable P-8 Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) will increase its ASW 
surveillance and engagement capabilities. The 
geography of the IOR, which enables choke-point 
ASW sensor employment, facilitates submarine 
detection. however, maintaining track on and re-
acquiring submarines remain a significant challenge, 
and airborne ASW and geography alone may be 
insufficient to provide truly robust anti-submarine 
surveillance. An enhanced IN ASW architecture 
might employ fixed sensor arrays located at 
choke-points, augmented by mobile, potentially 
unmanned, sensors for initial detections. These 
detections would be handed-off to fixed or rotary-
wing air or surface platforms to maintain track. 
The ASW COP could be enhanced by integrating 
non-acoustic information from Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT) and Communications 
Intelligence (COMINT) sensors, and partner 
information. Effective integration of these data 
will pose technical and operational challenges but 
can provide major benefits. Careful requirements 
analysis will be necessary to determine what mix 
of air, surface and submarine ASW capabilities 
will be optimal. US systems analysis capabilities 
could be helpful in this effort, helping India to 
identify a logical path forward in a resource-scarce 
environment. 
Enhancing Surface Warfare (SuW) capabilities in 
the IOR poses challenges similar to ASW, with 
some important differences. Maintaining an SuW 
COP is easier in some respects, since most or all 
of the sensors that support ASW can also support 
SuW. Additional sensors, including conventional 
and over-the-horizon radars (OTh-R), unmanned 
air or surface systems, and potential future 
space assets, can provide persistent wide-area 
surveillance. Engagement of adversary surface 
ships is complicated, however, by increasingly 
capable offensive and defensive systems. This is 
particularly true of Chinese surface combatants, 
which possess layered hard and soft-kill air-
defence systems, as well as long-range anti-ship 
missiles. To counter this, IN may want to enhance 
both its offensive and defensive capabilities. On 
the offensive side, IN could expand fielding of 
the proven BrahMos missile, and further improve 
its range and survivability. BrahMos fielding 
options could include expeditionary coastal 
defence cruise missile (CDCM) batteries, which 
could be deployed rapidly to locations such as the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands to control access 
to the Indian Ocean. India might also leverage its 
mature ballistic missile programme to develop an 
anti-ship ballistic missile capability. Defensively, 
IN could improve the survivability of its naval 
forces by investing in improved air and missile 
defence capabilities. Because hard-kill defence 
against modern anti-ship cruise and ballistic 
missiles is technically challenging and expensive, 
IN might want to emphasise soft-kill options to 
include on and off-board electronic attack and 
decoy capabilities. These capabilities should be 
employed as part of an operational construct that 
includes emission control, mobility, and dispersed 
operations to complicate adversary targeting. 
These concepts are also applicable to land-based 
forces such as the CDCM discussed earlier. 
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Whatever mix of capabilities India ultimately 
adopts, technical and operational integration of 
data from multiple sensors, potentially including 
those belonging to partner states, will be essential, 
thus enabling the creation of a maritime common 
operating picture for the IOR. India has already 
made significant progress in this direction 
with the inauguration of the Informational 
Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) for the 
centralIOR, as well as Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s initiatives in the Seychelles, Mauritius 
and Maldives to expand India’s maritime domain 
awareness network with coastal surveillance radars. 
Due to the prowess of India’s civilian technology 
sector, and the depth of its manpower resources, 
India may well have a comparative advantage in 
this area. 
Power Projection Within 
the Indian Ocean Region 
The second set of capabilities that IN will need 
to acquire is power projection within the IOR. 
While sea control refers to the general ability to 
ensure open access and freedom of manoeuver, 
power projection entails the ability to bring naval 
capabilities to bear rapidly in a particular location, 
often in support of land or air operations. These 
capabilities could include a range of kinetic and 
non-kinetic fires, as well as amphibious assault and 
expeditionary sealift. Of particular importance 
will be India’s ability to reach core areas of interest, 
including its coastal areas, maritime zones, 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), continental 
shelf, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the 
Andaman Sea, including the Malacca Strait. 
Possible impediments to India’s ability to project 
power within the IOR include China’s expanding 
footprint in the Indian Ocean, and growing 
Pakistani capabilities, as discussed earlier. India 
will also have to contend with non-state actors, 
such as those who carried out the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks; and an arc of instability on the IOR 
periphery, which is the locus of such problems 
as Somali piracy, Makram coast drug trafficking 
and the ongoing conflict in Yemen, where India 
conducted a well-executed noncombatant 
evacuation operation (NEO), Operation Rahat, 
in April 2015 when it rescued over 5,000 people. 
To respond to these challenges, India will need 
to develop sufficient maritime strike capabilities 
to hold at risk Pakistani and Chinese naval forces 
and bases in the IOR. This could involve a range 
of force-employment options up and down the 
escalation ladder, including cruise missiles, special 
operations forces and air assets. Improvements 
in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR), targeting, and command and control (C2) 
architecture will also be useful. These capabilities 
can facilitate decision making and battle 
management in increasingly complex maritime 
environments. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
such as the MQ-1 Predator, networked with 
4
th
/5
th 
generation land or sea-based fighter 
aircraft, could be helpful in this regard. 
The acquisition of additional amphibious ships 
and the adoption of amphibious warfare doctrines 
and operating concepts will also be important. 
Amphibious ships have enormous capacity and 
extended sea legs, enabling them to support 
ongoing power-projection efforts. They also 
are ideal for providing regional security force 
assistance, engagement, and maritime diplomacy, 
which can help India to shape the IOR security 
environment. India could consider collaborating 
in the amphibious space with Japan and Australia, 
which are also in the initial phases of developing 
amphibious capabilities. 
In addition, amphibious capabilities are required 
to support humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief (hADR), Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO) and expeditionary operations. 
They could also support Indian peacekeeping 
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missions in Africa, most notably in the Congo, 
where India provides the largest contingent in the 
UN peacekeeping force. IN recognises the need 
for amphibious capability and plans to build four 
Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). 
U. and India have a history of amphibious and 
hADR collaborations. In 2007, US sold the 
Amphibious Transport Dock-class ship USS 
TRENTON, now the INS JALAShWA, to 
India. And from 2008 to 2010, US and India 
held an annual bilateral tabletop exercise known 
as habu Nag, focused on developing the skills 
necessary to conduct hADR operations. It is time 
to revive and enhance this important training to 
feature an actual landing exercise, and include 
other interested countries such as Sri Lanka or 
Bangladesh. Such preparation may be especially 
important in coming years because of climate 
change, which could trigger extreme weather 
events and increase the demand signal for hADR 
missions. The 1991 response to Cyclone Marian, 
which devastated Bangladesh, illustrates this 
need. Over two million people were affected and 
approximately 140,000 people lost their lives in 
this tragic storm. Operation SEA ANgEL, led 
from a US amphibious task force, which included 
helicopters and landing ships distributing aid and 
medical care to millions of people, proved the 
value of a sea-based response to humanitarian 
disasters. 
Power Projection Beyond 
the Indian Ocean Region 
The third foundational capability that India will 
need to develop is power projection beyond the 
IOR. Although India’s primary interest lies in 
the Indian Ocean itself, the ability to establish 
an operational presence and protect equities, 
contribute to collective efforts, and influence 
outcomes in greater maritime Asia is important as 
well. This is particularly true given the strategic 
interconnectedness of the two regions, ongoing 
challenges to fundamental norms such as freedom 
of navigation in the Asia-Pacific, and India’s Act 
East policy. 
Impediments to Indian power projection 
beyond the IOR would come predominantly 
from China’s robust anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD) architecture. While similar to some of the 
challenges presented above, the A2/AD problem 
here will be much greater as it was designed 
to counter the powerful offensive capabilities 
associated with US aircraft carrier strike groups 
(CSg). This type of capability will pose significant 
problems for Indian naval assets seeking to enter 
and remain in the region. 
India can take a number of steps in an effort to 
overcome these impediments. First, it could 
increase the size and reach of its submarine force. 
given their stealth and survivability, submarines 
can operate effectively in non-permissive A2/AD 
environments that would repulse surface ships. 
India currently has 14 operational submarines, and 
a long-range plan to expand the force to a total of 
24. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has called 
for expansion of the submarine fleet beyond even 
this number. Although a detailed operational and 
campaign analysis will be necessary to determine 
precise quantities, the mix should include nuclear 
attack submarines, which will have better range 
and on-station time than conventionally powered 
subs. 
Second, India could increase the size and reach 
of its surface fleet, though its ships would still 
face difficulties penetrating a complex A2/AD 
environment. Surface ships armed with longer-
range missiles, and operating from a greater 
standoff range, could mitigate this problem, using 
the developmental subsonic Nirbhay missile, 
or an extended-range version of the supersonic 
BrahMos. Campaign analysis-based modelling 
would help determine the most effective mix of 
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weapons and platforms. 
Third, IN could improve its logistical capabilities. 
helpful measures would include acquiring 
additional logistic support ships, and improving 
combatant ship design to increase fuel and 
ammunition capacity and provide longer-range and 
on-station endurance. India could also consider 
establishing more forward-deployed units, with 
associated shore-based support infrastructure. 
Fourth, India could develop its ability to execute 
network-centric operations. This would require 
the acquisition of global C4ISR capabilities, 
including space-based assets. Network-centric 
operations would provide Indian Naval Forces, 
ranging from aircraft to carrier battle groups to 
submarines, the necessary battle-space awareness 
and command and control to operate with greater 
precision, and thus enhance survivability, in a 
difficult A2/AD environment. Networked C4ISR 
is also a key enabler for effective maritime strike 
operations. 
Finally, for many future missions and scenarios, 
including the provision of general maritime 
security—such as counter piracy, counter 
terrorism, hADR, NEO—as well as responses 
to potential crises with China, Indian interests 
will likely align with US and other regional 
states like Japan, Australia and Vietnam. India 
could make more effective contributions to joint 
security operations, and enjoy greater success 
penetrating robust A2/AD architectures, as part 
of a coalition of these states than it could by 
attempting to operate independently. IN may 
therefore wish to develop varying degrees of 
interoperability with other navies. Although some 
might worry that this could erode India’s strategic 
independence, such interoperability would not 
require formal alliances, and could be scaled to 
suit India’s relationships with a range of partners. 
Thus, if properly managed, interoperability could 
significantly enhance India’s security without 
unduly impinging on its autonomy. 
Conclusion 
The development of the three foundational 
capabilities discussed above will require India to 
balance strategic priorities with available resources 
as part of an ongoing commitment towards 
building naval capacity. Doing so will not be 
easy, from either a political or a fiscal standpoint. 
To make the task more manageable, India could 
decide to focus its near-term efforts on its highest 
priority, foundational goals, such as Indian Ocean 
sea control, and pursue other capabilities over the 
longer term. Whatever specific approach it chooses, 
developing these capabilities will help ensure that 
India is able not only to maintain its traditional 
sphere of influence in a rapidly changing maritime 
Asia, but also emerge as a major regional power, 
playing a more important strategic role than ever 
before.
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India’s emergence as a strategic actor in Asia has drawn attention to its Navy’s role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean. With growing 
maritime reach, and an admirable record of service 
in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Indian 
Navy (IN) is widely seen as an important security 
player in the Asian commons. Beyond securing 
the critical Indian Ocean sea lanes, however, the 
Navy has also had to deal with a sharp uptick in 
irregular threats in India’s near-seas. Ever so often, 
the mission has involved combating extra-regional 
influence in India’s maritime neighbourhood 
through subtle power projection. 
The strategic nature of threats has underscored 
the importance of technology in expanding naval 
offensive and defensive capabilities. Despite 
expanding its combat prowess, the Indian Navy 
has grappled with systemic deficiencies and delays 
in shipbuilding projects. As a corollary, there has 
been a growing clamour for the infusion of superior 
knowhow in naval systems to preserve IN’s combat 
edge. India’s maritime analysts have been worried 
about the deployment of Chinese warships and 
nuclear submarines in India’s near-seas. The 
anxiety has been heightened by South Asia’s 
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emergence as a theatre of geopolitical contestation, 
leading to urgent calls within the Indian strategic 
community to speed up IN’s modernisation. Asia’s 
murky power politics has highlighted the strategic 
imperative of robust maritime presence operations 
in the near-littorals.
Maritime observers are convinced that a high-
stakes technological contest is unfolding in the 
Asian littorals. It involves growing attempts by 
rival powers to acquire modern capability for 
effective posturing at sea. These include precision-
guided missiles, advanced intelligence, surveillance 
equipment and autonomous systems. The push 
towards advanced munitions, unmanned combat 
vehicles, quantum computing technology and 
hypersonic, has led many to contemplate new 
kinds of warfare scenarios involving cyber, space 
and energy weapons. 
The Push for Naval 
Modernisation 
Studies of the future maritime environment have 
acknowledged the increasing predisposition of 
navies to employ modern weaponry for posturing 
and deterrence. These include the use of precision-
guided missiles, unmanned vehicles and networked 
systems to achieve theatre dominance. There are 
indications that the use of long-range sensors and 
precision-strike capabilities in the future will rise 
exponentially, even as the maritime battle-space 
undergoes a veritable compression, imposing 
sharp restrictions on the freedom of manoeuvre of 
surface naval forces. 
Analysts aver maritime operations in the post-
modern era are likely to involve operational 
concepts that would require remote sensing and 
stand-off capability. By popular reckoning, in 
many of these areas—viz. scouting campaigns, 
network centric warfare, special operations and 
littoral war-fighting—unmanned and autonomous 
systems will play an important role in influencing 
events, both during peace and conflict.
Despite an early foray into indigenisation over 
five decades ago, IN hasn’t yet succeeded in 
constructing an efficient maritime industrial 
complex. While India’s warship construction 
programme has proceeded apace (with at least 
48 ships and submarines under construction 
in Indian shipyards), most projects remain 
dependant on foreign technology. To add, larger 
institutional lacunae such as insufficient capital, 
dated technology and deficient planning, continue 
to plague the system.1 
Even so, maritime managers remain optimistic 
about IN’s technological developments. Last year, 
the Navy announced the release of a guideline 
document, the ‘Indian Naval Indigenisation 
Plan (INIP) 2015-2030’, to enunciate the need 
for developing various advanced systems for its 
platforms.2 An ungraded version of a previous 
plan for the period 2008-2022, the new document 
sought to outline projects for a new phase of 
self-reliance, involving local manufacturing of 
advanced equipment under the ‘Make in India’ 
initiative.3 
In particular, naval engineers are said to have 
identified critical cutting-edge technologies to build 
into the warship building plan. The Navy plans 
to induct high-definition radars, infra-red seeker, 
sonars and electronic warfare suites to minimise 
foreign dependence for sensors and weapons. This 
appears consistent with the Ministry of Defence’s 
Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 
(TPCR-2103) that calls for the acquisition 
of modern subsonic, supersonic and ballistic 
missiles, equipment and sensors, propulsion and 
power generation, and surveillance and detection 
systems.4 More significant is the advocated shift 
from an ammunition-based, theatre-centric model 
to a directed energy weapons-based network-
centric model.
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Further, more instructive is a wishlist of 100 new 
technologies announced by IN in May 2016, to be 
acquired by 2031.5 These can broadly be classified 
into five major types of sensors and weapons. 
Precision Guided Missiles 
(PGM) 
The first category of keenly sought after technology 
is precision munitions, particularly drone-
launched guided missiles and loitering missiles. 
There is a growing realisation in Indian military 
circles that smart ammunitions have a distinct set 
of advantages over conventional munitions. For 
their versatile and flexibility of usage, the sheer 
range of potential targets, and the ability to limit 
collateral damage, the former are a clearly superior 
choice. The fact that smart ammo can be deployed 
onboard unmanned aerial vehicles, a platform 
of choice during littoral operations, makes it an 
attractive option. 
Unfortunately, India’s precision ammunition 
manufacturing technology remains 
underdeveloped. Efforts to establish joint 
ventures for precision-guided munitions (PgM) 
manufacturing haven’t found much success, owing 
principally to the lack of capital investments 
necessary for such ventures. The precision attack 
and targeting capabilities of Indian Armed Forces 
are currently limited to laser-guided bomb (LgB) 
kits attached to dumb bombs on Air Force jets.6 
The increasing usage of precision bombs and 
missiles in Indian naval and air weapon systems 
hasn’t done much to expand India’s indigenous 
manufacturing capabilities. Despite considerable 
efforts, New Delhi remains dependant on import 
of smart munitions.
With “loitering” missiles too, the story hasn’t been 
much different. Nirbhay, the Defence Research and 
Development Organisation’s (DRDO) subsonic 
cruise missile, is yet to clear its field tests.7 With 
an ability to lurk undetected over a target area and 
a capacity for higher loads of ordinance, subsonic 
missiles are considered indispensable by modern 
maritime forces.8 Unfortunately, with subsonic 
missiles, success has been fairly limited. 
In April 2016, reports that OIS Advanced 
Technology (OIS-AT) is partnering with Sagem 
of France to manufacture the munitions locally 
for the Indian Air Force caused some cheer in 
defence circles.9 DRDO says its negotiations 
with Sagem will lead to the development of the 
New general guidance Munition (NgPgM), a 
1000-kilogramme class bomb compatible with 
the Indian Air Force’s Mirage-2000h/Th.10 The 
successful miniaturisation of ammunition for 
aircraft operations could lead to the development 
of missiles for naval drones in the future. 
Net Centric Operations
Since the early 2000s, IN had been on the lookout 
for a satellite which could shorten the ‘sensor-to-
shooter loop’ to swiftly detect and tackle tactical 
threats. While the DRDO has developed the 
means to build such a platform, it didn’t have an 
indigenous gSLV rocket to carry the satellite.
After several years of trial and error, India finally 
launched its first dedicated military satellite 
gSAT-7 or ‘Rukmini’ in 2013.11 A geo-stationary 
communication satellite, the gSAT-7 enables real-
time networking of all Indian warships, submarines 
and aircraft with operational centres ashore, 
providing IN with an almost 2,000-nautical-mile-
footprint over the critical IOR. With UhF, S, Ku 
and C-band transponders, the Rukmini’s ‘over-
the-sea’ usage will soon be complemented by the 
gSAT-7A, a satellite dedicated for IAF and Indian 
Army operations.12 
Expectedly, the gSAT series is superior to the 
‘dual use’ Cartosat satellites or the Technology 
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Experimental Satellite that the Indian Armed 
Forces previously used for surveillance, navigation 
and communication purposes. Rukmini’s ability 
to keep an eye on the IOR by providing real-
time inputs was demonstrated at a theatre-level 
readiness exercise earlier in 2016, when near 
complete integration and synergy was achieved 
between two widely dispersed but networked 
fleets in the Indian Ocean. 
Meanwhile, the Navy has also placed navigation 
satellites in orbit. In September 2016, the Indian 
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) placed 
the seventh satellite of the Regional Navigation 
Satellite System (IRNSS) in orbit.13 NAVIC, as 
the IRNSS is popularly called, will be used to 
provide accurate real-time positioning and timing 
services over India and the region, extending upto 
1,500 km around India. The constellation consists 
of three satellites in geostationary Orbit (gEO) 
and four in geosynchronous Orbit (gSO), about 
36,000 kms above the Earth’s surface. 
The challenge now is to place low Earth orbit 
(LEO) satellites in space since IRNSS does not 
provide good photographic intelligence about 
enemy forces and assets in a dynamic war situation. 
ISRO engineers say the IRNSS is not equipped 
with cameras and sensors and, therefore, is not 
capable of providing high-quality photographic 
intelligence in real-time.
Anti-Satellite Weapons
In principle, India has always opposed the 
weaponisation of space. The Ministry of Defence’s 
TPCR-2013, however, dwelt on the need to 
develop ASAT weapons “for electronic or physical 
destruction of satellites in both LEO (2,000km 
altitude above earth’s surface) and geosynchronous 
orbits”.14 Despite their deletion in subsequent 
roadmaps, the need to exploit space for military 
purposes has been clearly established.
A year earlier, V.K. Saraswat, the then chief of 
DRDO had announced that India was moving 
to integrate an anti-satellite weapon to neutralise 
hostile satellites in low earth and polar orbits. In 
an interview, Saraswat suggested that India’s anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defence programme could 
be utilised as an ASAT weapon, along with its 
Agni series of missiles.15 
Even today, DRDO contends that it can develop 
ASAT weapons if required by marrying the 
propulsion system of the over 5,000-km Agni-V 
missile with the ‘kill vehicle’ of its two-tier BMD 
(ballistic missile defence) system.16 According to 
defence engineers, work has begun on a futuristic 
programme for launching ‘mini-satellites on 
demand’ for use in the battlefield as well as ‘EMP 
(electromagnetic pulse) hardening’ of satellites and 
sensors to protect them against ASAT weapons.17
Many Indian analysts, however, say ASAT 
capabilities require a number of technologies that 
India does not presently possess. These include 
modern space-based sensors, synthetic aperture 
radars, electronics, sound navigation system, 
guidance and control, and global positioning 
systems. There are also questions about India’s 
ability to produce infrared sensors, optical devices, 
electronic-optical sensors, and magnetic sensors 
vital for detecting and monitoring events in 
space.18 
Artificial Intelligence
It is ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI)—the ability for 
combat platforms to self-control, self-regulate 
and self-actuate, using inherent computing and 
decision-making capabilities—that constitutes 
the most radical and contested of all new 
technologies. 
Advanced computing technologies today enable 
autonomous systems to identify and strike hostile 
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targets, a phenomenon that has led to a growing 
interest in ‘intelligent’ naval combat systems. The 
advent of data-driven decision making in naval 
systems is fuelling efforts to combine AI with 
analytics and cloud computing. More crucially, 
maritime forces are charting a move away from 
the diagnostic to the predictive space—shifting 
from the management of data to actual decision-
making, powering decision-cycles of combat 
systems. 
Even so, there are complex questions that require 
firm answers. Many of them have to do with 
the ethics of AI. While drones avoid subjective 
decisions based on incomplete information and 
tensions, they sometimes find it hard to avoid 
risky manoeuvres, leading to untoward incidents 
or collateral damage in combat situations. 
Autonomous weapons also pose many legal and 
moral dilemmas. Consensus, for instance, is yet 
to evolve on whether the use of AI-prosecuted 
targets in battle—without due authorisation 
from a human source—constitutes a legitimate 
act. Indeed, many naval commanders express 
reservations about divesting human executive 
control over weapons systems.19 
And yet, there is little denying the need for 
modern-day operators to be actively assisted by 
sensors and systems. AI provides the technology 
to augment human analysis and decision-making 
by capturing knowledge that can be re-applied 
in critical situations. It seeks to alter human 
intervention from ‘in-the-loop’ controller to 
‘on-the-loop’ thinker who can focus on a more 
reflective assessment of problems and strategies, 
guiding rather than being buried in execution 
detail.
AI, however, really implies an inherent ability 
for a combat system to take targeting decisions. 
It’s worth emphasising that maritime forces, 
including many in the Navy, remain skeptical of 
autonomous weapon systems with independent 
targeting capability. Operational commanders still 
regard the decision to execute a missile launch 
as the exclusive preserve of the command team, 
which must act independently. Notwithstanding 
its utility in remotely operated weapons like 
drones, broader questions about AI’s utilisation in 
combat remain unanswered.   
Directed Energy Weapons
Around the world, a top priority with navies is to 
get their ships off gunpowder—a high vulnerability 
for naval ships, whose explosive laden magazines 
represent the nautical equivalent of a ticking time-
bomb. As a result, a growing number of maritime 
forces around the world have made a push for 
energy weapons. Russia, US and China have 
all made major strides in high-energy laser and 
microwave technologies, which have shown the 
potential for altering the dynamics of maritime 
battle. 
Many of these navies have focused on perfecting 
state-of-the-art energy weapons, which incorporate 
precision tracking/pointing and laser beam 
combination. India’s DRDO, too, is prioritising 
Direct Energy Weapons (DEW) development 
in the technology perspective and capability 
roadmap.20 The agency claims it has already built 
a number of smaller DEW systems. These include 
devices designed to disarm mines and other IEDs, 
vehicle-mounted crowd control units, and hand-
held devices capable of overpowering armed 
individuals
The question of how viable laser weapons are 
going to be in the long term, however, continues 
to vex the naval scientific community. There is 
talk of chemical oxygen iodine lasers, high-power 
fibre lasers and a 25-kilowatt laser that can knock 
out a ballistic missile during its ‘terminal phase’ 
from up to four miles away.21 These are ambitious 
plans that do not look achievable in near future. 
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Besides, mounting energy weapons aboard aircraft 
and naval ships is a challenging proposition, owing 
in no small part to the difficulty engineers face in 
directing a focused energy beam from a moving 
platform.
Yet, the difficulties are well worth the payoff. 
DEWs offer a number of advantages, including 
cost-effectiveness and an ammunition supply 
limited only by the weapon’s power source. Energy 
weapons also fire at the speed of light, is virtually 
silent, and can limit collateral damage. 
This is one reason why supported weapons 
programmes, like Laser Weapon System (LaWS) 
and the electromagnetic rail gun, are being tested 
by many top-ranking navies—including the US 
Navy. These new weapons have a virtually unlimited 
magazine, only constrained by power and cooling 
capabilities onboard the vessel carrying them. Not 
only do these provide safety for sailors and marines, 
they also reduce dependency on gunpowder-based 
munitions. Many Indian scientists now believe the 
potential cost savings offered by laser weapons and 
low-cost electromagnetic railgun projectiles (as 
against expensive missiles) make energy weapons 
a worthwhile investment for the DRDO.
Unmanned Aerial Systems 
and ‘Smart’ Missiles
For IN, unmanned systems constitute the holy 
grail of futuristic warfare. Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) are a source of enduring interest 
because of their ability to remain on station for 
extended periods and provide crucial data in real 
time.
The Navy’s three UAV squadrons in Kochi (Kerala), 
Porbandar (gujarat) and Ramanathapuram (Tamil 
Nadu) operate heron and the Searcher MK II 
vehicles for coastal surveillance. Each squadron 
has eight Searchers II and six heron UAVs, with 
each unmanned platform possessing a capability 
to operate at an altitude ceiling of 15,000 ft 
to 30,000 ft. Reportedly, plans are in place to 
induct at least two more squadrons of UAVs to 
be controlled from ships to increase the range 
of surveillance. These units would be specifically 
employed in reconnaissance, surveillance and 
intelligence gathering missions in the far littorals.
IN also plans to induct strategic unmanned 
systems, including a fleet of high-altitude long-
endurance (hALE) maritime UAVs as well as 
rotary-wing tactical UAS. Since 2010, Indian 
naval officials have been in discussions with their 
US counterparts for the possible transfer of a fleet 
of high-altitude long-endurance (hALE) maritime 
UAVs—the modified global hawk developed 
under the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) programme.22 
In March 2015, IN invited bids for ship-borne 
UAVs that can augment various patrolling and 
search-related tactics on its vessels.23 In order 
to enhance ISR capabilities and monitoring of 
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), as also 
to improve EEZ safety, anti-piracy and anti-
terrorism patrols, naval managers have expressed 
the need for ship-launched UAVs that can enable 
communication between sea-borne platforms 
and other friendly vessels, aircraft and satellites, 
especially IN’s dedicated naval satellite.
In some ways, the growing propensity of navies for 
autonomous operations is a reflection of the growing 
tensions in Asia-Pacific. The unprecedented rise 
in surveillance platforms deployed in the South 
China Sea, particularly China’s deployment of 
high-tech drones, such as the harbin BZK-005, 
has reinforced a perception in New Delhi that 
Chinese future military operations will focus on 
dominating Asia’s littorals.24
Fearing an expansion of PLAN presence in the 
Indian Ocean, New Delhi has sought to improve 
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its surveillance capabilities in the IOR by inducting 
long-range maritime aircraft (P 8-Is) and seeking 
the transfer of the multi-mission ‘Predator’ 
platforms from US.25  In addition, Israel will 
supply 10 heron TP armed drones for the Indian 
Air Force, capable of carrying 2,000 kg of weapons 
payload and air-to-ground precision missiles.26 
India already operates unarmed heron-1 aircraft 
for surveillance and reconnaissance missions and 
a fleet of harpy drones—a self-destruct aircraft 
carrying a high-explosive warhead and primarily 
used for taking out enemy radar stations. 
Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles
For the past few years, the DRDO has been 
designing and developing multiple autonomous 
underwater vehicle (AUVs) to meet broader 
operational requirements for futuristic scenarios.27 
In April 2016, DRDO scientists successfully 
developed an autonomous underwater prototype 
for multiple maritime missions in India’s waters.28 
A feasibility study undertaken for the development 
of different types of AUV platforms showed 
that the Indian R&D was capable of designing 
various kinds of unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs)—from hand-held slow-speed ones to 
military-class platforms—with the capability to 
assist in the entire gamut of maritime security.29 
DRDO’s prototype is a flat fish-shaped vehicle 
capable of speeds upto 7 kmph at depths of up to 300 
metres below sea level.30 Fully pre-programmed in 
terms of algorithms and mission requirements, the 
robotic vehicle is piloted by an on-board computer 
developed by the Visakhapatnam-based Naval 
Science and Technology Laboratory (NSTL). 
The design, apparently, is being reworked upon 
to provide the prototype with passive sonar and 
electro-optical sensors for anti-mining missions.
Meanwhile, NSTL is working on an ambitious 
programme called ‘Autonomous Sea Vehicle’ 
(ASV), modelled on the US Navy’s ‘Manta 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle’ programme. A 
‘submadrone’, a submarine-launched swimming 
spy plane contained within an underwater drone 
with folded wings housed in a torpedo canister, and 
the Indian ASV will be launched from submarine 
tubes and deployed in reconnaissance mode for a 
fixed time period.31 For deep-sea exploration, India 
has the Samudra, a low-cost AUV that operates 
underwater with pre-programmed inputs.32 Fitted 
with an on-board image processing unit, it can 
undertake path detection, obstacle avoidance and 
target identification under the sea.
The development of unmanned and autonomous 
underwater vehicles (U/AUV) is likely to depend 
on the future effectiveness of such platforms in 
carrying out conventional submarine missions. 
Analysts point out that modern submarines’ need 
for secrecy limits their utility in the far-littorals. 
If underwater vehicles could replace submarines, 
then a navy’s appetite for greater adventurism in 
enemy waters could rise significantly.
The more important implication of U/AUV 
operations is the shift in anti-submarine warfare 
operations from defensive to offensive missions. 
Since their inception, ASW techniques have been 
used primarily to protect specific assets in critical 
littoral spaces. The thrust of the naval effort has 
involved protection of the core of the fleet from 
prowling submarines. U/AUVs challenge the 
existing paradigm by targeting submarines on 
open patrol. In order to negate the advantages of 
modern submarines in terms of high endurance, 
speed and an inherent stealth, unmanned platforms 
are being designed to operate in packs, making 
it harder for submarines to escape detection in 
constrained spaces.33
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The Way Forward
For India, the main technological challenge is 
to reduce the imported content of indigenously 
produced naval sensors and weapons. While there 
are plans to build future naval technologies under 
the ‘Make in India’ initiative, it is unclear if an 
outright indigenisation approach to technology 
will be effective. The problem for New Delhi is 
that even though foreign defence companies are 
willing to collaborate with Indian manufacturers, 
they are reluctant to transfer cutting-edge 
technologies. Equally worrisome, however, is the 
suboptimal capacity of Indian firms to acquire 
and absorb foreign technology. 
Outwardly, the maritime technology mission 
seems well defined. Through the INIP, the Navy 
has announced its ship-building ambitions, which 
it believes will enable India to be a net provider 
of security in the maritime neighbourhood, thus 
building capability and enhancing capacity of 
regional partners. Yet, the shortfalls in terms of 
both Indian R&D and Indian manufacturing 
remain serious. For maritime managers, the mission 
involves five urgent tasks (a) R&D in military 
sciences and technologies; (b) amalgamation of 
R&D and the manufacturing sector; (c) bringing 
about an integration of users, designers and 
manufacturers; (d) making projects commercially 
viable, achieving economies of scale; and (e) tiding 
over technology-denial regimes.34 
It is the infusion of foreign technology and capital 
that is likely to present the biggest challenge, 
especially in the manufacturing of modern sensors 
and weapons. In the case of high-range hypersonic 
missiles, laser and directed energy weapons, 
for instance, Indian scientists haven’t managed 
much external support. Outer space too hasn’t 
attracted too much foreign collaboration. Since 
2007, when Beijing tested its ASAT (anti-satellite) 
weapons against low Earth orbit satellites, New 
Delhi has been on the lookout for counter-
space capabilities.35 After China’s space agency 
tested ‘direct-ascent kinetic kill’ capabilities, 
the space project acquired urgency. A growing 
number of senior Indian military officials point 
to the inevitability of a military race with China 
to protect space assets and a contest in space. 
Yet, Indian scientists acknowledge the lack of 
technology and investment in inducting kinetic 
and directed-energy laser weapons.  
With network-centricity, the basic building blocks 
seem to be in place. Key data links are being 
produced indigenously, and more networked 
military communication satellites will soon be 
orbit. The critical part will be the integration 
of modern weapon systems into the wider 
architecture for which more investment and R&D 
will be needed.
going forward, autonomous platforms are likely to 
be an area of focus. DRDO’s project to indigenise 
Rustom-I, a Medium Altitude Long Endurance 
(MALE) UAV, by integrating hELINA, a locally 
developed anti-tank missile, is slowly progressing.36 
Even though the avionics of Rustom have posed 
some problems, Rustom-2, an upgraded platform, 
completed its first flight in November 2016 from 
Challakere near Bengaluru.37 
A key enabler for armed UAV flights in India 
would be the new domestically developed 
satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) called 
gAgAN, useful for navigation and precision 
vertical guidance for commercial airplanes.38 
Designed essentially to assist civil aviation in India 
through the enhancement of satellite navigation 
(SATNAV) signals, gAgAN will be available to 
Indian military users as well. Local industry has 
been trying to develop a light-weight gAgAN 
receiver module that can be fitted aboard UAVs 
and is capable of receiving ‘refined’ signals from 
the American gPS, Russian gLONASS, and 
Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System 
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(IRNSS) which will become fully operational in 
the near future.39
The more complicated task will be the development 
of UUVs, where Indian engineers will need to 
fully comprehend demands that future operations 
are likely to place on underwater autonomous 
platforms’ ISR sensors, and command and control 
systems. The bottom line objective for India’s 
R&D community will be to extend operational 
awareness within the battle space without 
assistance from manned systems and human 
decision makers. At the same time, UUVs will need 
to accurately assess the operational environment 
and undertake calibrated action in foreign waters 
without escalating an existing situation. The 
critical requirement is to ensure that the quality of 
command decisions closely matches those taken 
by naval commanders.40
For the moment, it appears, the institutional 
focus is likely to be in areas where there is a base 
level of expertise—mainly maritime sensors such 
as electronic warfare suites and sonars. Many 
of the DRDO-developed EW systems, such as 
Ajanta, Ellora and Porpoise, installed on the 
latest frontline surface, airborne and subsurface 
combatants, will likely be substantially upgraded. 
Likewise, IN’s family of advanced underwater-
sensors, including Advanced Panoramic Sonar 
hull mounted (APSOh), hull-mounted Sonar 
Advanced (hUMSA) and UShUS, will be 
developed further.
To build future war-fighting capabilities, the key 
for IN will be to acquire disruptive technologies, 
including electromagnetic rail guns and kinetic 
energy projectiles; laser-directed weapons, weapon-
control systems and communication suites. New 
naval aviation assets—such as carrier-borne fixed-
wing aircraft, ship-borne multirole rotary-wing 
aircraft, ship/carrier-launched-and-recovered 
UAVs and UCAVs—will also need to be built in 
under the Make in India programme.
IN has ambitions to acquire and develop 
technologies in many crucial areas. going 
forward, military scientists will need to show 
progress with high-definition radars, infrared 
seekers, precision munitions and energy weapons. 
It will be important to build these weapons under 
license, for which both government and private 
industry will need to spend more on research and 
development. The critical task will be to expand 
research and development to a level where India 
maritime technological initiatives become self-
sustaining. 
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In his foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter’s ‘Pearl harbor: Warning and Decision’1, Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling wrote, “There 
is a tendency in our planning to confuse the 
unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency 
we have not considered looks strange; what looks 
strange is thought improbable; what is improbable 
need not be considered seriously.” he goes on to 
warn that the “danger is not that we shall read 
the signals and indicators with too little skill; the 
danger is in a poverty of expectations – a routine 
obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar 
than likely.”
This essay looks at three strategic scenarios that 
may sound unfamiliar today but cannot be 
dismissed from the realm of reality. With a time 
horizon of 2030, it is possible that some or all of 
them may be seen as more likely going into the 
future, and a few perhaps completely dismissed 
as the situation evolved. None of the scenarios, 
however, is a ridiculous fantasy; all of them are 
grounded in reality as it exists today.
There are a few common characteristics kept 
in mind while framing these scenarios. One, 
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they must threaten India substantially, whether 
geographically, economically, politically or socially. 
Two, the threat must have a security component, 
which necessitates the involvement of the military. 
Three, the scenarios have to be broad-based in 
nature where the details of the specific threat may 
vary but still fit in the larger picture. And four, 
they should fall within the danger of ‘poverty of 
expectations’ of the government.
Scenario 1: A tactical 
nuclear weapon attack 
by terrorists on Indian 
mainland
Pakistan has developed the hatf-9 (Nasr) short-
range ballistic missile (SRBM) as part of its full-
spectrum deterrence against India. Pakistan claims 
the hatf-9 is equipped with a tactical nuclear 
warhead (TNW) which can stop the advance of 
Indian mechanised forces into Pakistan. A TNW 
is a low-yield (8-10 KT) short-range nuclear 
warhead which is extremely costly and complex to 
manufacture and difficult to transport, store and 
maintain under field conditions. Because TNW-
fitted missiles have to be fired at a very short notice, 
unlike bigger strategic weapons, these nuclear 
warheads have to be kept in a fully assembled state. 
Moreover, the authority to fire a TNW has to be 
delegated to lower-level military commanders 
at an early stage in the battle. All this creates a 
proclivity among the military commanders to ‘use 
them or lose them’.
Pakistan army’s control over nuclear decision 
making and the risk of nuclear weapons falling into 
the hands of the jihadis have been the potential 
threats that India has been worried about. As far as 
the use of TNWs by Pakistan army is concerned, 
Indian policy is crystal clear. Former National 
Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon 
has put it thus, “If Pakistan were to use tactical 
nuclear weapons against India, even against Indian 
forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening 
the door to a massive Indian first strike, having 
crossed India’s declared red lines. There would be 
little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities 
to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, 
since that would only invite further escalation by 
Pakistan.”2
A similar degree of clarity exists, courtesy the No-
First-Use policy, on India’s non-usage of nuclear 
weapons to respond to a terrorist attack from 
Pakistan. But confusion would prevail if terrorists, 
from groups seen to be closely aligned to the 
Pakistan army or the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI), or operating from Pakistani soil, get their 
hands on a tactical nuclear weapon. As Menon 
has explained, the one situation that India really 
worries about is the radicalisation of the Pakistan 
army.3 Even a section of radicalised officer cadre 
could get easy and full access to a TNW during 
deployment, unlike a strategic nuclear weapon 
which needs multiple levels of control before 
being fired. The radicalised officer could then 
fire a TNW on an Indian civilian township or a 
military target. Or it could hand over the device 
to a terrorist group, which could try and smuggle 
it into India to use it on a major Indian city in the 
glare of television cameras. 
A 10 KT nuclear weapon would damage all 
buildings within a radius of one kilometre, and 
debris would cause injuries within six kilometres 
of ground zero.4 All electronic devices within 
five kilometres would stop functioning and a 
mushroom cloud would be visible in the sky. 
Population up to 30 kilometres of the blast will 
suffer from acute radiation and all public services 
in the area would be rendered non-functional. 
The number of dead would depend on the density 
of population, nature of blast and the weather 
conditions but in a densely populated Indian 
megacity, it could well be in thousands. All this 
would be happening in the full glare of media, 
making the situation even more untenable for 
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the authorities. This is a scenario India’s nuclear 
doctrine does not provide a clear answer to.
The situation is further complicated by the 
precedent set by cross-LoC surgical strikes 
following the terror attack on Uri army camp in 
September 2016. To satisfy popular anger and 
achieve emotional closure for the wider public 
following a nuclear strike, the Indian government 
will be forced to respond. The nature of response 
would be a political call but a nuclear strike gives 
India full authority to retaliate using a nuclear 
weapon, which the international community 
will have to accept. It would then have to be a 
massive Indian first strike to prevent any further 
escalation by Pakistan. If Pakistan does not want 
India to respond with a nuclear strike, it will have 
to make huge public concessions on terrorists to 
New Delhi. Even then, depending on the political 
climate and the state of bilateral relations, India 
may have to unleash a demonstrable military 
response. 
There is little that India can do to prevent 
this scenario from developing except using 
international diplomatic pressure to stop Pakistan 
from developing TNWs, and force it to act on 
terror groups which are aligned with the Pakistani 
army and the ISI. Moreover, Pakistan should 
double-check the security of its fissile material, and 
take forward a process of strict vetting its one-star 
and above military ranks for jihadi proclivities. If 
US authorities covertly monitor the development 
and movement of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, 
New Delhi should try and be a part of such a 
monitoring mechanism without making it public. 
Finally, notwithstanding the state of bilateral 
relations, India and Pakistan must keep lines of 
communication between its top political, military 
and diplomatic leadership at all times to prevent 
any miscommunication and misleading step from 
either side. It will not be easy but the fallout can 
then be contained to a great degree, if not fully 
prevented.
Scenario 2: Evacuating 
Indian diaspora if Saudi 
Arabia collapses
The Indian diaspora population in West Asia is 
currently estimated at 7.3 million, out of which 
three million alone are in Saudi Arabia.5 The largest 
evacuation done by India was in 1991, when 
more than 0.17 million people were evacuated 
by Air India in 67 days.6 Even though India has 
undertaken many other diaspora evacuations 
since, they have all been much smaller in nature. 
Mass evacuations of this nature from a foreign 
land present several challenges and risks which 
vary from political, diplomatic, military to media 
and perception management. The situation is 
further complicated because such situations arise 
in a conflict scenario where a humanitarian crisis 
in simultaneously unfolding.
Saudi Arabia remains ostensibly politically stable 
at the moment with the ruling house of Saud at 
its helm in Riyadh. There are however underlying 
problems which can cause upheaval in the oil-
rich country any time. The sectarian divide in the 
country between the Sunni majority and the Shia 
minority, plus within various Sunni tribes, remains 
a major cause of concern. It is also threatened by 
extremist Islamist forces which remain opposed to 
the house of Saud, and have been responsible for 
many terror incidents in the country. Saudi Arabia 
remains a close American ally but its constant 
tussle with the Shia republic of Iran or the Jewish 
state of Israel can trigger major instability in the 
kingdom. The region has also seen a demand for 
democracy in recent years, and those protests 
could erupt against the monarchy too. These 
could be triggered by the state of economy, which 
is dependent only on crude oil prices. It needs a 
barrel of oil to be in the range of $80 to balance 
its budgets, and if the price of crude oil remains 
low for a sustained period of time, even a minor 
incident could bring about a major change. 
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An analysis of available naval and air assets shows 
that the total current evacuation capacity of the 
government in a single trip is 67,458 persons.7 
This number is woefully inadequate in case of a 
rapid mass evacuation. A better understanding of 
the evacuation capacity comes from the concept of 
‘Figure of Merit’, which is defined as the number 
of people that can be transported across a certain 
distance in kilometres. It is derived by multiplying 
the carrying capacity of each asset with its maximum 
operating range in a single trip. The total sea lift 
capacity (Figure of Merit) per day is 30,993,600 
persons-km and the total air lift capacity (Figure 
of Merit) per day is 556,171,176 persons-km, if 
all the military and civilian aviation and sea-based 
assets of the government are included.8 
With Riyadh being 2,780 km from Mumbai, 
the desired evacuation capacity for three million-
strong Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia comes 
to 8,340,000,000 persons-km. If 100 per cent 
of the 556,169,376 persons-km Figure of Merit 
are available, the evacuation from Riyadh can be 
completed in 15 days. If a more realistic estimate 
of only 30 per cent of the resources being made 
available is done, the evacuation from Riyadh will 
take 50 days.9 The Indian diaspora works in the 
kingdom largely in the unskilled and the semi-
skilled sector; and is spread all over the country. 
This assumes that the Indian missions in Saudi 
Arabia will be able to bring the Indian diaspora 
from various locations in the kingdom to Riyadh 
as air and naval assets are made available by New 
Delhi. 
These assumptions—of 50 days taken for 
evacuation from Riyadh with the airport being 
functional there and the Indian diaspora being 
moved easily from across the country—are only 
valid if the crisis does not alter the governance 
structure of the kingdom. In the case of a 
scenario where the kingdom is overthrown by 
either Islamists, a democratic protest or due to 
an external conflict, the situation would be more 
desperate for New Delhi. having set a precedent 
of rescuing Indians in trouble from the region 
over the last 26 years, the Indian government will 
still have to move quickly to evacuate the Indian 
diaspora from Saudi Arabia.
If the Riyadh airport is unavailable, India will have 
work out alternate plans to move the populace to 
neighbouring countries, provided a safe route is 
available. India must have access to operational 
sea and air bases for uninterrupted operations 
in neutral countries, wherever there is a major 
concentration of the Indian diaspora.
Alternatively, India will have secure the ports and 
use only its naval assets to evacuate the Indian 
citizens. This can be done with the help of the 
local forces or along with one of the foreign forces, 
which may have secured the naval bases for the 
evacuation of its own nationals. If no foreign force 
is available, India will have to send its force to secure 
the naval base and the airport as well as create a 
secure enclave for the Indian diaspora for those 50 
days. Although this activity can be undertaken by 
the Navy’s Marine Commandos as the vanguard, 
it needs logistics support, scenario planning and 
rehearsals to be successfully executed at a short 
notice. The Indian Air Force and the Army will 
also have to be involved to provide support and 
additional resources for the enormous task. Besides 
the military component, New Delhi will have 
to put its diplomatic energies to ensure that the 
evacuation of the Indian diaspora takes place in an 
unfamiliar and non-conducive environment.
Scenario 3: China 
strangulates India 
In 2005, American consulting firm Booz Allen 
hamilton came up with the ‘String of Pearls’ 
theory. The theory, which has been debated 
vigorously, argued that China will try to expand 
its naval presence by building civilian maritime 
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infrastructure along the Indian Ocean periphery. 
It has been partly discredited as Chinese efforts to 
control the South China Sea have left most Asian 
countries wary of Beijing, which has been further 
supplanted by the American pivot towards Asia. 
The global focus, however, has not been directed at 
India and its neighbourhood—a clear and present 
danger for India.
The Indian Ocean is a nerve centre as half of the 
world’s container traffic and one-third of its bulk 
cargo plies through that route. More than 80 
percent of the world’s sea-borne oil transit—over 
one lakh ships annually—takes place in the Indian 
Ocean with the Strait of Malacca in the East 
accounting for 40 per cent of it. For the planners 
in New Delhi, there is strategic importance in 
controlling the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. 
But the scenario goes beyond the sea lanes of the 
Indian Ocean, as it involves encircling the Indian 
landmass by creating various pressure points in the 
neighbourhood and restraining New Delhi from 
assuming its natural leadership role in the region.
Some of the elements of this strategy are already 
in place. Pakistan remains a staunch military ally 
of Beijing; and the gwadar Port, developed by 
China, has the potential to become a full-fledged 
regional hub and a transshipment port in future. 
Beijing provided the majority share of funding for 
the $1.2 billion construction, which is connected 
to the Karakoram highway, linking the Arabian 
Sea to Western China through the China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor.10 This has the potential to 
not only develop into a sea-based threat but also a 
strategic military challenge for India.
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the recently added Colombo 
International South Container Terminal was built 
with the collaboration of China Merchant holdings 
Company. The same Chinese company is set to 
take over an 80 percent share of the hambantota 
deep sea port in exchange for taking over $1.1 
billion of Sri Lanka’s debt to China.11 As part of 
similar proceedings, an as yet unnamed Chinese 
company will also take over the debt-riddled, 
revenue-draining Mattala International Airport in 
Southern Sri Lanka in an attempt to turn it around 
financially. Sri Lanka had offered China debt-for-
equity swaps that included the hambantota port 
and Mattala airport, but these were rejected on 
the grounds that China preferred to enact such 
deals via commercial entities rather than through 
government-to-government exchanges. however, 
there seems to be a change in thinking in Beijing, 
which has the potential to convert Sri Lanka into 
a full-fledged Chinese enclave at a very strategic 
position in India’s neighbourhood.
China has also financed a container shipping 
facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, which has 
a potential military role for the Chinese. Even 
though the current Bangladesh government insists 
that the port is of an entirely commercial nature 
and is off limits to military vessels, the situation 
could change rapidly with a change in government 
in Dhaka. Reports about Chinese presence in 
Maldives and Myanmar have also been seen from 
time to time. While no concrete developments 
have been announced here, China could move 
on rather quickly to build a military base in these 
two countries. New Delhi should also be equally 
concerned about a Chinese military presence in 
Nepal, sometime in the future.
The worst-case scenario, in such a case, would mean 
Chinese military bases—or civilian facilities which 
could easily double up as military bases—in Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and 
Pakistan. That would encircle India dramatically, 
constraining Delhi’s strategic freedom in its own 
neighbourhood and putting it under pressure in 
bilateral negotiations. Imagine China making a 
grab for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—
something Indonesia had threatened to do in 1965 
after having laid a claim for them. The military 
situation did not materialise then but India was 
concerned enough to approach US even then.12
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The answer to such a scenario is similar even 
now. Indian response has to be premised on 
preventing such a scenario from developing, even 
if it doesn’t have the economic muscle to match 
those of Beijing. But by using deft diplomacy, and 
exploiting historical and cultural connections with 
the countries in the neighbourhood, India can 
still achieve a lot. Further, New Delhi will have 
to be more open to the idea of allying with other 
countries in the region which are concerned about 
China’s hegemonic designs. Even under the current 
Bharatiya Janata Party government, there has been 
political resistance to the idea of doing joint sea 
combat patrols with the US Navy in the Indian 
Ocean. That resistance may have to be overcome 
if the Chinese ambitions in India’s neighbourhood 
have to be thwarted. Finally, there is no alternative 
to building India’s military strength to create the 
correct balance of power, which will provide both 
an incentive to prospective allies and a deterrence 
to China. 
Conclusion
These scenarios are neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive in nature. But they provide a window 
into the diverse and unlikely nature of military 
challenges that could be thrown up in future. As 
India’s influence increases and it starts playing 
a greater global role, the complexity of such 
challenges will increase manifold. The military 
and the government cannot afford to be surprised 
by these challenges. They must learn to anticipate 
what is likely but appears unfamiliar. “The failure 
to anticipate effectively,” as Schelling warned, can 
often lead to a catastrophic disaster.13
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Fifteen years from now, in 2030, what changes will India have made to its nuclear doctrine and posture? Fifteen years is a 
long period of time, and it is difficult to know 
what India’s strategic landscape will look like at 
the end of it. Nonetheless, it is possible to make 
some reasonable assumptions about India’s future 
strategic environment and to explore possible 
implications for Indian nuclear policy.
Today, China and Pakistan are the main sources of 
India’s strategic challenges. Pakistan continues to 
support a proxy war against India, using Islamist 
militants to attack targets in Indian Kashmir and 
India mainland. In doing so, it hopes to attrite 
Indian resources and remake territorial boundaries, 
wresting Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control. 
China has been enjoying rapid economic growth, 
and assembling a military that is increasingly able 
to assert coercive pressure against states in the 
Indian Ocean/Asia Pacific region. Enduring Sino-
Indian border disputes make these problems even 
more worrisome for India. Both sets of problems 
are longstanding; they have been at the forefront 
of Indian security concerns for well over the past 
15 years, and it seems safe to assume that they will 
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remain there in 2030.
Even as they have endured, these challenges have 
also changed in important ways, and they will 
continue to do so. India will have to adjust to the 
new realities that they pose. Below, I discuss these 
changes and possible Indian nuclear responses. I 
argue that, given Pakistan’s move to full-spectrum 
deterrence, including battlefield nuclear weapons; 
and China’s combination of increasing military 
power, authoritarian preferences, and coercive 
behaviour, India in 2030 may wish to consider 
changes to its nuclear posture, including the 
development of more flexible nuclear capabilities to 
ensure that it has options across a broader spectrum 
of the escalation ladder; and reconsideration of its 
commitment to no-nuclear-first use. It will also 
have to consider the tradeoffs involved in pursuing 
a robust sea-based deterrent and missile defences. 
In both cases, despite the attractions of robust 
capabilities, strong arguments exist in favour 
of more limited approaches, and they will be 
deserving of serious consideration. The purpose of 
this discussion is not to offer policy prescriptions. 
Rather, I suggest possible directions in which 
Indian nuclear posture could move in coming 
years, and explore some of the costs and benefits 
of various approaches, as India seeks to generate 
security for itself in an increasingly challenging 
strategic environment.
Pakistan
The main challenge on the Pakistan front will 
be its move towards full-spectrum nuclear 
deterrence, which includes, most importantly, 
battlefield nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis have 
found that nuclear weapons provide an excellent 
complement to their longstanding strategy of 
using Islamist militants to challenge India’s 
control of Kashmir, enabling them to behave 
more boldly than they otherwise could, knowing 
that any Indian retaliation would necessarily 
be limited. This approach, however, is premised 
on Pakistan’s threat to use nuclear weapons first 
in the event of a large-scale Indian conventional 
attack. And this threat may lack credibility. For, by 
using nuclear weapons first and inviting an Indian 
nuclear response, the Pakistanis are threatening 
to turn danger into catastrophe. Would the 
Pakistan really do this? If their nuclear weapons 
are successfully to deter an Indian conventional 
attack, the Indians will have to believe that the 
answer is yes. The need to ensure credibility of 
this threat has become especially acute as Indian 
economic growth has outpaced Pakistan’s, India 
has undertaken major conventional military 
improvements, and the United States and India 
have become close strategic partners.2
In order to address this problem, Pakistani is devising 
a tactical nuclear capability. It will employ short-
range, low-yield weapons integrated with troops 
close to the Indo-Pakistan border, with launch 
authority probably pre-delegated to officers in the 
field at some point during a crisis. This promises 
to make Pakistani first-use threats more credible 
in two ways. First, battlefield nuclear weapons 
are relatively small and will be employed against 
military targets; they will not require Pakistan to 
launch large-scale attacks against Indian cities. 
The choice to escalate a conventional conflict to 
the nuclear level may thus be less momentous, 
and therefore easier for Pakistan to make, than it 
was before. Second, during a crisis, the decision 
to employ battlefield weapons may not be fully in 
the hands of Pakistani national leaders. Rather, the 
decision may be delegated to a field commander 
embroiled in a conventional fight, who could 
prove more willingness to choose escalation than 
senior leadership making decisions in relative 
calm, far from the front lines.3 Of course, even as 
they potentially enhance credibility, such measures 
also create significant concerns regarding physical 
custody of the weapons as well as the integrity of 
command and control.4
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Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear capability is still 
emerging. Pakistan first test-fired its short-range 
Nasr missile only in 2011. Although Nasr appears 
to have entered service after further testing in 2012 
and 2013, it is not certain if Pakistan has been able 
to miniaturise warheads sufficiently to use with the 
missile.5 Fifteen years from now, however, Pakistan’s 
battlefield nuclear capacity is likely to be far more 
sophisticated. This may pose a problem for Indian 
nuclear doctrine, which threatens only large-scale 
strikes, designed to inflict overwhelming costs on 
the enemy.6 This could leave India with no means 
of responding proportionately to limited nuclear 
use. Thus, India may find itself in much the same 
quandary as US was under the massive-retaliation 
doctrine during the 1950s, lacking a credible way 
of responding to, and potentially deterring, low-
level provocations.7
India could adopt an approach to this problem 
similar to US efforts to address it during the Cold 
War—building flexibility into its potential nuclear 
responses. Specifically, India can make clear that 
it reserves the right to respond to nuclear attack 
proportionately, from low levels to the highest 
rungs of the escalation ladder. Doing so may require 
India to acquire smaller weapons and shorter 
range delivery platforms.8 But India should be 
able to do so without the custody and command-
and-control problems generally associated with 
forward deployment and pre-delegation of launch 
authority. The reason is that India would not need 
to use these smaller nuclear weapons first to deter a 
Pakistani conventional attack. Rather, it would use 
the weapons only in response to low-level nuclear 
use by Pakistan. Thus, in Pakistan’s case, India 
may be able to create flexible options that enhance 
deterrence without falling prey to some of tactical 
nuclear weapons’ more pernicious effects.
China
Although China has long been a subject of Indian 
concern, its ability to exert coercive leverage over 
India and the region is increasing. At root, China’s 
coercive power comes from its economy. Rapid 
economic growth, averaging just under 10 percent 
per year since 1978, has facilitated major Chinese 
conventional military improvements, particularly 
in the areas of cruise and ballistic missiles; 
command and control; intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance; and cyber networking, all of 
which will enhance China’s conventional precision-
strike capabilities.9 It has also enabled China to 
modernise its nuclear force, including continued 
growth of its warhead arsenal; development 
of road-mobile missiles armed with multiple 
independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs); 
and buildup of its sea-based deterrent.10
It is difficult to know how the Chinese economy 
will perform in the coming decade and a half since 
it has slowed significantly in recent years, declining 
from just over 14 percent in 2007 to approximately 
6.9 percent in 2015.11 India has enjoyed impressive 
performance since undertaking market reforms 
in the early 1990s, and has averaged growth just 
below 7.5 percent per year over the past decade. 
Nonetheless, India’s economy will remain far 
smaller than China’s in the coming decades, with 
India’s gDP reaching approximately $6.6 trillion 
by 2030 and China’s topping $22 trillion. Japan, 
the only other Asian country predicted to rank in 
the top 10 world economies, is expected to produce 
about $6.4 trillion in 2030.12 Thus Chinese power 
is likely to continue to grow relative to India and 
the larger Asian region in the years ahead. how 
will China conduct itself?
The answer to this question is not entirely clear. 
China appears to be moving in an increasingly 
authoritarian direction, with President Xi Jinping 
recently receiving the title of “core leader,” which 
will enable to him to exert even stronger control 
over the country in the years ahead.13 Such domestic 
political arrangements do not, of course, translate 
directly to particular foreign policy behaviour. They 
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do, however, suggest that Chinese preferences may 
be more coercive than deliberative. This concern is 
compounded by numerous examples of aggressive 
Chinese strategic behaviour, including territorial 
reclamation projects, refusal to submit territorial 
disputes to international arbitration, establishment 
of an air defence identification zone in the East 
China Sea, and repeated and protracted incursions 
across the Line of Actual Control separating India 
from Chinese-controlled territory.14 In addition, 
China has been strengthening its relationship with 
Pakistan, helping it to develop the gwadar Port 
in Baluchistan as part of the $46 billion China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will link 
China’s Xinjiang Province with Pakistan and the 
Arabian Sea.15
These developments will ensure a robust nuclear-
weapons capability, which will become especially 
important to India in the years ahead. Nuclear 
weapons will provide assurance that even if China 
amasses a significant preponderance of power at 
the conventional level, it will be limited in its 
ability to coerce or otherwise harm India. This 
can help India not only to defend itself against 
outright military aggression, but also to resist 
pressure to conform to Chinese economic, legal, 
and territorial preferences.16
Will India’s current nuclear doctrine be helpful 
in its efforts to withstand Chinese conventional 
military pressure and achieve these goals? India 
has pledged not to employ nuclear weapons first 
against an adversary; it will do so only in response 
to a nuclear or chemical/biological weapons attack 
on its homeland or forces deployed abroad.17 Such 
a no-first-use (NFU) policy is well suited to a 
conventionally stronger party that can deter, and 
if necessary defeat, its adversary without resort 
to nuclear weapons. It may, however, be less 
well suited to a conventionally weaker party that 
might need nuclear weapons to blunt a stronger 
opponent’s conventional attack.18 If a weaker state 
credibly promised not to use nuclear weapons 
first, it could undermine its ability to deter 
conventional aggression by its stronger adversary; 
the adversary could engage and defeat the weaker 
state at the conventional level, believing that it was 
unlikely to face nuclear retaliation. If the weaker 
state’s nuclear capacity is to deter conventional 
aggression, there must be a real risk that it will 
use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. India is in a 
strong conventional position relative to Pakistan, 
and thus an NFU posture makes sense in this 
context. India is in a weak conventional position, 
relative to China, however. India may therefore 
wish to revisit its current posture, perhaps 
adopting a more ambiguous declaratory policy 
that, while not embracing first use, would sow 
more doubt in the mind of a potential adversary 
than its current, clear NFU stance. Calls to rethink 
no-first-use already animate debates within Indian 
strategic circles.19 They are likely to become even 
more common as Chinese capabilities grow in the 
coming years.
In its efforts to deter China, India may also seek 
more flexible nuclear options, including choices at 
the lower levels of the escalation ladder. India faces 
potential challenges from China on two fronts: 
along its northern borders in Aksai Chin, Sikkim 
and Arunachal Pradesh where longstanding 
territorial disputes continue to fester; and in the 
maritime domain as China extends its reach from 
the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and 
into the Middle East and Africa. One approach 
to managing this two-front problem could be for 
India to attempt to freeze the status quo in one area 
and focus attention on the other. Nuclear weapons 
might assist the Indians in doing this, protecting the 
northern borders where the strategic environment 
is relatively static, and seeking simply to maintain 
current boundaries. This could help to enable 
India to devote resources to the maritime domain, 
which is more dynamic, and will require a diverse 
mix of military capabilities to meet emergent 
challenges. Smaller, battlefield-type weapons could 
be preferable for the northern-border mission, 
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enabling India to block mountain passes and 
repulse attackers without using disproportionate 
force—though forward deployment and the 
associated pre-delegation issues would create 
custody and command-and-control concerns 
similar to those mentioned regarding Pakistan.20 
Indian leaders would need carefully to weigh these 
risks against nuclear weapons’ defensive benefits 
when considering this type of approach to the 
border problem.
Sea-based nuclear weapons will be another 
potentially attractive option for India as it attempts 
to generate deterrence against China. With the 
recent induction into the Indian Navy of the 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS 
Arihant, and the testing of the K-4 sea-launched 
ballistic missile, India has taken significant 
steps towards developing a sea-based deterrent 
capability.21 Nonetheless, the programme remains 
at a relatively early stage, and it is not yet clear 
how far it will develop, or how much India will 
come to rely on the sea-based leg of its nuclear 
capability.
On its face, a sea-based deterrent has much to 
recommend it. hidden beneath the oceans from 
first-strike dangers that threaten ground and air-
launched nuclear weapons, it can significantly 
enhance the survivability of a state’s retaliatory 
force.22 A sea-based deterrent can also have 
downsides, however. Sea-based weapons are 
technically complicated, expensive, and pose 
significant command-and-control challenges. 
Their ability to launch nuclear strikes from close 
abroad, with little warning time, also can be 
destabilising.23 A cheaper, less complicated, and 
potentially less destabilising approach could be 
to expand India’s arsenal of land-based missiles, 
enhancing survivability through sheer number 
of weapons. India’s submarine force could then 
focus on tasks such as intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance; blockades; and SLOC interdiction. 
Despite a sea-based deterrent’s obvious attractions, 
India will need to carefully consider these tradeoffs 
as it decides how far to pursue the development of 
sea-based nuclear capabilities.
Finally, in the years ahead, India may seek to 
defend itself from nuclear attack by expanding 
its missile defence capabilities. India already has 
undertaken significant efforts in this direction, 
including development of indigenous area-defence 
capabilities, and the acquisition of ready-made 
systems from countries such as Russia and Israel. 
The temptation to seek to develop a more robust 
shield will be strong. Missile defences are intuitively 
appealing, and policymakers naturally wish to do 
everything possible to shield their countries against 
nuclear attack. It is politically difficult to explain 
to constituents why they would potentially forego 
any protective capabilities that such systems could 
afford them. And missile defence might provide 
some real protection against small nuclear attacks 
resulting from accidents or unauthorised use.24
Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind problems 
that pursuit of a robust missile defence capability 
could entail. First, technology is complicated and 
expensive to develop. Second, adversaries can adjust 
to missile defence with relative ease; it is technically 
far simpler to overwhelm a missile defence system 
with additional warheads or decoys than it is to 
make the system marginally more effective.25 
Finally, missile defence could be destabilising. 
A state possessing robust missile defence could 
launch a counterforce attack on an adversary, 
and use its BMD to absorb the remainder of the 
adversary’s second-strike capability. This possibility 
can encourage arms racing, and nuclear-first use 
in a crisis. Pursuit of a robust missile defence 
capability thus could undermine India’s strategic 
position rather than improve it, consuming scarce 
resources and increasing competition with states 
such as China. As a compromise, India could 
consider maintaining a modest missile defence 
capability, designed to absorb small strikes 
resulting from accidental or unauthorised launch, 
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rather than seeking to develop a robust missile 
defence capable of real damage limitation in the 
event of a large-scale nuclear exchange.26 This 
could enable India to capitalise on the strengths 
of missile defence while avoiding the cost and 
stability problems that it can entail.
Despite the difficulties inherent in any attempt 
to predict the future, it is safe to assume that, as 
they develop nuclear policy over the next 15 years, 
Indian leaders will have to grapple with the issues 
raised in this paper. In discussing these issues, I 
have not sought to make policy prescriptions. 
My purpose, rather, has been to suggest some 
directions in which Indian leaders might decide 
to go, and explore tradeoffs that they may have 
to consider, given some of the basic principles 
of nuclear deterrence, as well as the unique 
characteristics of India’s strategic environment. 
Whatever Indian leaders ultimately decide, the 
serious consideration of alternatives such as these 
may stimulate debate that can, in the end, help 
lead towards better nuclear policy decisions.
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Statistically, we live in one of the most peaceful 
periods in human history. Despite the seeming 
frequency of conflicts worldwide, the number of 
wars and the resultant loss of human life is at an all-
time low.1 Statistics, however, can be misleading. 
While the number of wars (defined as an armed 
conflict between two States) has decreased, the 
number of skirmishes between State and non-state 
actors is higher than ever before. The 21st century 
has also witnessed a shift from the traditional 
theatres of conflict of land, air and sea, to newer 
domains like cyber. Cyber conflicts are different 
from traditional conflicts in two important ways. 
First, cyber-attacks often only require dual-use 
civilian technology, making the proliferation 
of dangerous tools harder to control. Second, 
cyber exploitation occurs across borders by both 
State and non-state actors, making attribution of 
the attack to a particular entity one of the most 
complex legal challenges.
The other significant difficulty lies in the ubiquity 
of information and communication technologies 
and the scale of damage that vulnerable systems 
pose. Following the technology boom of the late 
20th and early 21st century, information systems 
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have become an integral part of governance and 
delivery of services. Unlike traditional warfare, in 
cyberspace, the distinction between military vs. 
civilian targets is not as readily applicable. The 
most frequent targets of cyber attacks are therefore 
government services and companies that are 
enabled by the Internet. Any strategy to combat 
cyberspace threats must then be significantly 
divergent from traditional strategic thinking. It 
must be resilient to combat the dynamic nature 
of threats. It must be flexible to account for rapid 
advances in technology. Finally, it must be cohesive 
to encourage greater cooperation between the 
government, the military and the private sector 
to help secure systems that are critical to all three 
stakeholders.
To address this imperative, India’s defence 
establishment needs to integrate cyber defence as 
well as offence in its day-to-day operations. The 
defence sector’s involvement in cyber operations 
can increase overall security of India’s cyber systems 
and incentivise innovation in the domestic cyber 
technologies.
This paper is an attempt to identify the threats to 
information systems that are most likely to arise in 
near future. It will also suggest policy prescriptions 
for developing human as well as technological 
capacity to deal with these threats.
Threats 
To say that the Internet is ubiquitous would be 
an understatement. We live in a connected world 
where our machines—from kitchen appliances to 
defence systems—are constantly communicating 
with each other. They are reliant on a framework 
of interdependent networks managed at many 
different levels by the government and the 
private sector. While all information is important 
to protect, some information exchanged over 
the Internet requires more protection than 
others. When networks carry information that 
is necessary to ensure economic security of the 
country or social stability, they are designated as 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). Due 
to their importance to a country’s economy as a 
whole, CII is also the most frequent target of cyber 
attacks, and will continue to be so in future cyber 
conflicts.2 The threat that vulnerable CII poses 
to a country’s economy is best illustrated by the 
attacks on Estonia in 2007 and georgia in 2008. 
In both cases, cyber attacks that were allegedly 
State-sponsored caused massive disruptions in 
the countries’ networks, causing the collapse of 
essential services for weeks. The Estonian attack 
that lasted nearly a month brought down the 
country’s top media outlets, banking services and 
telecommunication companies. 
At the time, Estonia was the most wired country 
in Europe, with many essential services reliant on 
the Internet. Today, many other countries share 
the same reliance on the Internet for day-to-day 
governance. Indian CII, too, has been subjected to 
cyber attacks in the past. In 2014, computers in the 
Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO) were hacked allegedly causing the leak 
of sensitive strategic information. More recently, 
nearly 3.2 million credit and debit cards issued by 
nine Indian banks were allegedly compromised in 
a cyber attack that targeted ATM machine systems. 
In all of these cases, the breaches were detected 
after significant damage had been done because 
the country lacks an effective institutionalised 
system for threat assessment and vulnerability 
detection. 
Post-demonetisation of nearly 86 percent of 
India’s currency, the stakes have only risen, with 
a substantial percentage of the population having 
been forced to migrate to digital payments 
services. The Indian Internet user has also come 
to rely on the Internet for delivery of government 
services. however, amid this transition to a digital 
economy, no significant steps to protect Indian 
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networks appear to have been taken. Significant 
breaches in the recent past such as the alleged 
Russian hacking of the servers of the Democratic 
National Committee and the ‘Legion’ hacks of 
prominent Indian political and media figures’ 
Twitter accounts tell us that cyber attacks can even 
hijack democratic processes and conversations. 
These attacks represent a threat to the foundational 
aspects of a democratic nation and should therefore 
be treated with the same amount of gravity as other 
traditional forms of attacks. While no solution can 
be arrived at overnight, there are many steps that 
both policymakers and defence organisations can 
take to improve the state of cyber defence in India. 
First and foremost, among these steps, must be an 
exercise to build domestic capacity—both human 
and technological.
Safeguards
Human capacity
Cyber security in India is largely considered a 
matter of necessity—something that must be done 
to protect our networks against outside intrusion. 
however, in order to be able to compete with 
the most technologically advanced nations in 
the world, Indian leaders will need to realign this 
narrative. Cyber security is not just a necessity, it is 
an opportunity to create best-in-class intellectual 
and technological capital. however, to achieve 
this goal, it is not enough to merely train more 
professionals, it is equally important to lend 
cyber operations the administrative and financial 
support that it requires.
Cyber Security Professionals as a First Line 
of Defence
Due to the unique nature of cyberspace threats, 
it is critical for a country like India to develop 
a specialised workforce to safeguard these 
systems. The National Cyber Security Policy 
of 2013 recognises the need for training and 
skill development of 500,000 cyber security 
professionals by 2018 to protect India’s IT 
systems. In reality, however, the number of 
cyber security specialists for civilian as well as 
military defence in India is abysmal. Countries 
that have advanced their cyber war-fighting 
capabilities have done it on the back of tightly 
coordinated programmes that built expertise to 
not only understand and address threats but also 
build both offensive and defensive technology 
domestically. Israel’s Talpiot programme, for 
instance, was developed in the late 1970s after the 
nation’s leaders realised the importance of creating 
technologically-adept soldiers to command its 
future forces and reduce the country’s dependence 
on foreign technology.3
The programme has produced personnel who have 
not only gone on to command important units of 
the Israeli Defence Forces but also develop some 
of Israel’s most sophisticated military technologies 
like the Iron Dome and David’s Sling. Perhaps, 
a testament to the effectiveness of the Talpiot 
programme is the fact that its graduates have also 
gone on to create some of Israel’s most successful 
technology start-ups after completing their 
military service.
The Indian Army’s Military College of 
Telecommunications Engineering, similarly, 
has been a steady source of human capital for 
the military’s cyber operations. The college 
follows a dynamic curriculum that is reportedly 
updated frequently according to the Army’s 
needs. however, the specialists graduating 
from these programmes will be tasked with not 
only protecting India’s military networks but 
also civilian systems. They would therefore be 
better served by working closely with the private 
sector. 
92
Defence Primer 2017 
Cyber Command for Inter-Agency 
Cooperation
A critical difference between India’s approach to 
cyber security and those of more ‘cyber-ready’ 
countries like the United States (US) is an 
acknowledgement of the military applications 
of cyberspace in policy. India’s National Security 
Policy recognises the need to create a secure 
cyberspace; and has identified eight key agencies 
to fulfil this mandate. All of these agencies are 
however civilian bodies. The US Department of 
Defence, on the other hand, has promulgated 
a cyber strategy that lists supporting military 
operations with cyber operations as one of its 
stated goals. US has also institutionalised its 
cyber command that coordinates cyber operations 
between the army, air force and marines. China, 
too, has established its cyber command, which 
is housed under the Third Department of the 
general Staff; and reportedly employs 130,000 
personnel. 
Cyber commands offer institutional and inter-
agency coordination for developing responses 
to cyber threats. At present, India’s forces treat 
cyber defence with varying levels of priority. The 
Indian Army, has the most extensive cyber agenda 
among the three forces. The Corps of Signals is the 
lead agency that is tasked with developing cyber 
command and control software as well as training 
cyber security personnel. The Air Force and Navy 
both have agencies dedicated to information 
technology, however, these function with a view 
towards enhancing military communication 
technologies and not network warfare. Although, 
the Air Force Network demonstrated some 
capability for network warfare, this too is limited 
in its applicability for the 21st century threat 
scenario.4 India needs to create a cyber command 
that can serve as the nodal agency for coordinating 
cyber defence activities and developing policy on 
that front.5 In time, the command can also take 
charge for developing programmes for active cyber 
deterrence. In addition to increasing coordination 
and data sharing across agencies, the command 
can serve as a focal point for intelligence analysis 
and threat mitigation.
Technological capacity
Technology is its own antidote. No amount of 
administrative modernisation will secure India’s 
digital future if it is unaccompanied by necessary 
technological safeguards. going forward, 
Indian military will need to acquire, as well as 
indigenously develop, state-of-the-art technology. 
This acquisition process must be multi-pronged. 
First and foremost, it must be defensive, 
focussing on securing Indian networks against 
intrusion and malicious exploitation. Second, 
it must be offensive, acquiring systems that are 
able to infiltrate networks and gather real-time 
intelligence to protect India’s strategic interests. 
Third, the acquisition must also prepare the armed 
forces for the inevitable congruence of cyber and 
kinetic weaponry in future conflicts.
Cyber Ranges for Testing Network 
Integrity 
This paper has earlier discussed the interdependent 
nature of information networks in today’s world 
and the military imperative of protecting civilian 
networks. The process of protecting networks, 
however, is complex and not foolproof. A 
significant challenge in information security 
is identifying and correcting vulnerable points 
in one’s network that are susceptible to attack. 
Penetration testing of both civilian as well as 
military networks therefore must necessarily be a 
priority for the Indian government. One way to 
institutionalise the penetration testing process is 
by establishing a cyber range in India.
Cyber ranges are information facilities that serve 
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as test beds for network vulnerability. These 
ranges can simulate the public Internet as well 
as other specialised networks. In a secure and 
compartmentalised environment, these facilities 
allow controlled testing of the resilience of 
networks against cyber attacks. This not only 
helps identify loopholes in networks that are 
vulnerable but also help assess the damage caused 
to networks and their potential fallout in case of 
a large-scale breach. A private sector company 
launched India’s first commercially available cyber 
range in 20166 and it has been reported that Cisco 
plans to establish another such facility in the near 
future.7 It is however imperative that the Indian 
government invest in the creation of a dedicated, 
state-of-the-art facility to test the resilience of 
military networks. 
Zero Day Vulnerabilities for Offence and 
Intelligence Gathering
Vulnerabilities in computer networks make cyber 
attacks an imminent threat for India’s national 
security and economy. At the same time, the 
vulnerabilities that exist in software represent 
an opportunity for India to further its strategic 
goals. World over, governments as well as software 
companies are engaging hackers to identify coding 
flaws in software that can provide unfettered access 
to computer systems. These flaws, called zero 
day vulnerabilities, have fuelled an underground 
market that sells these to the highest bidder. 
Once obtained, these vulnerabilities can be kept 
dormant until the need or opportunity to use 
them arises or until they are discovered. Zero 
days—named for the fact that once discovered, 
the developer and the exploiter have zero days to 
either fix it or exploit it as the case may be—have 
gained prominence in light of the Stuxnet worm 
that was developed by the US and Israel to target 
Iran’s nuclear power plants.
US is currently considered the market leader in 
zero days with an annual budget of $25.1 million 
dedicated to the acquisition of these vulnerabilities. 
Its success however is attributable to more than 
the spending. US is one of the few countries in 
the world with an institutionalised system for 
the acquisition and handling of zero days. The 
Vulnerability Equities Process (VEP) was begun 
in 2010 to ensure that US intelligence agencies 
disclose a vulnerability to the developer once 
the it has been utilised.8 The VEP also prescribes 
procedure for disseminating information about a 
discovered vulnerability to associated agencies in 
intelligence, law enforcement and the department 
of energy to assess whether they have any utility for 
the vulnerability. Although the process is far from 
perfect, it is a significant step towards assessing 
what risk a vulnerability poses to a country’s 
cyber systems, and ways in which it can serve the 
national interest. 
For India to actively tackle cyber security threats 
of 2030, it is imperative that the country develops 
its own offensive capabilities. That perception that 
‘cyber defence’ is a misnomer is a familiar refrain 
in the field of cyber security. Indian policymakers 
and, in particular, its military would be well served 
to internalise this notion. Lack of technological 
capacity and insufficient coordination between the 
various arms of the Indian defence establishment 
have been a long-standing problem for country’s 
defence posture. A formalised process for 
acquisition of zero day vulnerabilities and well-
coordinated policy for cooperation among various 
intelligence agencies in their utilisation may just 
be the determining factor in whether or not India 
emerges as a cyber power in the future.
Autonomous Technology for Command 
and Control
As a country in a hostile neighbourhood, India’s 
moves towards cyber defence modernisation will 
also need to take into account future conflicts of 
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which information warfare is likely to be an integral 
part. Even if these conflicts are primarily fought 
with kinetic weapons, they will likely use cyber 
and autonomous technologies for deployment. 
DARPA, for instance, has developed the Persistent 
Close Air Support (PCAS), which allows better 
coordination between ground agents and combat 
air crews to reduce the time taken for calling in 
an airstrike by nearly a factor of 10.9 The german 
army too has deployed the NBS Mantis for 
forward base protection. The Mantis, consisting of 
six 35 mm guns, is capable of detecting, tracking 
and shooting down fast-moving projectiles. These 
advances have only been made possible due to 
years of investment in research and development 
of autonomous technologies. In India, the research 
in this area has been severely lacking.
India’s first level of engagement with autonomous 
technologies was as at an informal meeting of 
experts on the subject held under the aegis of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). 
At the meeting, India’s permanent representative 
to the Conference on Disarmament called upon 
nations to ensure that the technology gap between 
States is not widened by the proliferation of 
autonomous weapons. his statement indicates that 
India is willing to sit on the sidelines until such 
a time that clear international norms are created 
around the use and deployment of autonomous 
weapons. Unfortunately, this is an unsustainable 
policy in the long run. Autonomous weapons 
that are currently under development are likely to 
be deployed soon for no other reason than that 
they will significantly reduce the time taken in an 
attack-kill chain. They are also likely to cut down 
the number of human casualties by reducing the 
number of troops on the ground and through 
more precise targeting. Even as norms around their 
use are being debated, Indian policymakers would 
be prudent to fuel research and development in 
the area. The most cost effective way to do this 
would be to leverage the power of India’s booming 
technology sector and incentivise research into 
military applications of artificial intelligence.
Conclusion
India’s deficit in cyber capability is a direct 
consequence of the inadequate prioritisation of 
cyber security in domestic policy. India’s recent 
relaxation of two-factor authentication for small 
value transactions is one such move that is 
emblematic of a larger disregard for cyber security 
even as its cyber systems are constantly threatened 
by both State and non-state actors.10 On a positive 
note however, India is, now more than ever, in 
a position to help address these inequities. India 
was a member of the UN group of governmental 
Experts in 2016, a body created to assess 
developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international 
security. India was also represented at the meeting 
of experts under the CCW; and will later this year, 
host the 5th global Conference on Cyberspace 
(gCCS), the largest gathering of its kind with over 
100 countries participating. The gCCS presents 
a unique opportunity to build partnerships and 
help set the agenda for information security in 
the coming years. These developments are also a 
recognition of India’s emergence as the next big 
cyber power. Indian policymakers would be well 
advised to help leverage this position to bolster 
the nation’s cyber defence and not squander these 
opportunities.
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Outer space exploration has turned into a key part of a modern society’s functionality with several services 
including weather, communication, Internet, 
banking and navigation, supported by satellites 
orbiting the Earth. India being one of the major 
actors in outer space has in many ways led the 
usage of satellites for the benefit of the society. 
With the space infrastructure of India powering 
the economy, is there a case for exploring the 
defence of these vital systems? Moreover, given 
that the geopolitics and security scenarios are 
changing with respect to the utilisation of outer 
space, should India explore its capabilities and 
capacities built in the country for the past 50 
years for dedicated space defence operations? The 
present work provides insights on the key question 
as to are we or are we not at a tipping point where 
the government needs to draw a vision in securing 
national interests via creation of a Defence Space 
Agency as an interim arrangement until a full-
fledged Aerospace Command is in place. If so, 
what are its technological, organisational and 
policy facets?  
The case for India’s utilisation of outer space has 
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traditionally been to “harness space technology 
for national development, while pursuing space 
science research and planetary exploration”.1 
Today, the global space economy is a key part 
of modern society infrastructure, providing 
connectivity, insights of the Earth from space 
and navigational support. In terms of financials, 
the space economy grew by 9 percent in 2014, 
reaching a total of $330 billion worldwide, with 
commercial space activities making up 76 percent 
of the global space economy with a growth of 9.7 
percent (2014).2 
India, very much a part of the global space 
economy, has matured to be one of the key actors 
in outer space; and is one of those that reap benefits 
of infrastructure in space with the Indian Space 
Research Organisation (ISRO) operating one of 
the biggest fleets of satellites (remote sensing, 
satellite communications and navigation) in the 
world. Today, India’s space programme is valued 
at more than $2.3 billion in assets already in orbit; 
this figure rises to around $37 billion ground-
based infrastructure and value-added services 
are included.3 These satellites have facilitated 
governance, harnessing the advantages of space 
for its citizens.  
however, given the changes in the international 
and regional security and geopolitics of outer 
space over the past two decades, one might argue 
that India needs to consider utilising its space 
capacities for securing its regional and territorial 
interests and the safety of its space infrastructure. 
Some steps in this regard have already been taken 
in an incremental style. 
The first such concrete step was taken in 2010 
with the creation of an Integrated Space Cell 
(ISC) under the Integrated Defence Services (IDS) 
headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. The 
ISC has had a coordinating role between armed 
forces as well as with the Department of Space 
and Ministry of Defence for greater integration 
of space technology and assets into military 
operations.4 Following such developments, for 
the first time, ISRO built and launched dedicated 
military communications satellites, gSAT-7 
(2013) for the Navy and gSAT-6 (2015) for armed 
forces.5 Further, the Technology Perspective and 
Capability Roadmap (TPCR) of the IDS details 
several space-based capabilities envisioned for 
India’s expanding space-based security needs.6 
With this dedicated infrastructure in outer space, 
experts within space security have signalled 
the threat to these assets due to our reliance on 
them.7
From technological, organisational and political 
perspectives, India needs to take a stand in active 
utilisation of outer space for meeting its security 
interests and affirming its position among the 
global space community in providing a transparent 
regime to utilise outer space for national security. 
Therefore, given the evident movement in 
utilisation of space systems for space-based security 
interests, formation of a dedicated defence space 
establishment in India seems a logical step in 
taking charge of these advances.  
Facets of a Defence Space 
Establishment
Following recent turn of events, there has been 
a movement towards opening up India’s space 
security by a possible creation of a Defence Space 
Agency (DSA) as an interim arrangement until 
a full-fledged dedicated Aerospace Command is 
in place.8 This seems a case for the expansion of 
ISC for a more active role in utilisation of outer 
space within the armed forces. The case for a 
defence space establishment is not just of adding 
a final frontier edge to warfare or adding theatre 
capability via space assets to the armed forces. It 
is about developing a multi-dimensional approach 
to using outer space for strategic purposes.  
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establish minimum technology umbrella: While 
creation of a DARPA-like agency in India may be 
thought off as a moon-shot, there is tremendous 
scope to establish certain minimum technology 
capacity umbrella that is at par with that of 
advanced militaries and spacefaring nations. This 
minimum technology umbrella will not only feed 
into the current requirements but also act as a 
catalyst to spin-off advanced requirement concepts 
for the future.
space security doctrine: Declaring a space 
security doctrine that encompasses the military 
space utilities as well as spelling out the conditions 
under which India will consider the offensive 
and defensive use of space should be a priority. 
The doctrine should also factor in India’s internal 
security challenges, including surveillance of the 
vast coastlines, porous border areas and other 
insurgency-related issues.  
capacity building in the industry: With the 
recent opening up of markets with a much 
more conducive environment via foreign direct 
investment, there are institutional challenges 
within the system that need to be addressed. 
While the private sector is now trying to move 
ahead with investments, there are still a lot of 
challenges in building up capacity in the private 
sector for it to deliver turnkey-level solutions for 
large/complex systems. One of the big challenges, 
however, is to strike a balance between the public 
and the private sector so that they co-exist without 
any conflict of interest.
Long-term roadmap & foundation for next 
generation systems: While the TPCR provides 
some sense of what space-based capabilities are 
of interest in the realm of defence and security, 
there is a need to develop a dedicated long-term 
roadmap for space security in India. One can draw 
inspiration from ISRO in developing such decade-
long roadmaps and meeting technical challenges 
systematically in an effort to meet long-term goals. 
There is a need to develop mechanisms for the 
promotion of home-grown innovation in defence 
space systems (both in public and private sector) 
that will enable India to leapfrog in technologyand 
to build next generation systemsthat provide an 
edge in Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR).
Technological Capacity 
Interests
With the seed sown for space exploration right 
from the first satellite flown in 1957—being 
driven via defence interests—time and again, space 
capabilities have proven to bring an additional 
dimension to traditional defence capabilities that 
can support C4ISR. 
Figure 1 reflects minimum baseline technological 
capacities that need to be established to have 
an effective foundation in integration of space 
capabilities into the various military functions. 
Completing such an array of technological 
capacity requirements shall have a multitude 
of effects on speed, accuracy & precision of 
information collection, strategic planning & 
decision making, integration of technology to 
gain battleground superiority across the different 
forces and platforms. Each of these identified 
technological capacity has been detailed further to 
provide insights into their operational use from a 
strategic user perspective. 
Space Weather 
With growing number of space assets, one of the 
major fields of growing importance to monitor the 
health and safety of all systems in space and their 
allied equipment on the ground is tracking space 
weather. This has emerged as a part and parcel of 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA), with a broad 
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scope of monitoring and predicting near-Earth 
space environment that can degrade and disrupt 
the performance of technological systems due to 
adverse conditions caused by activities such as 
solar storm.
Space weather has gained such prominence 
that several spacefaring nations have developed 
preparedness strategies for space weather exigencies. 
For example, the Unither Kingdom has a National 
Space Security Policy (NSSP) whose objectives 
include resilience to the risk of disruption to space 
services and capabilities; and has developed a 
Space Weather Preparedness Strategy.9
There are several mapped impacts of space weather 
situational awareness on the ability to use space 
assets for missions which include communication 
and navigation, among others. From a space 
command and control perspective, these include 
decreased operational payload utility, decreased 
ability to control satellites, and loss of satellite 
tracking. From an ISR perspective, it would mean 
inaccurate position data or loss/degradation of 
intelligence due to radio frequency interference, 
range uncertainty, loss of target discrimination, 
spectral distortions, degraded system performance, 
reduction in resolution of SAR images due to solar 
flares, and ionospheric storms. From a SatCom 
and long-range communications perspective, these 
would be inability to exercise C2, inability to send 
evacuation with life of small teams at risk. From 
a positioning, navigation and timing perspective, 
these include loss of navigation and manoeuvring 
accuracy for precision-guided munition,  and 
decreased ability to synchronise ops with precision 
timing.10 given these risks at large from space 
weather, there is a need to expand the scope of 
understanding the scientific phenomenon of space 
weather to turn around the knowledge of these 
effects (spacecraft charging and ground effects) 
to design inputs and operational strategies for 
critical systems,11 especially communications and 
positioning. 
EO Small Satellites & Responsive 
Launch Vehicle
One of the major areas of low Earth orbit (LEO) 
exploitation in the recent times is in building 
low-cost small satellite (<150 kg) constellations 
Figure 1. technological capacity interests of defence space agency
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for fast revisit periods. This trend, unlike 
other space technology trends, has been led by 
commercial start-ups. Militaries across the globe 
are taking note of this trend, since this provides an 
unprecedented access to space data to users. There 
is tremendous potential to exploit miniaturisation 
of electronics and Commercial Off The Shelf 
(COTS) components to build small satellite 
platforms that can provide sub-meter resolution 
imagery at less than USD 5 million (about INR 
35 crores, excluding launch). These platforms in 
constellation can act as complimentary systems to 
larger satellites such as CARTOSAT, which can be 
of similar resolution but can provide bigger swath. 
however, once launched in a constellation of six 
to 12 satellites on a single plane, small satellites 
can even compensate for the swath. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of a small satellites 
constellation in orbit. While having very high 
resolution satellites such as CartoSat 2C in orbit 
shall provide capabilities of mapping up to 0.65 
m resolution on the ground, these satellites 
are expensive and can only be launched one at 
a time, and they provide a revisit of about four 
days. Therefore, there is a strong case to deploy a 
constellation of small satellites that can support <1 
m resolution on <150 kg platforms as gap fillers 
to this larger satellite capability. Any intelligence 
picked up by this network can be further enhanced 
by using the higher resolution capability on the 
CARTOSAT series. 
Moreover, these networks of small satellites can 
also be launched on demand with retrofitting on 
Figure 2. small satellites in constellation
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Agni-5 with mobile launching capabilities. This 
has the potential to be developed as a responsive 
launch capability programme where a network 
of six to eight satellites can be launched on one 
rocket through a single plane to provide excellent 
coverage in swath. As far as coverage is concerned, 
a CARTOSAT provides coverage of about 10 
km swath in a single satellite. however, having a 
network of these satellites on a single plane with 
an adjusted phase angle difference can provide a 
combined swath of 60-80 km, which has immense 
potential for exploitation in image intelligence. 
One has to also note the possible exploration of 
such a constellation in two or multiple orbits (one 
in polar sun synchronous and other in a slightly 
inclined orbit) to exploit security interests around 
the borders. 
ASAT Capabilities
Following the Chinese ASAT missile test destroying 
an unused weather satellite in January 2007,12 
there has been a debate on India’s ability to develop 
and demonstrate ASAT capabilities, which can act 
as a deterrent against such adversaries in the final 
frontier. India recognises such tests as a threat to 
all space assets as well as being against the spirit 
of non-weaponisation & peaceful usage of outer 
space.13 
While most of the ASAT tests have been performed 
in LEO, there is speculation of China performing 
long-range ASAT tests that could threaten 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and geostationary 
Earth Orbit (gEO) satellites.14 From a 21st century 
strategic perspective one can argue that in advanced 
threat scenarios, assets in LEO—which typically 
are into Earth Observation (EO) and remote 
sensing missions—are more dispensable against 
assets providing navigational and communications 
capabilities from MEO and gEO.  Removing the 
navigation and communications capability from 
space can have a crippling effect for large-scale 
military operations. 
From an Indian perspective, it is quite clear from 
several official statements at UN forums, such 
as the Conference on Disarmament in geneva, 
that it is against weaponisation of outer space.15 
however, India’s stand on conducting ASAT 
tests is unclear. There are concerns that if it does 
not demonstrate such a capability, it will be left 
behind facing a repeat of what happened in the 
nuclear domain.16
While India does have the fundamental building 
blocks for a kinetic-kill full-fledged ASAT weapon 
based on Agni and the ballistic missile interceptor, 
showcasing this capability has to be done in a 
responsible manner without creating huge amount 
of long-lasting debris that could damage existing 
satellites.17 A possible template to showcase 
technological capabilities may lie in following a 
strategic engagement of a low-flying asset that may 
not sustain any in-orbit debris but will completely 
be destroyed in entry and upper atmosphere. US 
performed such a mission as recently as 2008, 
launching a single Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and 
destroying a 5,000-pound satellite with nearly 
100 percent of the debris safely burned-up during 
re-entry within 48 hours and the remainder safely 
re-entering within the next few days.18 One has to 
note that India does not have any space asset at 
such a low altitude; and if such a capability has to 
be demonstrated, one of the dying satellites will 
have to be lowered to perform such a test. 
While the policymakers may choose to make 
concrete decisions on such matters reactively, 
technologically the focus should be on having 
long-range tracking capabilities, on-ground 
development of technological building blocks to 
increasing reach to MEO & gEO, and systems of 
denial of service. Long-term technology focus can 
definitely pursue the potential of exploiting non-
kinetic kill options by exploring cyber or focussed 
high-energy techniques. 
102
Defence Primer 2017 
Signal Intelligence 
The need for satellite-based signal intelligence due 
to limitations of ground-based equipment (owing 
to radio horizon as well as such an equipment 
being compromised in advanced threat scenarios 
due to attack) is real. The field of satellite-based 
Signal Intelligence (SIgINT) encompasses 
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) 
with a focus on interception and decryption of 
military and strategic communications, Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT) with a focus on developing 
technology for radio signals interception and 
decryption. The scope of SIgINT has also 
expanded towards capturing of telemetry signals 
with a special focus on missiles.19 
At present, India has extremely limited space-based 
COMINT capabilities with two gEO satellites 
supporting strategic communications with the 
multi-band communication satellite gSAT-7and 
gSAT-6.20 
however, China not only has full-fledged secure 
satellite communications networks, but also has 
expanded its satellite capabilities and may very well 
be equipped to use its network of LEO and gEO 
satellites to accurately track and target naval assets 
in near-real-time as part of its satellite-aided Anti-
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM). Similarly, from an 
air-defence perspective, ELINT capabilities may 
be used to precisely locate air defence systems, 
making such systems vulnerable.21 The Yoagan 
constellation launched by the Chinese is said 
to have capabilities of providing 16 targeting 
opportunities with less than 10-km location 
uncertainty for ballistic missile launch.22 
given the modernisation of armed forces and the 
increased air and maritime interests, India should at 
least establish a minimum ISR capabilities starting 
with three dedicated satellites and expanding to 
six with wide band receivers to be able to monitor 
activities in the Indian Ocean and South China 
Sea. Use of an array of space-based sensors, along 
with other sensors using common standards 
and communication protocols for transmitting 
information automatically through machine-to-
machine interfaces, are important. These become 
useful in the context of missile targeting as well 
as establishing data links in a multiple platform/
command & control scenario.  
GIS Cross Platform Integration
geographic Information System (gIS) is a 
powerful tool to combine various spatial, spectral 
and other sources of data to generate key insights 
for security stakeholders. With the ever-increasing 
computational power alongside the increase 
in the number of sensors available, utilisation 
and integration of gIS into specific scenarios 
and actual traditional battlefield systems (such 
as UAVs, tanks, submarines, aircraft, etc.) will 
provide an edge over adversaries. 
Post 9/11, US floated a dedicated National 
geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NgA) in 
2003 to provide geospatial intelligence putting 
policymakers, military, intelligence professionals 
and first responders at a decisive advantage.23 
This dedicated agency claims to have helped 
track down al Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin 
and shared insights with the special operations 
team that successfully stormed his compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan.24 
Tracking and visualisation of insurgent attacks 
based on their use of the geography, terrain, 
population density, and infrastructure with 
different mathematical models can be used to 
combat guerrilla warfare.25 This has tremendous 
scope for exploration from an internal security 
perspective for India. 
Dedicated tools in gIS have been explored for 
coastal security by combining several data sources 
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such as high-resolution images, Lidar, conduct 
of fleet/vehicle mobility analysis, continuous 
sea–land Digital Elevation Model (DEM) and 
geo-visualisation of changing shorelines with 
tidal levels in an effort to build a Littoral Warfare 
Database that enables commanders to take feasible 
and realistic decisions.26
With the exponential dispersion of sensors (both 
in space, on ground and below) and emergence 
of technologies such as IoT/M2M, fusing all such 
data alongside gIS information will hold the key 
to taking intelligent decisions. There is no doubt 
that cross-platform integration of gIS technology 
as well as on-ground decision intelligence support 
system are the very basic needs of an effective 
network-centric warfare strategy.
Navigational Capabilities 
India has completed the Indian Regional 
Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) constellation 
for providing accurate position information to 
users in India as well as the region extending up to 
1500 km from its boundary.27 This constellation 
can be used to aid in navigation for missions on 
land, in sea and in air; and can very well serve 
as an invaluable component of network-centric 
warfare. 
While India is undertaking modernisation of its 
defence equipment, the integration of indigenous 
navigation systems at the user segment of these 
equipment will definitely be an important step 
towards self-reliance in defence technology. 
Typical examples of such uses shall be in the 
ballistic missile programmes such as Agni, and 
cruise missile programme such as BrahMos.28 
The indigenous navigational capabilities have a 
wide array of other uses also, of course, outside 
of strategic areas—from most mundane such 
as location devices for infantry to smart bombs, 
covert surveillance and armoured warfare.  
Space Situational Awareness
Satellites form an important part of network-
centric warfare and therefore are prone to a broad 
range of natural disasters and intentional attacks, 
including cyber-attacks, space weather, space 
debris, collisions with other satellites and ASAT 
attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to have a military 
space situational awareness capabilities to not only 
track objects in space but also map the capabilities 
of various space systems and their implications for 
national security. 
India right now has limited capabilities in the field 
of space situational awareness, with major asset for 
tracking objects such as space debris being carried 
out by ISRO’s Multi-Object Tracking Radar 
(MOTR).29 While tracking is a major portion of 
space situational awareness, ground-based radar 
tracking may provide real-time collision analysis, 
given the cataloguing of the location and orbital 
information about all space objects. however, from 
a military dimension, there is a need to develop 
space-based systems that can help determine the 
capabilities of various space systems in-orbit and 
the intentions of its owner. 
Internationally,there have been recommendations 
made to develop radar-independent tracking 
methods such as lasers, coherent infrared sensors 
as well as developing space systems with a sole 
purpose of tracking the functional capabilities 
of suspected satellites that may serve the military 
functions.30 
A dedicated space situational awareness initiative 
within the defence space agency can serve for 
gathering space-based network-centric intelligence 
capabilities of adversaries and shall help map out 
evolving ground-based counter-capabilities.
104
Defence Primer 2017 
Communications Capabilities 
The current satellite communications platforms 
for defence operations are served by gSAT-7 for 
Navy31 and gSAT-6 for the armed forces.32
One of the significant areas to explore COMINT 
from a defence space perspective is its ability to 
exploit gEO platforms for data relay services 
for UAVs or other airborne platforms. Such 
airborne platforms can send their observation to 
a data relay satellite in gEO via an optical link. 
Subsequently, the satellite-based data relay services 
via high-speed laser communication can be used 
to replace expensive network of ground stations 
needed to constantly receive LEO satellite data.
Moreover, there is also scope to explore inter-
satellite links between gEO satellites that can be 
used to share resources and/or route traffic around 
a satellite network. In order to effectively exploit 
space, India also needs to focus on having orbital 
slots available in gEO, which shall be critical to 
have the necessary authorisation by International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to place 
satellites over the Indian-subcontinent. 
Logic for A Space Security 
Doctrine
India’s space programme has grown enormously 
over the past decade but without a broad strategic 
plan because India has lacked an overall strategic 
doctrine that lays out its long-term goals and 
objectives. As India’s power and influence rises, 
there has to be greater clarity on what it wants to 
achieve as a nation in its overall security as well 
as within each of the important security domains 
such as nuclear and outer space.
India has many external security challenges, from 
cross-border terrorism and internal insurgencies 
to unresolved border and territorial issues, all of 
which call for a huge defence-space requirement. 
Repeated terrorist attacks in India, including on 
sensitive military installations, point to the need 
to better integration of space technology for 
military functions such as reconnaissance, and 
safe and secure communication channels, which 
put a premium on India’s space capabilities. While 
space utilisation has picked up in the backdrop 
of these challenges, these are still being done in a 
haphazard manner. 
India must also outline its red lines in space, 
that is, under what circumstances offensive use 
of space will be sanctioned. These must be laid 
down in clear terms to bring about clarity within 
the Indian establishment but also clarity in the 
minds of the adversary as to what is considered 
permissible behaviour and what might provoke 
a military response (intentional jamming and 
blinding, destruction, interference). This should 
include, for instance, a code of conduct and 
standard operating procedures for any threat to 
Indian space assets to avoid ambiguities.  
The doctrine must also spell out how space assets 
will be put to use to deal with the internal security 
of India. The internal security challenges are very 
vast and these include surveillance of the cross-
border areas, monitoring of the vast coastlines 
and water spaces, and monitoring naxal-affected 
areas. The cyber-outer space interface is another 
set of challenges that need to be factored within 
the doctrine.  The growing linkages between cyber 
and outer space domains present India with new 
challenges, and India should develop a set of 
considered options that would protect against its 
vulnerabilities in space.  
Space Security Strategies 
and Policy
having established itself as a major space power, 
what India lacks is an overarching strategy that 
guides its space programme. In the absence of such 
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a strategy, India’s space programme and ISRO’s 
attempts to cater to the wide-ranging demands 
have represented more of a piecemeal approach. 
India has to factor in the growing requirements of 
the space assets in social, economic and security 
arenas. A space security strategy will synchronise 
these growing requirements, taking into account 
India’s total capacity, including political and 
economic capital.  National space security strategy 
should also include the command and control 
structures to implement and respond to situations 
identified in the doctrine such as offensive uses of 
space and maintaining space deterrence.
Audit of Technology 
Integration and 
Performance 
Even as ISRO has done a splendid job with India’s 
space programme, there has to be better accounting 
and auditing of the technological developments 
and, more importantly, technology integration 
and performance. Providing constant insights on 
the performance of the programmes, the direction 
of the organisation, insights from an international 
technology and geopolitical perspective through 
a parliamentary oversight group or government-
funded defence think tanks—such as the Institute 
for Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), Centre 
for Air Power Studies (CAPS)—can be done via a 
dedicated Task Force created within the DSA for 
this purpose.
Conclusion
While there are significant opportunities to 
integrate satellite-based technologies into the 
defence realm, there is a need to carefully plan this 
technology integration. given that DRDO does 
not focus its efforts on development of satellite 
platforms, there is tremendous opportunity for 
Indian industry to invest into such platforms. 
Moreover, the defence space agency can act as 
an observer and regulator, which will constantly 
assess the needs of the armed forces and executes 
those needs via the industry. This provides a win-
win situation for both the armed services and the 
local industry. This also ensures that there is scope 
for long-term capacity building in the country 
that can foster export of turnkey solutions for 
satellite-based products and services from India. 
Further, this will serve as a method of fruition 
of the tremendous efforts put forth by ISRO to 
develop a local industry ecosystem over the past 
40 years. 
Additionally, wherever there are gaps in state-of-
the-art technologies, there is tremendous scope 
to explore closing such gaps with models such as 
international JVs under initiatives such as ‘Make 
in India’. 
From an organisational coordination perspective, 
there is a need to setup a clear protocol for 
coordination of defence space use between already 
established institutions—such as Defence Image 
Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC), Aviation 
Research Centre (ARC), National Technical 
Research Organisation (NTRO), Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defence Satellite 
Control Centre (DSSC), and Research and 
Analysis Wing (R&AW). The critical aspect of the 
utilisation of the space dimension for intelligence 
gathering by these institutions can further elevate 
the quality of inputs to both investigative bodies 
as well as policymakers for internal and external 
security.
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